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Before Exit:
Three Essays on Business Exit in Politically and Economically Adverse Environments

Abstract
This dissertation re-conceptualizes the exit phenomenon in management research by focusing on
what precedes exit in times of political and economic turbulence, when firms and entrepreneurs
are forced to contemplate unwanted exit as they face multiple threats in their home country. The
three essays of this thesis collectively highlight the inadequacy of theories that conceptualize exit
as a sudden and complete cessation of activity by showing that exit is an adaptive process that
unfolds over time, and across parts of given entities.
The first essay contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial exit by exploring how entrepreneurs
proactively respond to political and economic turmoil at home that threatens the continuation of
their ventures. Relying on the accounts of 27 entrepreneurs, the study inductively reveals two

adaptation mechanisms—temporal and partial—that revise the entrepreneur-venture relationship
in the aftermath of traumatic events.
The second essay adopts a longitudinal and comparative case analysis of 12 firms to explore how
adversity at home influences firms’ internationalization paths. The study shows how firms
sequentially replace resources, values, and opportunities no longer available in their home
market with alternatives that they seek and find in foreign contexts. The essay contributes to the
literatures on institutional arbitrage and relocation by revealing how firms identify
complementary institutional contexts in international markets, and progressively transition to
greener pastures.
The third essay is a systematic review of the exit literatures in strategy, international business,
and entrepreneurship. The review develops a framework to organize 90 articles that have been
systematically coded, and outlines relevant decisions, actions, and processes that may precede
i

exit. The analysis highlights the partiality and temporality of exit as focal dimensions for future
research and theorizing on exit in various management disciplines.

Keywords
Exit, political and economic adversity, entrepreneur, entrepreneurial exit, institutional arbitrage,
internationalization, home context, relocation, Middle East.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Turbulence ripples around our world (Oh & Oetzel, 2017), from political conflicts in the Middle
East (e.g., civil wars in Syria and Yemen) to economic shocks and crises in Europe (e.g.,
“Brexit” and the economic crisis in Greece). The more one’s operating context gets shaken or
shattered by front-page events, the more relevant questions regarding business closure and/or
collapse become (Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013). As danger increases (Hiatt &
Sine, 2014), even the best businesses are at risk of underperforming, and many are forced to
contemplate premature exit (Aldrich, 2015; Elfenbein & Knott, 2015).
This dissertation complements and extends prior theories of exit as an event and/or process by
theorizing and exploring how founders of firms buffeted by repeated shocks persist and resist in
the face of multiple setbacks (Coelho & McClure, 2005; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983) and/or
opportunities (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). Combining a systematic, multi-disciplinary review of
the exit literature with longitudinal and comparative qualitative analysis of 30 cases spanning a
12-year period field research, I develop insights about the ways businesses handle recurrent
adversity at home when forced exit is impending.
I preface the summary of the three essays with an overview of the central concepts anchoring the
research (turbulence and exit), and clarify how the current work builds on—as well as departs
from—prior definitions. After outlining each of the three essays, I briefly explain how they are
interconnected.

1.1 Turbulence
The Global Risks Report (2017) of the World Economic Forum shows a rise in political
disruptions during 2016; the number of political conflicts worldwide rose from 363 in 2010 to
402 in 2016 (HIIK, 2010, 2016). Interstate conflicts and state collapse or crisis made the top five
“Global Risks” in the last two years (2015 and 2016). Political turmoil is compounded by the
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growing incidence of economic shocks and/or the persistence of economic downturns (Bradley,
Aldrich, Shepherd, & Wilkund, 2011; Marino, Lohrke, Hill, Weaver, & Tambunan, 2008).
There have been several recent calls for management research that addresses contexts of unrest
and political and economic instability to study the impact of disasters, crises, risks, and threats
(George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016), but our understanding of how firms
manage during these periods remains limited (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). For many of the affected
firms, turbulence is a constant struggle as they try to delay or prevent the binary outcome (i.e.,
survive or perish), allowing us to discern new recipes for facing, and sometimes escaping,
ominous circumstances (Oh & Oetzel, 2011).
Take, for instance, Mahmoud Meme, one of only a few business owners still operating in
Aleppo, Syria. Although he has had to close four of his stores, he is keeping the last one open as
an act of defiance; he does not want to abandon his business, or his city, but might have to
eventually (The view from Aleppo, 2016). Another Syrian entrepreneur says he is determined to
keep his two factories open, one producing cleaning products for Germany’s Henkel, and the
other producing lube oil under a licensing agreement with France’s Total. He is hoping peace
talks will bring the conflict to an end soon (Abu-Nasr, 2014). His colleague operating a
packaging materials plant already closed his business in Syria and relocated to Turkey (AbuNasr, 2014). Similar anecdotal evidence reveals the stay-or-go dilemmas for businesses in
Greece (Two groups mulling exit from Greece, 2015). Moreover, some British firms, such as
Magal Engineering, are taking a similar “wait and see” approach, as the economic uncertainty
surrounding the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (i.e., “Brexit”) may
change their fate (Castle, 2017). Across many contexts and kinds of turbulence, these business
founders share a common concern about whether, and for how long, they can go on.

1.2 Exit
Studying firms that exist in turbulent conditions highlights the inadequacy of theories that
conceptualize exit as a sudden and complete cessation of activity in a specific domain (e.g.,
technology, market, industry, or geographic region) (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Decker &
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Mellewigt, 2007). It also increases the relevance of processual theories of exit that take a more
progressive view of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the business (DeTienne,
2010). Table 1.1 summarizes the conceptualization of exit as event or as process. The
management literature has moved beyond listing the many factors that can trigger a binary
outcome (e.g., Cumming, 2008) to more precisely understand the time to exit (Elfenbein &
Knott, 2015) or the forms of/paths to exit (e.g., Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon,
2010).
For business owners like Mahmoud Meme, the eventual outcome (i.e., whether they make it or
not) is less important than what they can or should do in the here and now to keep going. This
thesis relies on around a decade of first-hand experiences of 32 entrepreneurs1 (half of whom
dealt with partial closure of their businesses, and one-third of whom were eventually forced to
exit completely). Iterative analysis of the combined 378 “founder-years” reveals new and
pragmatic ways to deal with cumulative adversity. Taken together, these inductive insights
answer the call for more scholarship on how exit unfolds (Aldrich, 2015; Wennberg &
DeTienne, 2014; Wennberg et al., 2010), and how it is implemented (Moschieri, 2011). The
qualitative findings also complement the current attention to what happens after exit (Shepherd,
Williams, & Patzelt, 2015) by unpacking the many decisions and actions that take place before
exit (Burgelman, 1994; 1996). Leveraging qualitative insights on the temporality and partiality of
exit that our data reveals, the third essay takes an abductive approach to reclassify the literature
on exit across three different disciplines: strategy, international business, and entrepreneurship.
Although there is no consensus within or across fields of research about what exit is and how it
should be defined (Mellahi & Wilkison, 2004; Ucbasaran et al., 2013), this systematic analysis of
90 prior studies draws attention to the importance of further specifying the what of exit (i.e., the
parts of a given entity that are being discontinued) and the when (i.e., the timing of terminating

1

The data of the dissertation includes 32 entrepreneurs but 30 cases of firms, as two of the cases include
two entrepreneurs as partners.
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the parts). The conclusion section works across the three studies to broaden future research
agendas

on

turbulence,

exit,

and

the

growing

overlap

between

the

two.
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Table 1.1 Exit: Event or Process?

Exit

Partiality

As Event

As Process

Definition: cessation of involvement in a venture
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013), discontinuation of/withdrawal
from operations (Chung et al., 2013; Gimeno et al., 1997)
Counterfactual
Not to exit = to persist (DeTienne et al., 2008)
Operationalization
Survival analysis - Event methodology - Binary variable

Definition: the process by which the founders of privately held firms
leave the firm they created (DeTienne, 2010)
Counterfactual
Not to exit = to resist
Operationalization
Who/how initiates (Collewaert, 2012) and/or completes exit (Moschieri,

Which portions of existing business units (Vidal &
Mitchell, 2015) are no longer necessary?

Temporality

When to exit? (Time to exit) (Elfenbein et al., 2017)

-

2011; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014)?
How are specific portions being disconnected and/or reconnected?
Interpreting and/or compensating for what is lost/kept.
What happens after exit (Rouse, 2016; Ucbasaran et al., 2013)
What happens before exit: forces driving exit (Burgelman, 1994; 1996)
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1.3 Working Definition of Exit
I entered the field agnostic to scholarly definitions. I was interested instead in how individual
business owners thought, felt, and spoke about exit. As the qualitative essays underwent multiple
rounds of peer review, I became sensitized to the dichotomy that splits the existing literature—
that is, the dichotomy between exit as event versus exit as process. As I refined the theoretical
and empirical contribution of the two field studies (Essay #1 and Essay #2), I became more
familiar with the disciplinary nuances in how exit has been conceptualized and operationalized in
strategy, international business, and entrepreneurship, respectively. Appendix 1.1 summarizes
some of the definitions and operationalizations.
While the inductive work remains loyal to field-based conceptualizations, the third essay
reconnects the inductive insights with a large body of (largely quantitative) findings, offering a
two-dimensional organization of prior arguments. After completing the dissertation, I refined my
working definition of “exit” to refer to a fracture in the relationship between two entities,
whether between a founder and one’s venture, a corporate firm and one of its business units, or a
multinational enterprise and its foreign subsidiary. This broad definition of exit does not presume
death (non-existence) of either entity, but it does emphasize a significant and unrecoverable
departure from past existence.

1.4 Research Contribution
The unifying theme that frames this three-paper dissertation is re-conceptualizing the exit
phenomenon in management research by focusing on what precedes exit (although it may not
predetermine exit) in times of recurrent distress. The overarching research question and intended
contribution of the three essays taken together is: What does happen before a founder and/or
firm exit a turbulent environment?
In times of tremendous disruption, chaos, and uncertainty, the core relationship between a
founder and its business is at risk. The focus of the dissertation is to understand the period that
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precedes the disconnection, and examine, in detail, the multiple attempts founders make to
safeguard this relationship.

1.5 The Three Essays
1.5.1

Essay #1

Given the growing incidence of natural and manmade disasters, systemic upheavals of nations
and industries, and the forced exit of firms finding themselves in the middle of such conflict and
crises, entrepreneurs are compelled to contemplate unwanted yet sometimes unavoidable exit.
Understanding such forced exits requires us to look beyond what makes one firm fail, and
instead theorize how entrepreneurs grapple with recurring threats. With this motivation in mind,
we ask: How do entrepreneurs respond to emergencies that threaten the continuation of their
ventures?
We examine 27 entrepreneurs who have witnessed a decade of political and economic turbulence
in Lebanon, a country “at the centre of Middle Eastern conflicts” (Lebanon country profile,
2016). This extreme context allows us to study a broader range of causes and complications of
exit.
While quantitative studies paint a bleak picture by focusing on the numbers of entrepreneurs who
exit and fail in the context of political disruption, our qualitative research shows that many
entrepreneurs anticipate and carefully manage the exit process. We develop an inductive account
of how they respond to recurrent turbulence, and find two exit pathways that combine partial and
temporal adaptation mechanisms.
The essay enriches the entrepreneurial exit process (DeTienne, 2010) by revealing a dynamic
relationship between the entrepreneur and his/her venture when emergencies repeatedly fissure
this relationship, affording multiple occasions for repair and recovery on either side.
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1.5.2

Essay #2

Home country contexts are complex and multifaceted environments that both enable and
constrain the actions of firms. When they face growing turbulence at home, firms look to
international markets. In Essay #2, we ask: How does political and economic instability at home
influence the internationalization of emerging market multinational companies?
We develop and compare nine longitudinal cases of corporations that have witnessed a 12-year
window of political and economic turbulence in their home country. Seven of these cases were
included in Essay #1 and further analyzed in Essay #2. We also pursued two additional, de novo
cases, and then added three contrast cases, which were not included in Essay #1.
Adopting a longitudinal comparative theory building approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Santos &
Eisenhardt, 2009), we induce a tripartite process of how distress at home alters the
internationalization paths. We find that firms “manage” the growing threat of an impending exit
by sequentially replacing the resources, values, and opportunities no longer available in their
home market with alternatives they seek (and eventually find) in foreign institutional contexts.
Understanding changes in internationalization as responses to growing turbulence at home
contributes to the body of work on home country contexts (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo
& Wang, 2012). Specifically, we show how firms may reconstruct the relationship with their
home country context to delay—and, in some fortuitous cases, even avoid—collapse.

1.5.3

Essay #3

Essay #3 is a systematic review of the exit literatures in strategy, international business, and
entrepreneurship. We selected and coded 90 articles and catalogued relevant decisions, actions,
and processes that unfold from the contemplation of exit through its execution and
implementation to the finality or irreversibility of exit. We examined the “fuzziness” of exit,
whereby entities may not remain intact as the process unfolds, to underscore the partiality of exit.
We also elaborated on the temporality of exit, differentiating between relevant windows, such as
time to exit, and other ways of temporal organization, such as stages or sequences. By combining
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these two dimensions (i.e., temporality and partiality of exit), Essay #3 offers a 2x2 framework
that reclassifies the extant literature, and discusses new avenues for future research that each
quadrant opens up.

1.6 Overall Contribution and Connection between the Three
Essays
The main contribution of the dissertation is shifting the current understanding of exit in
management research from an end-state event to a partial and temporal process that unfolds
before a firm exits. The partiality dimension underscores that most entities do not perish instantly
but rather, undergo a painstaking—and largely deliberate—dismantling, as some parts are kept
and others discarded. The temporality dimension draws attention to the ongoing work that
founders do to avoid, delay, prevent, or resist exit, shedding light on the varieties of processes
that take place before founders close their business.
The partial and temporal dimensions of exit are evident in the fieldwork. The entrepreneurs we
studied in Essay #1 not only adopted a range of partial adaptation mechanisms but also resorted
to temporal adaptation by slowing down or speeding up the process. The emerging
multinationals analyzed in Essay #2 managed their exit from the home country through a process
of internationalization that was both incremental (i.e., by replacing partial elements they were
losing at home with alternatives they sought and found elsewhere) and sequential (i.e., unfolding
over time).

1.7 Organization of the dissertation
Each of the three essays in this dissertation is an independent paper that is presented with its own
introduction, theory, methods, discussion, contribution, and bibliography. Following these
essays, I wrap up with a conclusion of the dissertation.
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Appendix 1.1 Disciplinary Definitions and Operationalizations of Exit
Discipline
Entrepreneurship

Definitions

Operationalization

Business exit befalls unviable
businesses: whether they be “relatively
unviable” when taking into account the
entrepreneur’s outside options, or
“absolutely unviable” in the economic
sense of being unable to cover costs;
business “death” is an appropriate term
for describing business exit (but
business “failure” is not) (Coad, 2014,
p. 721).

Firms where the principal was still with
the firm were coded as 0. Firms where
the principal was no longer with the
firm were coded as 1 (Brigham et al.,
2007).

Business failure is understood as the
cessation of involvement in a venture
because it has not met a minimum
threshold for economic viability as
stipulated by the entrepreneur
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013, p. 175).

Exit variable can take on five values
each year: (0) continuation, (1) harvest
sale, (2) distress sale, (3) harvest
liquidation, and (4) distress liquidation.
(Wennberg et al., 2010).

Entrepreneurial exit: the process by
which the founders of privately held
firms leave the firm they helped to
create, thereby removing themselves, in
varying degrees, from the primary
ownership and decision-making
structure of the firm (DeTienne, 2010,
p. 203).

Exit, a binary variable, represents the
exit decision of firm n (0 if the firm
continued, 1 if it was discontinued)
(Gimeno et al., 1997).

Decision to persist - Likert scale of the
likelihood of persistence (Definitely
Remain in the Market” vs. “Definitely
Discontinue Operations”) (DeTienne et
al., 2008).
Probability that firm i will survive
during the period t1 to t2 (Hiatt & Sine,
2014).
Qualitative study – exit in the model as
likelihood of shutting down versus
selling (Akther et al., 2016).
Qualitative study - disengagement path
that founders follow when leaving one
organization and starting another
(Rouse, 2016).

Strategy
Divestitures are understood as the
parent company’s disposal and sale of
assets, facilities, product lines,
subsidiaries, divisions, and business
units (Moschieri & Mair, 2008, p. 399).
Business exit is an asset-restructuring
activity involving a diversified firm's
divestiture of one of its businesses
(Decker & Mellewigt, 2007, p. 41)

A dummy variable that takes on the
value of 1 if the focal firm exits at time
t (the exit year), and 0 prior to that date
(Gaba & Terlaak, 2013).
Asset divestment from the industry divested a business unit, the variable
coded 1 (0 otherwise) (Durand &
Vergne, 2015).
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Firm exit was defined as the cessation
of a firm’s operations in the industry.
The indicator variable was set to 1 for
when a firm had exited, and to 0
otherwise (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007).
International
Business

Subsidiary divestment is deﬁned as a
multinational enterprise’s withdrawal
from a subsidiary operation—that is,
the closure or sale of a subsidiary by
the multinational enterprise (Chung et
al., 2013, p. 126).
Foreign divestment is a signiﬁcant
corporate-level decision that involves
the sale of international subsidiaries,
closure of foreign plants, and exit from
foreign markets (Soule et al., 2014, p.
1032).
Broader definition of international
divestment as any reduction of a firm’s
engagement in, or exposure to, crossborder activities (Benito & Welch,
1997; Wan et al., 2015).

Subsidiary divestment (Dxt) served as
an indicator variable, taking a value of
1 if subsidiary x was divested at time t
and 0 otherwise (Chung et al., 2013).
Exit is an indicator variable, Ext, that
takes a value of 1 if subsidiary x exits at
time t, and 0 if it stays (survives) (Dai
et al., 2013).
A time-varying dichotomous measure
for each firm-year, which is coded 1
when a firm divested its holdings in a
given year (and is otherwise coded as 0)
(Soule et al., 2014).
Binary variable denoting whether the
affiliate is divested or not between early
1995 and early 1999 (Belderbos & Zou,
2009).
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Chapter 2

2

Emergency Exit

ABSTRACT
Entrepreneurial exit, defined as the termination of the relationship between a founder and the
venture s/he created, is a common occurrence even in benign and/or munificent environments.
This relationship is particularly fragile, however, under adversity: when calamity strikes and so
disrupts the patterns of living, production, and consumption, that otherwise viable ventures
struggle to survive. We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial exit by developing an
inductive account of how entrepreneurs adapt to emergencies that threaten the continuation of
the individual-venture relationship. We inductively reveal how the individual-venture
relationship is being revised and sometimes revived in the aftermath of traumatic events: a partial
mechanism that fractures and fixes aspects of the venture rendered unfit by adverse events, and a
temporal mechanism that adjusts the horizon of continued individual involvement with
increasingly fragile ventures. We explain a continuum of responses to emergencies, from depersonalization to re-personalization of exit, by drawing attention to two recurrent combinations
of partial and temporal adaptation: lengthening time horizon to enable problem-focused coping,
and emotion-focused coping to enable shortening time horizon.
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2.1 Introduction
Exit is often understood as the last stage of business (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon,
2010), and takes one of three different meanings: (1) death, demise, or disappearance (Coad,
2013); (2) a deliberate decision with either good or bad outcomes (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012;
McGrath, 2006); or (3) the termination of a relationship between an individual and his/her
venture (Byrne & Shepherd, 2013). We adopt DeTienne’s (2010) definition of entrepreneurial
exit as the process through which an entrepreneur leaves a firm that he/she helped to create.
Recent reviews suggest that the pressure to exit prematurely and involuntarily may not
necessarily be terminal, but instead helps to unleash certain kinds of entrepreneurial agency
(Coad, 2013; Williams & Shepherd, 2016). New entities can be birthed from the ashes of dying
organizations (Walsh & Bartunek, 2011). The demise of one venture may spearhead others
(Eggers & Song, 2015), and fragments of knowledge, practices, and processes can find new life
within the failing firm (Cope, 2011) and/or in other organizations (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007).
Moreover, the learning and sense-making mechanisms triggered by the failure can rekindle one’s
pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities (Mueller & Shepherd, 2014; Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd,
Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011).
There have been multiple calls for new theories of exit (Aldrich, 2015; Wennberg & DeTienne,
2014), and a growing interest in pre- (Morgan & Sisak, 2016; Singh, Corner, & Pavlovich, 2015)
and post-exit dynamics (Mantere, Aula, Schildt, & Vaara, 2013; Rouse, 2016). Here, we focus
on the pre-exit dynamics (for a comprehensive review of life after business exit see Ucbasaran,
Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013). We know that most organizations try to avoid, prevent, or at
least delay exit (Bakker & Shepherd, 2017). Postponing exit sometimes can be constructive; it
can help some entrepreneurs to prepare emotionally for the end (Shepherd, Wiklund, & Haynie,
2009) or reflect on lessons learned from the closure of the venture (Shepherd, Patzelt, Williams,
& Warnecke, 2014). Yet at other times, exit may be costly and counterproductive. Entrepreneurs
may overstay, overinvesting in a venture that lacks core competencies or becomes increasingly
misaligned with key market success factors (Wennberg et al., 2010).
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We contribute to the body of work that explores when one leaves a firm that one helped to create
by focusing on the process of entrepreneurial exit within turbulent contexts, where otherwise
striving ventures may perish prematurely, despite entrepreneurs’ best efforts to salvage them.
The incidence of such extreme challenges to business as usual is – unfortunately – increasing:
“this decade is characterized by political instability, economic volatility, and societal upheaval”
(George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016, p. 1880).
While the majority of the literature has examined exit in benign and munificent settings
(DeTienne, McKelvie, & Chandler, 2015; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014), many entrepreneurs
operate in highly unstable environments, where resources are scarce, and political disruptions
may cause previously successful firms to exit against their will (Hiatt & Sine, 2014). In such
“dangerous” environments, risks are hard to predict or mitigate, and sometimes lead to “erratic”
or “irrational” behaviours (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). We
know that when entrepreneurs are pressured to exit, they engage in deliberate efforts to restore
oneself or revive the venture (Shepherd & Williams, 2014) and experience loss and grief
(Shepherd & Cardon, 2009; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011) when they cannot continue.
Facing termination reinforces the beliefs one already holds of oneself as an entrepreneur
(Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). One key way that entrepreneurs cope with involuntary exit is by reentry (Burke & van Stel, 2014). Exit from one firm motivates serial entrepreneurs to enter
existing ventures (Hessels, Grilo, Thurik, & van der Zwan, 2011) or launch a new venture
(Hessels et al., 2011; Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Walsh & Bartunek, 2011). The focus of the extant
literature is on entrepreneurs’ attempts to re-enter after an exit has taken place. For example,
many of those forced to exit by a traumatic event quickly launch new ventures that enable faster
recovery for themselves and the community (Shepherd & Williams, 2014). There is greater
experimentation and latitude in the aftermath of such shocks, with new entrepreneurs or
enterprises emerging to fill some of the needed, and often novel, responsibilities compelled by
adverse events (Campbell, 2010).
We elaborate on recent accounts that suggest entrepreneurs may reinvent themselves in the
aftermath of traumatic events (Shepherd & Williams, 2014), either by launching new types of
organizations (Campbell, 2010) or launching new organizations for radically different reasons
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(Williams & Shepherd, 2016). We develop an inductive account of how entrepreneurs operating
under adversity interpret and respond to events that threaten the continuation of their existing
ventures. Our findings suggest that an impending and involuntary exit may serve as an invitation
for dual adaptation: partial and temporal. By focusing on what happens before exit, we begin to
explain how entrepreneurs may make something positive out of negative circumstances
(Bonanno, 2004; Joseph & Linley, 2008; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004).

2.2 Methods
We conducted a qualitative study of entrepreneurs in Lebanon. According to a July 2014
National Strategy whitepaper (Lebanon’s Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2014), SMEs
accounted for 93 to 95% of all registered businesses, and over 90% of the active enterprises in
the country (for an estimated count of 41,629 ventures employing 841,564 people). The same
report estimates that 82% of Lebanese entrepreneurs are opportunity-driven, and had highgrowth and high-employment potential. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2016) estimated
that 16% of the adult population was engaged in entrepreneurship, accounting for “one of the
highest densities of established business owners, not only in the MENA region, but even
globally” (p. 16) – at 6.9% the U.S. has only half as many. The Ministry of Economy and Trade
had launched a dedicated “Enterprise Team” and an Integrated Small and Medium Enterprise
Support Program (ISSP) initiated in 2005, but the entrepreneurial eco-system was hard hit by
recurrent adversity.

2.2.1

Research Context

We chose Lebanon as the context of our study. As it is “at the centre of Middle Eastern
conflicts” (“Lebanon Country Profile,” 2016), Lebanon is an appropriate setting (Bamberger &
Pratt, 2010) for studying entrepreneurial exit in response to emergencies. We focused on the food
and hospitality industry because prior research suggested it often suffers first and most from
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adverse events, mainly as a result of changes in consumption patterns and life adjustments
following threats or attacks (Spilerman & Stecklov, 2009).
Appendix 2.1 lists the major events between 2005 and 2015, the window of our study. Recurrent
interference from neighbouring countries Israel and Syria (Ezrow & Frantz, 2013), a weak
internal institutional environment (e.g., the country’s parliament failed multiple times to elect a
new president since May 2014), and the proliferation of guerilla units representing different
sectarian groups all contribute to a state of ongoing unrest (Jamali & Mirshak, 2010). Early
shocks (e.g., the 34-day military conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006) had significant
repercussions on Lebanese entrepreneurs (Jamali & Mirhsak, 2010), and were experienced
firsthand by the first author while he worked for a family business in Lebanon between 2004 and
2008. Temporary travel bans to Lebanon from the United Arab Emirates, along with Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, issued after a number of security incidents including
abductions and bombings, exacerbated business disruptions in the chosen setting: food and
hospitality entrepreneurs had “never experienced conditions as tough as the ones they are going
through today,” a November 2014 Al Akhbar article reports and were “slowly dying” starved of
cash and tourists. A few years prior, tourism averaged a direct contribution of 8% and an indirect
contribution of 22% to Lebanon’s GDP. The sector had boosted double digit growth as recently
as 2008 and 2009, but experienced negative growth rates in the three years prior (2011 to 2013).
The disruption peaked once the civil war in Syria spilled over causing over 1.5 million Syrian
refugees to flee to Lebanon (EIU, 2016). We collected retrospective accounts from 2005 to 2012,
and followed entrepreneurs in real-time between 2013 and 2015. We stopped the data collection
in 2015 as the tourism sector begun to rebound, with different sources reporting 2% to 14%
increases in key metrics (Lebanon tourism sector grows, 2016). After “six tough years”, the
Ministry of Tourism reported that in 2016 tourist arrivals hit their highest level since 2011, at
1.69 million tourists; “this is the closest Lebanon has been to the 2.17 million visitors mark
reached back in 2010,” (Tourism Sector in Lebanon, 2017). Tourism continues to rebound since,
reaping benefits from ripples of conflict across the Middle East: “while neighbouring Syria and
Iraq burn, the Lebanese industry is looking — cautiously but optimistically — at the promise of
a new beginning,” the Associated Press broadcasted on July 2, 2017 (Issa, 2017). Headlines on
non-tourism

related

business

opportunities

resumed

in

early

2017,

ranging

from
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counterproductive initiatives like tobacco and organ trading to internationally-backed
investments to rebuild the region.

2.2.2

Theoretical Sample

All of our respondents worked as entrepreneurs in Lebanon’s food and hospitality sector (either
as manufacturers or service providers). To identify the respondents, the first author contacted the
Lebanese Chamber of Commerce, the Lebanese Franchising Association, and the Syndicate of
Owners of Restaurants, Cafes, Night Clubs and Pastries in Lebanon. He used his personal
networks and attended various private and public symposiums, where he made contacts with
additional entrepreneurs. He also conducted a comprehensive search of publicly available
sources. Our paper builds on longitudinal histories of 27 entrepreneurs, each of whom confronted
multiple disruptions over the 2005–2015 period. Twelve of the entrepreneurs ended up partially
closing their ventures; of these, eight reported complete cessations of operations in Lebanon.
Table 2.1 provides the profiles of the entrepreneurs, using pseudonyms to disguise their
identities.

2.2.3

Data Collection

Our primary data of 27 interviews was collected during two successive field trips in July 2013
and in June/July 2015. Between the first and the second round of interviews, the presidential
vacuum that started in May 2014 added significant cause for concern for Lebanese entrepreneurs,
there were successive travel bans that dried up tourism, and the Syrian refugee crisis escalated.
The interviews with entrepreneurs were semi-structured and open-ended. Appendix 2.2 shows
the initial interview guide and Appendix 2.3 the follow-up guide. All interviews were conducted
in person in Lebanon by the first author, with the exception of three interviews conducted in
Dubai, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and three conducted via Skype. Interviews lasted 60 to
120 minutes. For some of the respondents (10 of them), we also had access to archival data
and/or real-time Facebook posts and online blogs. We supplemented our interview data with in-
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depth input from 5 industry experts and first author’s in-situ observations and detailed notes
taken during each field trip.
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Table 2.1 List of Entrepreneurs Interviewed
Entrepreneur
Anthony
Amer

Aziz
Mike

Kamal

Luke

Michel
Ghassan
Peter
Khalil
Yasser
Serge
Gaby

Hadi

Business

Exit Histories

Entrepreneur

Business

Exit Histories

5 restaurants: 118 employees
closed.
1 café: 8 employees
3 restaurants: 150 employees
closed.
Retail business: 400 employees
9 restaurants/bars
320 employees local+120
abroad
25 cafés/restaurants
300 employees local+400
abroad
1 restaurant Lebanon: closed
2 restaurants abroad
Total 120 employees
1 restaurant concept - 11 outlets
60 employees full-time +150
seasonal/temporary
1 hotel & 1 resort: closed
60 employees
2 restaurants, 2 hotels
200 employees + 100 seasonal
2 hotels: 200 employees

2006 exit 2 ventures
2010-2015 exit 3 ventures

Marwan

2012-2013 total exit out of
hospitality industry

Nader

2005 exit venture
2008 contemplated exit
2014 exit Lebanon
2015 contemplated exit

2005 exit 1 venue
2006 relocated 2 venues

Oscar

2008 exit 1 outlet and relocated
headquarters
2012-2013 closed 4 outlets
2012 exit Lebanon

Claude

2007 exit 1 outlet
2013 exit 2 outlets

Ralph

2014 exit resort
2015 exit hotel
2011 exit 1 venue
2015 contemplating total exit
2015 contemplating partial exit

Zain

Food and beverage
production:
50 employees
2 restaurants Lebanon: 130
employees
8 outlets abroad
2 restaurants Lebanon:
closed
5 abroad: 200 employees
Food equipment production:
100 employees local + 40
Africa
15 venues Lebanon: closed
5 venues in the UAE:
300 employees
15 venues Lebanon: closed
5 venues in the UAE:
300 employees
Food production and retail:
20 employees
Food supplies production:
100 employees
1 hotel: 70 employees

Food and beverage production
170 employees
3 cafés and coffee roasters:
60 employees
1 hotel and furnished
apartments: 40 employees
5 restaurants, 1 café
300 employees
5 restaurants, 1 café
300 employees

2006 and 2013 contemplated
major international relocation
2014 contemplated exit
2006 contemplated exit
2013 contemplated exit
2009 exit 2 restaurants
2012 exit 1 restaurant
2013 exit 1 restaurant
2006 & 2008 contemplated exit
2009 exit 2 restaurants
2012 exit 1; 2013 exit 1 restaurant

Jean

Samer
Julian
Omar
Maggie
Charbel
Zach

Food and beverage
production: 20 employees
2 restaurants: 110 employees
3 restaurants/bars:
65 employees
2 restaurants Lebanon (1
closed): 85 employees:
1 restaurant Dubai

2006 exit
2013 exit
2006, 2011 and 2013
contemplated exit
2006 & 2008 partial exits
2012-2015 total exit
2005 personal exit
2006 & 2008 partial exits
2012-2015 total exit
2013 personal Exit
2006 contemplated exit
2013 contemplated exit
2006 contemplated exit
2013 contemplated exit
2015 contemplated exit
2013 contemplated exit
2005 contemplated exit
2013 contemplated exit
2015 exited 1 outlet
2006 partial exit
2013 closed 1 outlet
2014 personal exit
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Our study relies on retrospective accounts of entrepreneurs. Thus, we adopted several techniques
to reduce the concern with ex post rationalization. First, we were careful to adopt a free-reportstyle interview, in which informants were encouraged to recall events meaningful to them
(Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). The 27 entrepreneurs not only offered elaborate accounts of
events that had occurred as much as 10 years earlier, but repeatedly reinforced how meaningful
and impactful these events had been for themselves and their ventures. As one of our
interviewees, Samer, noted: “We are still talking about the 2006 War now. Why? Because the
impact of 2006 is still felt until today. We are still feeling it. Why? Because the impact is so
deep. You forget about minor events. But you talk about the major events, because of their
impacts [such as] the impact of Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination.” We probed our
interviewees on the details of specific events (who, what, when, where) to trigger episodic
memory (Tulving, 2002) and facilitate fine-grained post- hoc recollections. According to Tulving
(2002) and Miller, Cardinal, and Glick (1997), rehashing autobiographical events can improve
recall accuracy and increase the accuracy of the accounts. We double-checked for retrospective
bias (Golden, 1992) by comparing recalled events against real-time accounts (interviews, blogs,
posts) and by revisiting the recalled events in multiple follow-up interviews. When applicable,
we also triangulated our interviews with trusted media features of the same protagonists at that
specific point in time, and with those of third-party accounts (e.g., newspapers, magazines, and
television stations).
Second, as founders and/or leaders of their ventures, the entrepreneurs we interviewed were both
knowledgeable and motivated to interpret and to respond to adverse events (e.g., Vuori & Huy,
2016). Our context is characterized by many political and security events that all our informants
witnessed firsthand. However, their recollections offered unique details regarding the impact of
the same event on different ventures, and revealed a significant range of responses.
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2.2.4

Data Analysis and Coding

All of our interviews were conducted in Arabic, though some of the entrepreneurs occasionally
used English and French, as both languages are widely spoken in Lebanon. Interviews were
audio recorded, translated into English, and professionally transcribed. To check for linguistic
accuracy, we drew a random sample of 100 short excerpts from the original audio transcripts (10
excerpts from 10 different entrepreneurs). We asked third parties fluent in the original language
of the respondents but blind to the purpose of our study to alert us to any discrepancies in the
transcribed translations. No discrepancies were found in 95% of cases; there were small
differences in the translation of idiomatic expressions in five cases but these remained consistent
with our codes. Subsequent follow-ups were conducted in English, by both co-authors, so that
respondents were presented with the English codes for constructs and relationships to ensure that
the meaning inferred from the interviews accurately reflected their accounts.
We followed several best practices of grounded theory to increase the rigour of our qualitative
method. We read the interview transcripts independently and openly coded them in parallel
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to create themes that captured key insights the interviewees shared
with us. A clear and quick consensus emerged around entrepreneurs’ interpretations of some
events, but not others, as emergencies. We then compared and elaborated on these themes during
regular research meetings, and relied on iterative and collaborative memos to think further about
theoretical mechanisms and important insights (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) interlinking the
emerging themes (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Strike & Rerup, 2016). We noticed that
entrepreneurs responded to emergencies in nuanced ways. Accordingly, we mapped responses
that typically clustered together in a majority of narratives, and noted outliers or exceptions. As
new themes emerged, we deepened our reading of the literature to delve further into the different
kinds of adversity and the various ways in which entrepreneurs responded to adverse events, as
well as their reasons for doing so (Williams & Shepherd, 2016). Figure 2.1 presents our data
structure.
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Figure 2.1 Data Structure
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To induce our aggregate constructs, we followed a three-step process. The first step sensitized us
to the fact that entrepreneurs offered different interpretations of the same events; they also
recalled a broad range of cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses. In a second step, we
delved deeper into time-action combinations, querying the data systematically about what
exactly entrepreneurs did when.
We came to appreciate that each entrepreneur had one or a couple of closely co-occurring pivotal
events that seemed to have ‘framed’ how they interpreted and reacted to emergencies henceforth.
The interviewees did not organize their narratives chronologically. Rather, they emphasized first,
and dwelled most on, those events they felt had most seriously impacted the ultimate course of
their venture; they also returned to these pivotal events repeatedly, and often comparatively,
during their explanations of other decisions (whether they had undertaken those earlier or later).
We noticed two very different kinds of pivotal events. In some cases, entrepreneurs took the
impact very personally: “When I left to Dubai [during The 2006 war] to help my family leave, [I
felt] I had nothing. I was worth nothing. Today, if the country stopped working, I am worth
nothing,” (Luke). In others, they distanced themselves from it: “You come to a point when you
don't think about yourself; really, seriously, I don't think about myself - I think about the place,
customers, employees” (Yasser).
Sensitive to the influential role of such pivotal events and mindful to variations in the closeness
or distance between the entrepreneur and their threatened ventures, we returned to the data for a
third time. We compared and contrasted multiple modes and sources of data for each one of the
entrepreneurs to construct a chronological map2 that helped us visualize and verbalize timeaction sequences for each of the 27 entrepreneurs. In this last stage, it became clear that
entrepreneurs iteratively adjusted both their actions and their time frames, until an equilibrium

2

We show, and elaborate on, three representative visual maps in the discussion section.
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was reached. When further events de-stabilized this equilibrium yet again, entrepreneurs
recommenced this dual adjustment process.

2.3 Findings
We induce a generalized process theory of emergency exit that explains how exogenous
pressures to terminate otherwise successful ventures motivate repeated, ingenious, and
sometimes successful attempts to repair the distressed relationship between an entrepreneur and
the venture s/he founded. We start by establishing how entrepreneurs interpret shifts in the
environment as emergencies (or not). We then group time-action sequences in two modes of
entrepreneurial exit (i.e., the breakdown of the individual-venture relationship (DeTienne,
2010)), which we label “de-personalized” and “re-personalized” according to the emphasis
placed on the closeness or distance between the individual and the venture. As we explain in
greater detail below, entrepreneurs carefully and repeatedly adjusted this distance through a dual
adaptation process that updated either their time frames or their actions, often both.

2.3.1

Emergency

The starting point for our model is an assessment of a specific event—one that the entrepreneur
and the organization are facing as an emergency that may jeopardize the continuation of the
firm’s operations in their current form, location, and context. Entrepreneurs discriminated among
the threats associated with different events. They were very explicit about the threats they
perceived, eloquently describing the overall impact, as well as analyzing how significantly and
how imminently any given event might endanger their organization, as one entrepreneur, Kamal,
demonstrated: “What’s dangerous for this business is not the situation, because there were a lot
of successful companies during the constant war. But what bothers you is the fact that you can
never know what will happen…. For example, a few days after the Charlie Hebdo incident in
Paris, or for other reasons [like] strikes or demonstrations, you know that work will decrease by
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70% for two or three days, not for long. The problem in Lebanon is that you never know for how
long.”3
The assessment of an event as an emergency was a deliberate call, specific to each
entrepreneur—that is, although our interviewees experienced the same series of events, they
often deemed different events emergencies for their venture, and they did so for distinct reasons.
The literature has long acknowledged that the same event can yield drastically different results
for different types of organizations, from devastating effects on the tourism and retail sectors to
beneficial effects on arms exporters (Spilerman & Stecklow, 2009). Research also reveals that
entrepreneurs respond quite differently to the same events (Williams & Shepherd, 2016).
From the beginning of our data-collection process, we were intrigued by how the entrepreneurs
we interviewed interpreted the exact same event in different ways. Most of the entrepreneurs in
our sample experienced these events firsthand, at the same time, and in the same sequence; for
example, the assassination of the late Prime Minister Hariri in 2005 was followed by the 2006
Lebanon War, which sent the country into a tailspin of political insecurity and economic
“suicide.” There were several other assassinations, bombs, and intermittent security breaches,
and eventually, multiple spillovers from Syria’s conflict, including the world’s largest influx of
refugees. The aftermath, however, was uneven.
For many, the impact of the 2006 War was devastating. Amer noted, “It happens so fast, and
when it goes down, it all goes down fast.” Yet others, like Yasser, found the impact translated to
an opportunity to do more. When Yasser arrived at his coffee shop in Beirut “to find people
waiting for him” at the onset of the war, he instantly decided to keep his coffee shop open
despite the curfew. He would serve his customers in the morning, then capture the conversation
of the day in his blog in the afternoon, as he described: “At 7:00 a.m. I used to open the café and

3

All the quotations in this paper are based on personal interviews, and prioritize the accurate transcription
of those interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished
grammar or syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard.
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people came, had their coffees and talked ... and I would write what they were saying… so I
would take notes, and when I finished, I would go home and blog, I did this for 33 days.”
Unlike Amer, Yasser did not interpret the war as an emergency. Rather, he embraced the
opportunity to do more than usual for his customers: “I was trying to get [the clients] a good
feeling. First, there was no TV in the shop, so [they couldn’t] see the news of the incidents.
People met there … for the first time [since the war started]. People loved each other … people
became a family during those 33 days.” What was normally “business as usual” became an
unusual achievement under the circumstances, even an occasion for celebration: “The coffee
truck arrived [after roads had been blocked for so many days]. The clients outside started
clapping. It is very nice. They were clapping for me because I got the coffee,” Yasser recalled.
Even for the same entrepreneur, the same event could affect operations in different locations
quite differently, as Gaby explained to us while sketching a map on a paper: “ [Restaurant A] is
here and [Restaurant B] is there. Between here and there, there are only 50 metres, but it is a
totally different story. Really. I will say it from the end. This is the border. It is crazy, one was
not affected by the insecurity and was working well, while the other was extremely affected ….
This one was working well, this one wasn’t working at all.”
To arrive at an interpretation of an event as an emergency, the entrepreneurs we interviewed
engaged in four separate assessments, often sequentially. First, they placed the event in its
historical context; second, they corrected for what the new norm had become for themselves,
given their own prior experience with conflict; third, they estimated foreseeable ups and downs
for their specific ventures; and fourth, they expressed how they felt about these fluctuations.

2.3.1.1

Historicizing

Our interviewees customized their assessment of the damage using two complementary
estimates. First, they tried to pinpoint specifics about the events themselves (markers). Then,
they evaluated the imminence of the threat itself, establishing how soon and/or severely a given
event might impact their venture (attributions). Oscar referenced to Prime Minister Hariri’s
assassination using specific calendar dates as markers—“Our official opening was supposed to
be February 20, 2005, and guess what happened on February 14, 2005?”—underscoring the
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proximity and inevitability of impact. Oscar had one week to brace for impact, but did not do so
because “we were ready to open in downtown. So we opened there and then sh*t hit the fan.”

2.3.1.2

Normalizing

Experiencing and living through constant instability for a prolonged length of time makes one
“grow a thick skin.” The more setbacks the entrepreneurs had successfully survived previously,
the more likely they were to downplay the possible negative consequences of turbulent events on
the venture. Normalizing referred to recounting one’s adaptability to—and survivability of—past
encounters that had left them unscathed, drawing the lesson that they had developed the
expertise, even the habit, to bounce back from historical setbacks: “I personally have been a long
time in the business. And in this [environment] what do they say? Things coming over my head,
incidents over incidents, so I am used to how to do it.” (Yasser).
We found two facets of normalizing: (1) comparing current events with past events the
entrepreneurs remembered overcoming and (2) contrasting the setbacks current events may cause
with positive aspirations. Reminders of bad events that ended well offered a more lenient or
favourable interpretation of the disruption likely to follow a specific event, as Omar stated: “This
is the Lebanese trait. You rebuild and continue. It’s a survival mode. So I asked [my father] last
year, ‘What do we do if there is a civil war?’ He told me, ‘Omar, during the civil war, when they
bomb us, we hide. When they don’t, we work.’ Aspirations enabled entrepreneurs to emphasize
positive expectations in a way that counterbalanced the negative impact of current events, as
Amer described: “We are waiting for better days. Our objectives become waiting for promises
and hope. You start to convince yourself because you are the local and it is your country. …
God, please make tomorrow a better day. … You start to make plans, saying let me get over this
year, and see what next year will bring. Maybe next year is better. But technically speaking, if
you get an external eye that is looking into what you are doing, he will tell you leave.”
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2.3.1.3

Volatility

Entrepreneurs vividly described the unpredictable downturns after events: “Something came up
every two days. We opened, closed, opened, closed. So we had to close. With big losses.”
(Luke). They also contrasted these with the expected upturns, had the events not happened:
“Honestly speaking, we started this year extremely well. So it should not be, it could not be, as
good as it is in this kind of environment, that is so unstable,” (Gaby).4 This jigsaw of the ups and
the downs created a great deal of generalized volatility. “When it is going good, it is so great.
Everybody comes, everybody is attracted by it. When it is not blooming, it gets thorns; no one
wants to come close to it.” (Anthony). But for some entrepreneurs the downs kept coming, and
cumulating: “We opened in February after a soft opening two months prior. What happened? In
March, the work was very good. In April, it was amazing. If we had continued like that,
everything would have been good. On May 11, people visiting Lebanon on a bus were kidnapped
next to Syria. Then, let me put it bluntly. In just one day, customers dropped by 50%. During the
last 20 days of May, we worked 50% less than the first 10 days, while the work was supposed to
go up because the season is getting better. In June, we lost 50% of the 50% that were left. So we
lost 75%. In July, we then lost 50% of the remaining 50%. That means we had 12.5% left.”
(Kamal).
The volatility was particularly dreaded by entrepreneurs like Kamal who, after a cascade of
downturns, could no longer foresee what may happen next. We heard a lot of “I don’t know” in
the interviews, which we coded as unknown consequences because entrepreneurs were still
trying to rebound, counting the many sleepless nights they had spent trying to figure out what
might happen the next day and what their next move should be. “You have to find a way to keep
going … [but] there is an uncertainty. … What is going to happen? … We don’t know. We don’t
know.” (Luke). What made this downward spiral even worse were the known dependencies (i.e.,

4

The summer period in Beirut after the interview was conducted was relatively calm with no major
security issues; however, in November, following the interview, there were two suicide bombings, killing
43 people in Beirut.
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commitments entrepreneurs had made, often years in advance, which, as the setbacks cumulated,
they realized they could no longer honour). “In 2008, things were good, and this is when we
started to think about [this project], planning [this project]. It was three years before, and what
can you do? You already invested in it, $5 million.” (Charbel).

2.3.1.4

Vulnerability

Irrespective of whether/how badly they had been hit, all entrepreneurs underscored how
vulnerable they felt. Those whose operations had not been negatively affected yet used the
expression “living with the sword of Damocles hanging over [their] heads” to express their
feeling of looming danger. Those whose operations had been disrupted used the words “force
majeure” to underscore the significance of the setbacks. We found two aspects of vulnerability:
first, as a lack of choice (“There is only so much that you can do.” (Zach)), and second, as an
absolution of fault and blame (“We can’t blame ourselves.” (Anthony)), because there was
nothing that anyone could have done differently. The two sides reinforced each other: “So many
times you needed to shut down the operations, close on many weekends and many days. How
can you make money? And how can you progress in an environment like this? (Ralph).

2.3.2

Exit

When entrepreneurs concluded that they were facing an emergency, even if they had no prior
plans to exit, they began contemplating it: “In 2004, when they killed [Prime Minister] Hariri, we
started to worry. The business started to go down but 2006 was the last straw. It was a true
wakeup call. 2006 was the wakeup call. I had salaries to pay in 2006 but I couldn’t. You can say
that life stopped in 2006. Something had to be done, we couldn’t continue as we were. It was the
worst time for us. We fled Beirut and went to Faraya. I had to pay payroll and had people to give
jobs to, but everything collapsed.” (Claude). If they had prior exit plans (i.e. “We also had offers
that were supposed to allow us to exit in a clean way …. ‘Clean’ means in a way where we
didn’t lose much. Meaning, selling the store,” Kamal told us), the emergency nullified all
lucrative options and “when you don’t sell the store and you leave it as it is without doing
anything, it is then that you lose a fortune,” Kamal explained. Whether or not entrepreneurs had
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executed exit before in other ventures or had contingencies in place for their current ones, they
felt unanimously unprepared for an emergency exit: “We didn’t know how to exit. We didn’t
know we had to exit,” Oscar underscored.
Our interviewees described exit in two opposite ways. Some, like Amer, told us, “It is not about
you anymore.” Others, like Yasser, emphasized, “It affected me on a personal level.” We used
the words de-personalized and re-personalized to differentiate these two extremes, because in
each case, entrepreneurs qualified their changing individual-venture relationship as being less or
more relevant to their person.

2.3.2.1

De-personalized exit

Some entrepreneurs de-personalized exit by interpreting away personal inputs and outputs and
focusing instead on everyone else—the employees, the creditors, the customers, and the
community, as Samer described: “There are a lot of considerations that you have to make, not
only for you, in terms of making money, but also for families, for your employees. We have
many families that live from this business.”
Many entrepreneurs used the Arabic expression “Haram” to qualify the premature closure of
their ventures as not right, or against the nature of things, because they felt their businesses were
good, well-run commercial establishments, with a long history, high status in the community,
and excellent prospects. Had it not been for the emergency they faced, these entrepreneurs would
have kept investing in their ventures, expanding and growing them instead of contemplating
termination. Many used this expression, [in translation] “it’s a shame,” to qualify the
gratuitousness of the unwanted yet unavoidable losses. “It’s a shame for someone to work in
Lebanese cuisine and not do it in Lebanon. That’s why I was really excited about this project …
It’s a shame. It went away really quickly. Like I said, we opened in February and closed in
August … but it was a shame.” (Kamal).
Our interviewees called attention to the many parties likely to be harmed by a premature or
poorly executed exit, and underscored their intention to prevent, minimize, or mitigate the likely
negative consequences on all relevant third parties. Entrepreneurs listed the stakeholders
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impacted, counted the families affected by the layoffs, took into account their obligation to the
community, and then took all the steps they felt they could in order to exit as responsibly as
possible. “We exited with our head held high. We wanted to pay our suppliers, but they told us,
‘It’s okay, you can wait.’ We refused. We paid right away and gave them everything. We wanted
to close our accounts and have clearance. They went crazy. When we reopened, some suppliers
told us, ‘We have never seen people work as good as you do.’” (Oscar).
As we describe below, entrepreneurs delayed a de-personalized exit as long as they could afford
to stay open: “If I close the [business] down in Beirut, there are 150 families that will be
affected. Can I sleep at night? My decision will affect 150 families.” (Ghassan). Amer agreed:
“[Delaying exit] becomes humanitarian and moral because I have those people who work for
me.” Entrepreneurs justified the delay as a way to avoid the anticipated harm that a premature
exit would cause to their employees and their families. “I cannot tell our employee Elias Sr., who
has been with us for 40 years, ‘Sorry we are closing down the factory.’ If I didn’t have this
obstacle, I would have closed it for sure.” (Claude). Giving themselves a little extra time allowed
them to focus their energy on the problems they could solve. “Have to suck it in and do”
(Ghassan). Amer elaborated: “We have to survive, we have to inject money into the business,
we have to work on our payments, we have to find a way to survive.” Solving problems
motivated these entrepreneurs to continue business as usual for a while longer, until they found
another problem to solve, which bought them a little more time yet: “We take altogether the risk,
attack versus an attack. That way, you can survive during this crisis. … If I don’t take care of my
employees who have been working with me for 10 years, we will go.” (Maggie).

2.3.2.2

Re-personalized exit

Other entrepreneurs re-personalized exit by calling attention to their personal feelings of loss,
deep sadness, and even suffering. Kamal commemorated the closure by posting a short poem on
his Facebook page: “I am sad; the restaurant is dead, and many things inside of me.” Exit hurts.
The pain entrepreneurs experienced made them feel emotionally exhausted: “What can I do on
my own? You get tired, you feel exhausted and consumed.” (Amer). The more exhausted the
entrepreneurs felt, the less likely they were to keep going, even if the venture was not in a dire
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situation yet: “I had another operation (at this mall) that was making 10% profit when it was time
to renew the rent for six years. I refused, although it was making money. I decided to close it,
because the headache and the risk factor is so big, … to the extent that I don’t want to try
anymore.” (Anthony).
In stark contrast to instances of de-personalized exit that prolonged entrepreneurs’ efforts and
rekindled their will to survive along with the ingenuity to revive the individual-venture
relationship, in cases of re-personalized exit, the hurt and exhaustion entrepreneurs felt dulled the
will to survive. Their efforts to cope with these negative emotions made the situation even more
unbearable: “It affects your energy because we were not creative anymore,” Jean explained.
“You get sick, you get tired, enough. Enough! I personally went through a lot of stuff here.”
(Yasser). The more hurt and exhausted entrepreneurs felt, the sooner they came to recognize an
irreconcilable mismatch between their resources (time, energy, ingenuity, etc.) and what the
venture might need to survive the emergency. “You feel this is the last straw,” Yasser explained.
“You know … it is just gonna make it worse, so you just have to kill it,” Zach added.

2.3.3

Adaptation

Both de-personalized and re-personalized exit were adaptive responses: once entrepreneurs
interpreted a given event as an emergency, they took the steps they deemed appropriate to
preserve the individual-venture relationship. In every case, they reassessed all the parts that
might keep their venture running and adjusted the time frame, by either lengthening or
shortening the time horizon for their next move. We refer to these processes as partial and
temporal adaptation. While four combinations of these two adaptation mechanisms are logically
possible, we only found two combinations in our data. Furthermore, the order between partial
and temporal adaptation was reversed, with temporal adaptation preceding partial adaptation for
de-personalized exit, and partial adaptation preceding temporal adaptation for re-personalized
exit. Figure 2.2 shows these two paths.
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Figure 2.2 Inductive Framework of Emergency Exit
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2.3.3.1

Path 1: De-personalized emergency exit

With a single exception (unpacked further below (Jean)), entrepreneurs’ initial response to the
first event they deemed an emergency was to stay the course and figure out a way through the
adversity. It is important to note that not all adversity was bad for business—our data included
one extreme case where a serious incident was framed as an opportunity to launch the venture in
the first place (Marwan)—nor did the severity of events automatically threaten all entrepreneurs
or all ventures. Whenever entrepreneurs came to realize that the individual-venture relationship
was in jeopardy due to the specific aftermath of a given event on their operations, they tried to
figure out how long they could afford to stay open. Then, critically dependent on this time
horizon, they chose which problems they should begin tackling: “We have reserves which we
keep for this type of situation. Today, I know if my business stops, how long can I last? ... I’ve
always tried to never be in debt so that when the situation is bad, I could survive.” (Luke).
Lengthening time horizon. Emergency made survival important for its own sake, and
overcoming the emergency set a new bar or metric of success: “Whoever will survive, will
succeed.” (Maggie). Julian underscored the same point: “The only adaptation we have is
survival. And sometimes this means taking on more loans and that means we [self-] re-finance
… I’m putting money from my own pocket.”
Entrepreneurs delayed exit for one of two reasons: (1) because they felt that staying was, on
balance, better than the alternatives, or (2) because they had made commitments they could not
easily break, as Ghassan explained: “You can't get out of it. You can’t. ... You have also your
reputation and this is what I am saying in any situation, in anything, there are many things that
are going to get affected: name, credibility, financial situation, the loans of the bank, your
employees, there are many things. … Forget about me and my financial situation. There are so
many [other] things: my name… Oh!! The [Ghassan] family closed a [business]! Oh!! They laid
off employees. Oh! This and that. There are so many things that you need to endure. Have to
suck it in, and do.… Here, if I don’t have this asset: the hotel and gardens, I would never do
something in Lebanon.” (Ghassan)
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Problem-focused coping. Once entrepreneurs decided to delay their exit, they took specific steps
to improve their odds of survival by identifying and tackling (if not always solving) some of the
problems brought on by the event itself with the resources at hand (more specifically, the subset
that remained viable). We found three key approaches: focusing on critical resources or rents;
shifting critical resources or rents to more favourable contexts; and changing key configurations
or conditions altogether so that critical resources could be leveraged in an entirely new way. All
three approaches helped update the individual-venture relationship by changing (in part rather
than the whole) the venture side of the relationship.
Shrinking. We often heard explicit or implicit statements along the lines of “we shrunk the
business” (Jean), which meant shutting down operations bit by bit, starting with the ones that
were obviously not working anymore, and focusing on the most critical resources, like core
employees or the brand. Everything that was not critical could be dispensed with, and was
reframed as a “luxury”—something no longer warranted given the new reality of the business,
and something that could or should be given up to preserve the core: “It is (like) you don’t have
the luxury to spend a lot of money on advertising, you will bring down the advertising budget,
you don’t have the luxury to do some costly events.… You have an outlet that makes you lose
money, you close it.” (Amer).
Stretching. Once entrepreneurs understood which resources remained viable in the aftermath of
the emergency, they sought to extend or multiply their uses and create new sources of rents,
iterating through different levels or applications in the hope that they might find a new way to
keep the business running. Stretching was often radical: prices were cut; customers changed
(e.g., from wealthy tourists to impoverished Syrian refugees); offerings shifted (e.g., from food
venues to disco clubs); operations were revamped with ad hoc repurposing of common spaces. In
all of these cases, a previously critical resource was used in a radically different way in an effort
to bring out an alternative source of revenues. “I started to change the prices. We did more
promotions. I did everything that anyone can do within the restaurant business to be able to
overcome this period. Then I changed the décor. I made a new investment, thinking that people
might have become bored of the old décor, so I will give them a new look, new menu.”
(Anthony). These iterations were not trivial undertakings because they were expensive to try out:
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“Everything will cost you, and the cost is not only the financial cost, but also the time cost. [I
don’t] want to waste two weeks of my time studying something that I won’t implement or
include.” (Yasser). Stretching viable resources did not assure business survival. Anthony, for
example, tried and tried, “but still it didn’t work.” Anthony and Yasser took as many detours as
possible, and tried as many new combinations as they could afford, all in an effort to avoid
severing the individual-venture relationship.
Substituting. At some point, a critical mass of entrepreneurs ran out of the changes they could
make within Lebanon, and “stepped outside” (Aziz) in search of new conditions or
circumstances where their businesses could be relocated. Substituting referred to replacing
factors that shortchanged critical resources or rents with factors that might allow these resources
or rents to work well again. The predominant change was contextual because, as entrepreneurs
unanimously concluded, most aspects of the business worked well before the emergency, and
would have continued working well had it not been for the emergency. As the events escalated,
more and more entrepreneurs tried to remove themselves from the emergency in an effort to
preserve their individual-venture relationship by transplanting it elsewhere: “Every time I
boarded a plane, or after the (2006 War), I met entrepreneurs who were starting businesses
outside. I do believe that point was a big turning point for many Lebanese businesses.” (Mike).
Respondents did not run away from instability per se, and in some cases, they started over in
dangerous settings: “We cannot work in Lebanon anymore, nor can we in America or Europe.
Nigeria isn’t heaven. It’s dangerous too … but we had to do it.” (Claude). By proactively
releasing one critical constraint, substituting changed some of the ways in which entrepreneurs
previously did business so they could go on: “So I could say the political instability sped up our
expansion process to go abroad. So this is silver lining to it. At least it motivates you to look for
different alternatives in different markets to apply your investment and your human capital.”
(Zach).
Despite the fact that most entrepreneurs felt compelled to delay exit to safeguard others, and
most had incurred significant and unrecoverable losses along the way, the harder they tried to
overcome setbacks, the more satisfied they were with their initial decision to stay rather than
leave. “It is a good thing that we didn’t close the factory, as things got better later on,” Claude
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told us. “You have to accept the system here is winning sometimes and losing a lot, the other
times, it’s not always a win-win situation. You just need to accept you are bound to lose business
in this country.” Trying longer and harder by no means guaranteed success. Ghassan, for
example, had no choice but terminate the individual-venture relationship once he ran out of
things he might fix: “I cannot find a way … but I tried everything … I tried to think inside the
box, and outside the box, and in and out of the box… and half in and half out … enough! F***
the box.”
One of the most counterintuitive ways in which entrepreneurs lengthened the time horizon and
engaged in problem-solving coping was by starting something else, effectively instantly
overwriting the individual-venture relationship getting broken by the emergency with a new
individual-venture relationship, which the entrepreneur felt had better odds of success. “I
officially signed off [Restaurant X] on April 30, 2013, to open [Restaurant Y] on May 15. That
was like [rising] from the ashes … 15 days later, you open a new place.” (Zach). “[It seemed]
crazy enough to open another restaurant … everybody told me, ‘What you are doing?!’”
(Maggie).

2.3.3.2

Path 2: Re-personalized emergency exit

“Surviving” the 11-year window of adversity we studied proved extremely challenging, and for
20 out of the 27 ventures, we witnessed at least one instance of re-personalized emergency exit.
This type of exit typically occurred late or last, when, after multiple attempts to prevent
premature exit, most entrepreneurs had not only already run out of resources and options, but
were also beginning to run out of energy and ingenuity. As they rapidly approached their
threshold of personal suffering, they shifted attention to emotion-focused coping. Unfortunately,
in many cases, this effort proved to be too little too late. Anthony told us, “Today, the game is
not within our hands anymore.… Here, if you have a grand big ambition, you will hit the wall,
look at me from nine restaurants to food carts. At the end of the day you say, enough!” Once
they understood how personally taxing their efforts had already been, most entrepreneurs
accelerated time to exit: “We didn’t have the guts to take a decision to shut down, the first time.
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This click of a button. The second time, the “shut down” was like a quick push of a button. The
decision was overnight with big losses.” (Oscar)
Emotion-focused coping. Entrepreneurs faced their hardships in two different ways. They found
new appreciation for whatever alternatives they had in place; and they reclaimed their confidence
in their abilities to try again and hope to succeed, at a different time or in a different place.
The worse their ventures got, the more appreciative entrepreneurs became of options they might
have created for themselves. “There is a hope someday that things will change. If they don’t
change, we’ll have options. Most importantly, for me, as a person, I do have other options. I have
Kuwait, Canada, Bahrain, London, and other options. I can move and live … as long as you have
the option. And this option, not a lot of people have it. And it took me a long time to establish
these options.” (Oscar). If they had no options, either because their prior options no longer
worked or because they had not yet looked beyond the failure of the current venture to what may
come next, they appreciated the lessons they had learned and contemplated ways in which these
lessons might prove generative in the future. “Practically… you need to reinvent yourself in this
line of business,” Jean reflected.
The strong negative emotions stirred up by the pressures or losses entrepreneurs experienced
motivated them to claim newfound capabilities: “Because we believe in what we have, we have a
product that is second to none, we are innovative, we’re creative, and when you are creative and
innovative and passionate about what you’re doing, the sky is the limit. … What we learned in
Lebanon and the experience we had in Lebanon … all of it aggregated, but mostly in Lebanon.
We will definitely benefit from this experience.” (Oscar). Even those who had lost everything
could reclaim their confidence in themselves: “Wow! I did this. I could. I survived this incident,
and I survived it well. Therefore, seriously, I am very good. You become confident. Definitely,
you become more confident.” (Yasser).
Emotion-focused coping allowed entrepreneurs to see and accept that the individual-venture
relationship was about to end. As the end became clear, they let go of any rationales they might
have given themselves previously: “Forget about the money … I don’t want to live in a country
where … one time this person is shot dead, another time one person gets exploded. Every time
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something happens, I would be afraid [and wondering] where my son is … why would I want to
do this to my kids? … I cannot live on hope. One day I have money, the other day I don't have
money. … Personally, I am leaving. I don't know where yet, but definitely I’m not staying here.”
(Ghassan).
Shortening time horizon. Once entrepreneurs realized that they were fast approaching (and in
some cases, had even exceeded) their threshold of suffering, they would bear no more pain.
Looking back, the entrepreneurs wished they had exited sooner, in part to minimize the financial
loss and in part to avoid the personal trauma, ranging from health problems to marriage
difficulties; many entrepreneurs expressed, “I kept it open longer than I should have.” (Hadi).
Some entrepreneurs made the explicit decision to exit sooner. The actual losses were substantial,
and the higher the losses, the more painful their decision to exit: “It was a painful decision. … It
was painful because we invested $1 million and nothing was returned. So [we lost] all the money
invested in the project.” (Zach). Some could still keep going but had simply gotten tired of trying
so hard and going nowhere: “We took the decision after 2011, but the decision inside was
already taken, because it was obvious, we were not expanding, we were focused on a couple
things but we were not going left and right. … We had to take a decision.” (Ralph). Those who
overstayed “were massacred. Twice. Twice is too much. Total loss: $2 million.” (Oscar).
Typically, the re-personalized exit path unfolded extremely quickly, with exit imminent in days
or weeks after entrepreneurs realized how miserable they really were. However, it was often a
by-product of a hidden sense-making process that, for many, had gone on for months or even
years of unsuccessful efforts to prevent exit: “It’s like having a lymphoma on your back. And it’s
getting bigger…It’s not cancerous [so far]. You can’t sit the same way. First you were used to
sitting a certain way, but not anymore. It’s growing, and you can’t control it. You have one of
two choices. Either live with it with the pain, and never know what will happen, maybe it will be
cancerous [and you won’t survive]. Or you can have an operation and fix it, suffer for a while,
remove it, and then live with the scar.” (Oscar).
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2.4 Discussion
The dual adaptation pathways we induced from the data reveal that individual-venture
relationships are malleable enough to overcome even the direst or most dramatic situations, at
least for some time, while there are enough resources set aside to try something new or different.
Perhaps the single most significant insight from this qualitative study is that a great deal happens
before exit takes place. We wind back the proverbial clock, which most studies set at the time
when the entrepreneur herself/himself makes an exit decision (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Wennberg et
al., 2010), all the way to the adverse events that precipitate this decision. In so doing, we
discover that entrepreneurs follow two very different paths to this decision: one deliberately
slowing down the exit process enough to try as many alternatives as they can afford, and the
other hastening exit to prevent further personal distress. Some of the actions entrepreneurs may
take on either path have been touched on before, for example in prior studies of grief and postfailure recovery (Shepherd, 2003) or in the literature on post-disaster start-ups (Shepherd &
Williams, 2014; Williams & Shepherd, 2016). What the current framework adds is a fine-grained
understanding of when and why entrepreneurs choose one pathway or the other.
As shown in Figure 2.2, all entrepreneurs start with a careful assessment of a specific event.
Entrepreneurs do not react to the events themselves; rather, they respond based on their
interpretations of multiple aspects of the event, starting with historical observations,
remembering how they may have experienced similar events in the past, estimating the ups and
downs such events are likely to cause to their ventures, and assessing how vulnerable they feel
given their own predictions. While entrepreneurs consider all four of these aspects for most
events, they tend to gravitate towards either normalizing a given event and continuing business
as usual, or sensitizing themselves to the vulnerability other events may cause. For events
unfolding over extended periods of time, or with escalating consequences, entrepreneurs often
return to their emergency assessment multiple times, and thus have the option to restart on one
path or the other, depending on their iterative assessments of the same event.
Knowing that some entrepreneurs find themselves in an emergency does not tell us much about
whether they would decide (let alone execute) exit. While prior literature yields detailed
predictions regarding the time to exit once entrepreneurs have taken the decision to exit
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(Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017), we know relatively little about when and how such exit
trajectories might be shaped even before the decision to exit. Indeed, our inductive framework
suggests that exit trajectories fork while entrepreneurs contemplate when and how they would
exit if they had to.
Perhaps most importantly, entrepreneurs engage in a great deal of work before they decide
whether they have to exit. They lengthen or shorten the time horizon. They engage in problemfocused or emotion-focused coping. Even the order in which they engage in these adaptive
processes matters, because emotion-focused coping tends to further shorten the time horizon,
while lengthening the time horizon affords additional problem-focused coping. Moreover,
because we have shown that what entrepreneurs do first is foreshadowed by their emphasis on
either the normality of the event or their vulnerability to it, an important insight of our study is
that the interpretation of adverse events is critical, because it tends to lead to path-dependent
decisions and behaviours.
To further our understanding of the two pathways, and determine whether or why they may
intertwine at times, we constructed visual maps for each of the 27 entrepreneurs during our
analysis. These visual maps preserve the associations the entrepreneurs themselves made among
specific events and their responses, and draw specific attention to the exit pathways and their
sequencing over time. Most entrepreneurs organized their narratives from the present to the past,
and typically started with the events they felt were most impactful for themselves, personally and
individually. However, in order to facilitate comparisons among events, we re-organized these
associations chronologically, as if there was a logical progression between perceived
emergencies, the adaptation pathways, and the kinds of exits that followed. In fact, we find no
evidence of progression. Instead, our data suggest that major discontinuities in the business are
by-products of entrepreneurs’ responses to those events they deemed emergencies.
Many entrepreneurs, like Claude (Figure 2.3), felt responsible for the continuation of a longlived family business, particularly so when they had a large footprint (infrastructure, employees,
etc.). Their emergency exit process was largely de-personalized, and they sought to delay exit
and prolong the status quo—often to assure their employees’ livelihoods. Yet as the pressures
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intensified, these entrepreneurs exited specific areas or activities and added others. Claude, for
example, de-personalized exit multiple times before eventually re-personalizing it.
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Figure 2.3 Emergency Exit for Claude
EMERGENCY
Normalizing: We have been living in times of
war since we were kids. We are used to this
type of life. We used to hide during the war.
Vulnerability: In 2004, when they killed
Hariri, we started to worry. … It was then that
we realized that this wasn’t a one-time deal, it
was a constant thing.

De-personalized Exit 1
All the warehouses, factory, showroom and workshops are all based here in Lebanon. The whole company’s structure is based in Lebanon, we have been
here for 51 years.
Lengthening Time Horizon: Something had to be done, we couldn’t continue as we were. My thinking and my outlook changed..
Problem-focused Coping: Since 2004 we had a lot of outstanding payments, this wasn’t the case before. We always had outstanding
payments but the amount became a lot bigger after 2004. We reduced the team, we shrunk the business. We focused on other brands. We
changed a lot.

Volatility: After the big shock of the war in
2006, we had small shocks too with the
different assassinations and then the war in
Syria happened so it was going down from all
angles. We didn’t know what was coming. …
There are so many incidents that are making
me close down and leave.
Vulnerability: You can say that life stopped
in 2006.

De-personalized Exit 2
The business started to go down but 2006 was the last straw. During the war in 2006, it was the worst time for us. We fled Beirut and went to Faraya.
Lengthening Time Horizon: I seriously thought of closing down the business here. … If I didn’t have people working in the factory since my
father’s reign, I would have closed down the factory long ago.
Problem-focused coping Therefore, we decided to go international. This was the only strategy! Otherwise, we would have closed the whole
business if we relied on the business in Lebanon. … Today we are at 80% of the work being abroad while 20% being in Lebanon. We are
targeting to reach 95% abroad and only 5% in Lebanon.
Lengthening Time Horizon: I am a businessman, as long I am not losing money I will stay open. The day I lose money, I will close
down and focus on renting my real estates. That way I will make more money.
Problem-focused coping: We saw that the business isn’t working here so we decided to go abroad with putting the base here
in Lebanon and using whatever advantages Lebanon is still offering. … In Lebanon, we are on survival mode for the business.
Abroad, we are doing amazing. In Lebanon we are just breaking even and covering our costs. The profit is coming from
abroad. As long as I am doing great abroad with the base and support from Lebanon, I will not close down.

Normalizing: It is all relative. However,
comparing to Lebanon, Nigeria is better. …
I prefer to do it in Africa, in Nigeria in
particular. If you ask me if it is dangerous, I
would tell you it is extremely dangerous from
Ebola to Boko Haram to kidnappings. …. It is
very dangerous. … So one needs to accept
these to the expense of working there. … This
is the case with me and many others.

De-personalized Exit 3
We cannot work in Lebanon anymore.
Lengthening time horizon
If there were a bit more security in Nigeria, it would have been a dream come true. … Africa is a bit dangerous but we do not have a better option.
…. Besides [the dangers], the potential is there.
Problem-focused coping: I am so happy that we took that decision to move to Nigeria. It was the right thing to do. … I would have never
invested in software without Nigeria. I invested in it so I am aware of all aspects of the business there. .

Historicizing: We were affected greatly [by
the war in Syria], both directly and indirectly.
Normalizing: It’s all the same, if you came to
my office a year ago and watched the news it
would have been the same type of news you
hear now.
Vulnerability: The crisis isn’t affecting me
much now. However, it is a different story if
ISIS attacks Lebanon.

Re-personalized Exit 4
It affected me greatly. … This would take up my energy and I wouldn’t be able to work.
Emotion-focused coping: The day I feel my children are in danger, I close everything and move abroad. This is the only thing that will make me
leave the country fully. …We already have plan B to go to NYC and plan C to go to Dubai.
Shortening time horizon: In case one day the war comes to Lebanon, I will move my whole operations abroad too.[…] When they are 1 km
away from us, we will leave the country on the first plane.
Emotion-focused coping: I put my energy at work during the day and when I get home, I put my energy on my family. When we
finish the interview, I will go see my children and spend quality time with them. This is where I like to put my energy.
Shortening time horizon: Every year I was losing more confidence than the year before. … When you look at the country, you see
what I am doing makes perfect sense.
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At the opposite extreme were a few entrepreneurs, like Jean (Figure 2.4), who chose to exit early
for personal reasons. While the event itself did not require such a precipitous exit in Jean’s case,
the exit motivated him to reallocate a great deal of his initiative and ingenuity to scoping out and
building up the business in different contexts, like Europe, Qatar, and Dubai. Jean made multiple
re-entry moves in response to a single event, which many others (including his own partner and
many investors) did not even interpret as an emergency at that time. For instance, Jean’s own
partner, Ralph, elected to stay behind and manage some of the ventures in his stead for many
years

after

Jean

severed

his

own

relationship

with

these

ventures.
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Figure 2.4 Emergency Exit for Jean
EMERGENCY
Vulnerability: My partner and I decided in
the minute of the assassination of PM Hariri.
We decided that it is not going to work
anymore.
Volatility: You can feel the drops. I used to
get all the numbers from the [tourism]
syndicate about how many people visit. We
started to witness 20 to 25% drop. … Then
2006, we had the war with Israelis and
Hezbollah. Then 2007 we had Nahr el Bared.
Then 2008. Another drop.

Re-personalized Exit 1
My partner told me that things will be ok. Personally, I am a coward: I don't want to die on the street because of a fight. … This scared me. [My partner]
tried to cool me down. I told him I am leaving. He said ok.
Lengthening time horizon: If you go back to 2006, when we had the war, all the clubs opened in Faraya, but what is the crowd? 2,000-3,000?
You cannot base the economy of a country on 2,000 people. By 2007 we ended up with 13 outlets. We were the first group to export a Lebanese
brand to Europe. … We had one outlet in 2006 in London. … We opened in St. Tropez in 2007. We were super big.
Problem-focused coping: I moved to Dubai [in 2005, it was a reaction of the assassination of PM Hariri] … So I went to Qatar, Jordan. I
was trying by hook or crook to tie up with an existing clubbing company and to bring our expertise and name, and we ended up here. … We
opened our first place [in Dubai], and we were shutting down in Beirut, expanding here, shutting down there, expanding here. … We were
expanding in Dubai.
Lengthening time horizon: We had the best locations, best buildings, you cannot find places [like these] every day in Beirut. We wanted
to keep them.
Problem-focused coping: In 2007, we stopped expanding. Our [flagship outlet] started losing [money] at the end of 2007. We had a
negative P&L. I used to buy from our outlets; we were buying the POS system. I was taking the gear from the kitchen, just to reduce
the losses. Sometimes we used to rent the outlet empty, for arts exhibition, or … a private party.

Vulnerability: When Nahr El Bared incident
happened, there were no more people going
out … If you hear there is a bomb that
exploded, you would not go out.
Volatility: I used to go to the bank for a loan.
They used to tell me please send us a forecast
for the coming year. … You really want
forecast? … Then one bomb, it would change
[everything].

Re-personalized Exit 2
Until we drowned. We drowned in 2009, because we were not able to pay rent. The bankruptcy was a domino effect. We had 450 employees. We had
loans. And the operations [overseas] could not sustain.
Emotion-focused comping: When it comes to such a decision, I cannot take it alone. We called the board and then we decided and of course they
agreed. … How we can get money? Who is the investor who is willing to give you money? Which bank will give you [a loan]? … Our bank
account told us then that we need to close.
Shortening time horizon: When you don't have literally any option, you need to stop loss. Why are you going to drag yourself in more?
Because you cannot see the light at the end of the tunnel. It is a super dark tunnel. You’d rather stop your losses there, and then you negotiate
in how you are going to close in the least damage possible;

Vulnerability: The classy people stopped
coming and I started to get the very low end
clients, so my business can't work with this
kind and level of clients.
Volatility: Afterwards, when someone
decided it was time to make Hamra district
working, they started demonstration and
people started talking. And they started to
make troubles in the streets. They released
some trouble makers in the street.. tik..tik..tik..
Vulnerability: The country was not backing
us up. Zero security, zero social security, zero
pension, zero everything. We are alone.

Re-personalized Exit 3
We were not living. We were hoping to survive and when you hope to survive … you lose it.
Emotion-focused coping: It affects your energy because we were not creative anymore. … Practically, you need to reinvent yourself in this line of
business. But when you were drowning, what kind of moves you can do? You are just want to breathe.
Shortening time horizon: Bit by bit, we had to shut down because we could not sustain our operations. To come to our place is not a
necessity. It is not a school or a hospital. It is extra-extra spending, just to have fun and people stopped to have fun,
Re-personalized Exit 4:
We started closing in 2008 … getting out of Lebanon (as a company) in 2012.
Emotion-focused coping: It is not that we are losing. We didn't lose. It was not a mismanagement thing. It was a force majeure.
Shortening time horizon: I would say [we were] around 700 people then. Today we are around … 300, all located in the UAE. In Lebanon
we have 4 employees: one auditor, one lawyer, one office boy, one taking care of the HR.
Re-personalized Exit 5:
Now [my partner] he relocated to Dubai but only two years ago. He was the last man standing.
Emotion-focused coping: It has been two years since I was shouting: Enough! Enough! What for? What for? It is a waste of energy. Every time I
go back I feel sad, and then I want to take back the plane and go somewhere else. So it bothers me and then I feel like leaving Beirut again.
Shortening time horizon: We shut down everything in Lebanon. We just have a virtual office because we still have some staff on our
company for social security. We still have our lawyers and a virtual office. We reduced the costs to like really nothing and that’s it.
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Several entrepreneurs iterated between de-personalized and re-personalized exit processes.
Marwan (Figure 2.5), for example, switched from one path to the other and back again. He
actually entered Lebanon at a peak of turbulence, and even leveraged it in its brand, so it is not
surprising that he started off as if the disruption was normal and he had the time and the means to
troubleshoot any specific challenges he might encounter along the way. However, his view of
normal turbulence turned out to be very specific, and had one exclusion: civil war among his
fellow citizens. Once this bridge was crossed, Marwan felt quite vulnerable, not only because
there were no precedents, but also because the event itself clashed with his personal philosophy.
As a result, he felt “disgusted” and accelerated the breakdown of the individual-venture
relationship, even though his business and brand continued to thrive in the inauspicious
conditions. He had much less trouble with subsequent events, which went back to his idea of
“normal,” and he gave himself the time to experiment and figure out the best way to leave.
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Figure 2.5 Emergency Exit for Marwan
EMERGENCY
Historicizing: [2005] Hariri died and we ate
shit.

Start of the business: In 2005, we started the discussion and chat about the [product] idea. … In 2006, I told him. Are you serious or are you joking? He
said. I'm serious. … Up to that time, I have never had [experience in making this product]. … I started [preparing] during the war. It all began with being
Lebanese as a brand. … My brands are all about the stories behind them. … The brand that I build is not about marketing, but it is all about the story. All
about actual reality of what it is going on in real life. … We raised $5 million to build a new [plant] with 10 times the capacity and look at doing global
domination.

Historicizing: Then ABC explosion, then
Verdun explosion, then they killed Samir
Kassir, then they killed Pierre Gemayel.
Volatility: The Syrian market is hit, and our
local market here is a joke, where will I sell
my products? … What the F***?
Vulnerability: Two months ago, I was going
to build a factory. What happened? I did
nothing wrong.

De-personalized Exit 1
I don't have other choice.
Lengthening time horizon: Up to that point, I was not worried about the impact of the situation on my business ideas.
Problem-focused coping: It was just me and one of our head sales back then. We sat down and we looked at the map. Do they drink a lot of
[our product] in Sweden. F***! I don't know. Let’s have a look. Oh yes, they do. Who is there? I don't know. Let’s call the distributors there.
… I got on a plane and travelled the world trying to sell our [product] and I opened Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland, UK, Spain,
Portugal, France, Switzerland, Australia, made US bigger. We went to Brazil, Ghana, the UAE, and we closed the year with our exports up
20%. … Now 90% of my work is export.

Historicizing: Then Hezbollah came and did
May 7 civil unrest and siege of Beirut.
Volatility: F*** off! Leave me alone. Every
week there is something happening out of
these events.
Vulnerability: In one night only, through no
fault of our own, because of the events. Yes!
of no fault of our own!!

Re-personalized Exit 2
I relinquished the chairmanship.
Emotion-focused coping: I no longer focus my energy on it. … I stopped being proud of my country since May 7 2008. I don't want to leverage the
brand anymore because I’m not proud anymore of Lebanon.
Shortening time horizon: You wake up after one month and you find that your company is going to go bankrupt and disappear, the whole
company and you send your employees home. … We stopped it. If we did it, we would have gone bankrupt. … In retrospect, if I knew that
May 7 would happen, I would have said F*** you and F*** [the country] then. … What am I still doing here?

Vulnerability: We were exporting to Syria.
There was a new law early in early 2013 that
affected our exports. There was a new law that
prohibited the import of anything without
prior consent from government.

De-personalized Exit 3
The Syrian problems started in 2013. Last year, the Syrian market was screwed. It represents 60% of our sales. From November we lost a chunk of sales.
By January, the market was low because of seasonality and then we had Syria beginning 2013.
Lengthening time horizon: Since the start of the turmoil in Syria every year we are facing deterioration.
Problem-focused coping: Since the first day we started, it is all about problems and decisions to make. … And then I travelled to Australia
…. In 2013 I went 3 times … and said let’s do it here. I moved to Australia. … We wrote a business plan and raised some money. Set up an
Australian company around September 2013. With Australians. It was my first production outside Lebanon.
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By using data to theorize the connection between emergencies and entrepreneurial exit, our
inductive framework draws attention to the many steps entrepreneurs take ‘before exit’, fulfilling
recent calls to pay close attention to what happens “before, not after failure” (Singh et al., 2015,
p. 150). Our findings suggest that exit pathways are especially malleable very early on,
particularly before entrepreneurs have settled on their interpretations of events.
Our work also shines a spotlight on the individual-venture relationship (foundational to the
entrepreneurial exit literature) by showing how malleable this relationship can be, even in the
harshest of circumstances. Specifically, we show the different ways in which entrepreneurs can
adjust the venture and/or themselves to preserve core aspects of the relationship, so that even in
cases where we can observe a departure from a given context and/or a closure of the commercial
establishment, many aspects of the individual-venture relationship carry on.
Taken together, our findings motivate more theory-building efforts to ascertain what happens
before exit, especially when exogenous events threaten the continuation of businesses at peak
performance. Our insights also suggest that exit may be more richly understood as work on
repairing the individual-venture relationship as recurrent events keep breaking it (Fathallah &
Branzei, 2017), rather than by isolating or modelling the ultimate consequences of singular
precipitating events. In our study, the link between emergencies and exit grew clearer the more
entrepreneurs dwelled on the when and the how of sequences of unexpected events.
As theories of entrepreneurial exit become more nuanced, and begin to pay closer attention to
what happens before exit (Singh et al., 2015), there is new theoretical and empirical space to
articulate prospective explanations of when and how entrepreneurs exit. While theories of
voluntary exit have long acknowledged that exit can be proactive and purposeful (DeTienne,
McKelvie, & Chandler, 2015), theories of involuntary exit have so far largely focused
comparatively more on how entrepreneurs mitigate personal downsides, such as the stigma
associated with failure, rather than on the steps entrepreneurs take to accelerate recovery. As
turbulence increases, and entrepreneurs face a greater range of shocks and disruptions, exit may
(or may not) be unavoidable. Our study suggests that even in response to emergencies,
entrepreneurs can exert significant choice over exit by engaging in partial and temporal
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adaptation, within and beyond their existing venture. Our inductive findings demonstrate that the
individual-venture relationship affords significant degrees of adjustment at both ends. By
juxtaposing adjustments for their ventures and themselves, entrepreneurs can exert a great deal of
latitude over the degree and timing of their exit, even when they face dire or dramatic
circumstances; their idiosyncratic choices, rather than their circumstances, determine how well
or how long their ventures will outlast adversity.
By revealing the flexible coupling between emergencies and exit, our study elaborates on the
construct of exit, offering three distinct extensions (Suddaby, 2010). First, this study broadens
the scope of the exit construct to explicitly include what happens before exit. In addition to work
entrepreneurs do on themselves to prepare for anticipated failure (Singh et al., 2015), we show
that entrepreneurs significantly and repeatedly adjust their venture as well. This give and take in
the individual-venture relationship allows some entrepreneurs to avoid exit altogether, and
enables many others to exit with dignity—and even renewed confidence—knowing they did
everything possible to honour their responsibilities to their many stakeholders.
Second, our findings draw explicit attention to the temporality embedded in exit. While other
studies have recently examined the pre- and post-exit dynamics, broadening the chronos view of
exit beyond the exit event itself, we are just starting to explore the non-linear effects of time. Our
study shows that some entrepreneurs buy themselves and their ventures more time to problemsolve in response to emergencies, while others rush for the proverbial emergency exit.
Third, the many downsides of exit, especially involuntary exit, have spearheaded much more
attention to its relationships with negative constructs (such as failure and stigma) than to positive
constructs (such as coping and confidence) (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). By fleshing out the
complex relationship between emergencies and exit, we hope to rekindle interest in the ways in
which pressure to exit may be generative. We are especially excited about theorizing exit as nonterminal, and as a precondition for positive discontinuities in one’s entrepreneurial journey.
Finally, we contribute to the emerging literature on adversity, which is beginning to differentiate
between acute (Bullough & Renko, 2017) and chronic (Powell & Baker, 2014) adversity, by
underscoring that the progressive accumulation of adversity—setback after setback—creates
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distinct pressures and exit approaches (Fathallah & Branzei, 2017). When adversity is
cumulative, entrepreneurs respond to one event at a time; however, they may not always or
accurately anticipate how one specific disruption may impact their future trajectory. Situations
initially assessed as manageable can end up being terminal as their impact unfurls; similarly,
some truly traumatic events end up being quite manageable for some entrepreneurs as they tackle
one problem and one setback at a time.

2.5 Conclusion
Our inductive theorizing using the first-person accounts of 27 entrepreneurs facing recurrent
adversity in Lebanon extends the literature on entrepreneurial exit to account for what happens
before exit. We underscore the malleability of the individual-venture relationship and show two
exit pathways that combine partial and temporal adaptation to repair relationships repeatedly
damaged by cumulative events that disrupt either side.
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Appendix 2.1 Timeline of the Major Political Events in Lebanon5
Date
1975-1990
Feb. 14, 2005
Jun. 2, 2005
Jun. 21, 2005
Jul. 12, 2005
Dec. 12, 2005
Jul. 12, 2006
Nov. 21, 2006
Dec. 1, 2006
May–Sept.,
2007
Jun. 13, 2007
Sept. 19, 2007
Dec. 12, 2007
Jan. 25, 2008
May 7, 2008
May 8, 2008
Mar. 15, 2011

Summer 2012
Oct. 19, 2012
Dec. 2012
May 20, 2013
Jun., 2013

Jul. 9, 2013
Aug. 15, 2013
Aug. 23, 2013
Dec. 27, 2013
Apr. 2014
May 2014
Aug. 6, 2014

5

Description of the Event
Lebanese Civil War
A massive car bomb in Beirut kills Prime Minister Hariri and many others. Immense street
protests take place as a reaction to the assassination.
Journalist Samir Kassir is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut.
A bomb kills George Hawi, former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party.
Defense minister Elias Murr is among those wounded in a car bomb in Beirut.
An explosion kills Member of Parliament Gebran Tueni. Two other people are also killed.
Israel launches a one-month-long war against Lebanon after Hezbollah captures Israeli soldiers in
an attack across the border.
Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel is assassinated by gunmen.
A coalition of political parties stages a massive sit-in demonstration in downtown Beirut. A series
of political protests and sit-ins follows until May 21, 2008.
Clashes between Islamist militants and the Lebanese military at the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr
al-Bared. More than 300 people die.
Member of Parliament Walid Eido is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut.
Political party lawmaker Antoine Ghanem is assassinated in an explosion.
A car bomb kills General Francois El Hajj.
A bombing kills Internal Security Forces officer Wissam Eid.
Pro-Hezbollah fighters lock down Beirut and clash with people.
Pro-Hezbollah gunmen take over large parts of West Beirut. Gun clashes lead to many casualties.
The Arab Spring reaches Syria. The conflict eventually develops into a civil war in Syria. In
Lebanon, one coalition of political parties backs Syrian rebels, while the other coalition supports
the Syrian regime.
The Syrian war spills over to Lebanon through violent clashes in Tripoli and Beirut.
Police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan is killed along with eight other people in a car bomb.
Violent fights breaks out between supporters and opponents of the Syrian president in Tripoli.
Sectarian violence continues to spill over from the war in Syria. Many fights take place in Tripoli.
The main provider of Lebanon’s tourism revenue, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates—issues a travel warning for
citizens thinking of visiting Lebanon, as Syria’s civil war is fuelling violence in Lebanon.
A car bomb wounds at least 53 people in Southern Beirut where many support Hezbollah.
A car bomb in Southern Beirut kills 27 people and wounds 336 others.
Two car bombs in Tripoli kill 42 people and wound hundreds.
Mohamad Chatah, Lebanon’s former finance minister is killed with at least five others in a car
bomb in a central location in Beirut.
The United Nations announces that the number of Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon is over 1
million.
Lebanon’s President Suleiman ends his term of office, leaving a power vacuum. Several attempts
are made in parliament over subsequent months to choose a successor.
Syrian rebels cross to the Lebanese town of Arsal and get involved in clashes. They withdraw after
being confronted by the military, but take many Lebanese soldiers and police captive.

“Gulf states warn citizens against Lebanon travel,” 2013; “Lebanon profile – Timeline,” 2017; Mroueh,
2015; “Timeline: major attacks in Lebanon since 2005,” 2013; “Timeline: Tension in Lebanon,” 2014.
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Appendix 2.2 Initial Interview Guide
Introduction: I am interested in the impact of political instability in Lebanon on the ways in
which you operate in this context.
The Impact of Political Instability
 How does the political instability in Lebanon affect your firm? (firm’s operations and
strategies)
 Would your strategy be different if there was no political instability in Lebanon? Why
and how?
 How do you cope with this environment?
 What are the objectives of the business in this unstable context?
 How does the threat of the country’s political instability differ from other risks and
uncertainties your organization faces?
 How does this context influence your strategies – are there any significant differences
from what you think any business (that operates in politically stable context) needs to
consider? What resources and capabilities are the most helpful during distress and why –
and how do they differ from resources and capabilities most organizations need and use?
Stay or Exit / Motivation and Strategies
 Are you contemplating future turbulence? What scenarios are you thinking of? For
example, if a civil war erupts, what is the course of action you might take?
 What levels of performance will be acceptable to stay in business? What would have to
happen (in terms of losses, disruption etc.) to cause you to exit – i.e. terminate all
operations in Lebanon? (Probe: How patient would you be and why? What factors
determine the final decision?)
 Why do you stay in those situations? Or why have you exited (in case you have)?
o Probes: Thinking about Exit could be triggered by: small market, turbulent
industry (losing customers), losing money because of bad operations, hard to
manage operation, general economic environment, institutional settings, political
instability, changes in competitive advantage, intensity of rivalry in market, exit
of competitors, shortages of resources, strategic-poor fit, getting rid of
undesired/unprofitable units, shifting resources into units with greater growth or
opportunity…
o Probes: Exit barriers: cost to divest: sunk and relocation costs, organizational
entrenchment, management attachment to previous choices, resistance to admit
economic failure, personal commitment, trapped by assets, aversion to loss,
denial, family obligations
 What event do you recall most vividly as having had a significant impact on business (in
general, in your industry, on your own organization)? (Probes: what happened, what
issues did the events create for you, what did you do? Why? What was your thinking at
the time? What were your objectives?)
 What event has had the strongest impact on your own operations?
 How did these events affect you and your business?
o Civil war
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o Prime Minister Hariri assassination and the 2005 series of assassinations
o August War 2006
o Spillover of the Syrian civil war
o Series of car and suicide bombs in 2012 – 2013
Please tell me about any shifts or changes in your business strategy that may have been
triggered by any one of these events:
o Civil war
o Prime Minister Hariri assassination and the 2005 series of assassinations
o August War 2006
o Spillover of the Syrian civil war
o Series of car and suicide bombs in 2012 – 2013
Looking across these events, tell me more about your decisions on staying vs. exiting.
What strategies help you continue operating? How are they helpful? (What difference did
they make?) (What have you done, you think, that has allowed your company to stay?)
What has worked for you? What has not worked? What have you learned about how to
operate successfully in politically turbulent conditions?
Have you made any specific decisions about exiting? How would you know when it may
be better to go than to stay?
If a waiting approach has been suggested by the interviewee… when is a wait-and-see
approach is more expedient?
What is your thinking about staying and going now, and how has it changed over your
tenure with the current organization?

Stay or Exit / Forms: (specific to probe more discussion, if needed)
 Have you ever thought of exiting from: the specific venture? Entire business? Industry?
Country? Region?
 When does an exit become an option to consider? (Intention to exit) is it always an
option?
 What were the reasons at the time? What were you thinking at the time?
 What would an exit look like? Forms of exit: liquidate; sell, staged (gradual) or
immediate, complete or downscaling and downscoping as partial exit?
 What are the factors that you consider when exit is on the table?
 How do you feel about the possibility of an exit?
 Who is involved in the decision? What is the process?
 How do other stakeholders within the organization (e.g. investors, employees) affect your
decision to stay vs. exit? How do other stakeholders may limit your ability to make exit
or stay decisions?
Understanding the context
 Do you have operations outside Lebanon?


If yes, do you compare across contexts? e.g. Lebanon vs the UAE or Iraq? Take me
through what dimensions are most important to you across contexts and how they
compare with your operations in Lebanon.
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Within Lebanon, what are some of the key local institutions (rules, regulations,
organizations) that influence your operations in a positive or negative way? Are some
institutions missing – what would you like to have in place that is not currently available
or useful to your own operations or to business in general?

To help us contextualize your answers, can you tell us a little more about yourself, professionally
and personally?


Tell me first about your professional satisfaction – in your current position and organization.
 Remind me of your position, main duties, and how long you’ve been in this position
 How long with the organization overall
 Remind me of where the organization is right now…Number of employees, total annual
sales, field of business, year of foundation, number of business offices or branches in
domestic market.
 How have these changed since you first joined – how low or high did some of these
metrics get – were there any major changes associated with some of the events we talked
about?



How much time have you spent thinking about the effect of the political/economic
instability on your business operations? Were there times when you were particularly
preoccupied with the effect of context?
Looking ahead, how do you think the business (and you yourself?) will be a year/5 years
from now? Are you looking at any major changes in the next few years?



Last, tell me about your personal approach – how do you think about the context of
Lebanon and what you do here from a personal perspective? Does the continuation of
your business here influence your family life? In what ways?




Anything else you’d like us to think about?
Thank you.

69

Appendix 2.3 Follow-up Questions – Interview Guide
1. When you considered shutting down some of your operations, how did you think or talk
about it? Have you since changed your mind about what it meant – or the way you talk
about the cessation of operations/locations?
2. How far back in time did you begin contemplating the shut down? Give me a timeline of
the main triggers and thinking behind whether or when you may have to close at least
part of your venture down or relocate it elsewhere?
a. Do you recall a threshold or tipping point along the journey?
b. Did the decision suddenly become more (or less) professional vs. personal to you?
3. In the end, did you exit – if so, when and what exactly did the exit mean (physically,
geographically, materially, emotionally)?
a. How did you “date” when the exit actually happened?
b. How did you delineate where and how the exit took place?
4. Did you ever felt like you had to choose between your survival or your venture?
a. Were there scenarios in which your venture could have gone on without you?
b. If you were not in Lebanon – could the venture have survived without you? (Was
there something specific then and there that interlinked your fates?)
5. If an exit was articulated or executed (not just contemplated): Do you recall particular
moments or decisions along the way when you may have felt relieved it’s all over?
a. Were there other reactions you noticed at that time?
b. How do you feel now (how long has it been) about the exit?
6. Was the exit something you grappled with on your own or did you involve others (e.g.
friends, competitors, family)?
a. If others were involved at that time, what roles did they play – specifically did
they make it easier or harder to exit?
7. At what point did you start considering alternatives for yourself or the venture? Did you
look for options while you were contemplating or actually closing down operations? If
so, what difference did this dual approach (exit and re-entry) make to you personally –
8. How did you feel back then about alternatives coming online – did it make you feel better
about yourself and/or the venture?
a. Did it change in some way the way you related to your venture and if so, what
was the difference you felt at that time?
b. Looking back, do you feel the pressure to exit opened up new opportunities for
you, and if so, how did the exit make a difference to the opportunities you
contemplated or pursued since?
9. Comparing the re-entry post exit with the other opportunities you pursued without any
pressure or constraint before, what would you say was different for you? Did the ‘crisis’
model bring out new skills/expectations, or did it help you let go of some old
skills/expectations?
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10. What was the best thing you would say came out of contemplating exit? If you actually
closed down operations, are there any subsequent wins or even breakthroughs that you
attribute to that forced exit?
11. Could you give me an update on what you have been up to since we last spoke?
a. Any changes in your operations at home or abroad?
b. Any personal revelations or transformations?
c. Anything else you’d like to share?
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Chapter 3

3

No Place like Home? How EMNCs in distressed contexts
arbitrage resources, values, and opportunities abroad

ABSTRACT
Through an inductive study of 12 firms over 12 years, we examine how political and economic
instability at home influences the internationalization of emerging market multinational
companies (EMNCs). Our central contribution is a framework that outlines how EMNCs
internationalize under prolonged turmoil, that is, by sequentially replacing the resources, values,
and opportunities no longer available at home with alternatives they seek and find in foreign
contexts. We further elaborate on existing theories of institutional arbitrage by inducing how
each of the three ways in which EMNCs respond to distress qualitatively updates key attributes
of the home context.



We thank the founders and managers who made this research possible. We are grateful for the feedback
of the participants at the Academy of Management, Academy of International Business, and
Administrative Sciences Association of Canada.
We are very grateful for the financial support of Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada Insight Grant (R3695A08).
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3.1 Introduction
“On a recent flight from Beirut to Addis Ababa, Lebanese businessmen were swapping stories.
“Business is excellent in Angola,” declared one. “I hear it’s good in Ghana?” inquired another.
Flights out of Lebanon buzz with optimism. For Lebanese businessfolk, the juiciest opportunities
are abroad.”

3.1.1

The Economist, March 16, 2013

Why Home?

Home contexts shape firms’ global strategies (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Wan & Hoskisson,
2003), influencing their domestic versus international choices (Zahra, Korri & Yu, 2005),
performance trade-offs (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005; Peng, Wang, & Jiang,
2008) and patterns of growth (Khan, Rao-Nicholson, & Tarba, Forthcoming; Storper, 1997; Scott
& Storper, 2003). The (dis)advantages provided by home-of-origin endowments are foundational
in theories of international business (Elango & Sethi, 2007; Harzig & Sorge, 2003). We know
that institutional conditions, and changes, within a given context shape or shift firm-level actions
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Liang, Lu & Wang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin,
2007; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). We also know that firms recognize, and sometimes
deliberately arbitrage, institutional disparities among different contexts (Marano, Arregle, Hitt,
Spadafora, & van Essen, 2016).
The relationship between home context and internationalization is double-barreled. Abundance
at home broadens firms’ options elsewhere. Firms’ embeddedness within local networks (Guler
& Guillén, 2010), communities (McKeever, Jack, & Anderson, 2015), and eco-systems (Dahl &
Sorenson, 2009; Pajunen, 2008) enables and/or accelerates internationalization (Arregle, Miller,
Hitt, & Beamish, 2013; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kin, 1997). Firms may
leverage strength at home either by looking for more formal or stricter institutional environments
that challenge them to develop new capabilities (Witt & Lewin, 2007) and/or exploiting their
current skills in less formal or institutionally weaker settings (Luiz, Stringfellow, & Jefthas,
2017; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Scarcity, (i.e. weak or unstable institutions), (Luo &
Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007) and/or instability (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Henisz, 2000; Peng,
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Wang, & Jiang, 2008) at home may reduce or delay internationalization (Gammeltoft, Pradhan &
Goldstein, 2010; Wu & Chen, 2014), by threatening survival at home (Guillén & Suarez, 2005;
Ramamurti, 2009) and thwarting firm’s ability to plan ahead (Hiatt & Sine, 2014). However
danger and distress at home may, on occasion, accelerate internationalization (e.g., Holmes,
Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013; Stoian & Mohr, 2016) as exposure to uncertain and crisis-prone
environments increases a firm’s willingness to deal with risk and internationalize to more distant
or even riskier countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). Some firms “escape” challenging
environments altogether (Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008), leaving settings where capital
markets are underdeveloped, or critical institutions (e.g., infrastructure, intermediary markets,
regulatory systems, contract-enforcing mechanisms, etc.) missing, in search for greener pastures
elsewhere (Luo & Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007)
Such extreme conditions, unfortunately, are no longer an exception (Cantwell, 2009; Cantwell &
Mudambi, 2011; Eden & Molot, 2002). The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2017
(2017) underscores a rising trend of political disruptions with inter-state conflicts and state
collapse or crisis making the top five global risks in 2015 and 2016 (HIIK, 2010, 2016). Yet, we
have limited knowledge on how the internationalization process unfolds as many previously
stable homes are being buffeted by distress. We therefore ask how political and economic
instability at home influences the internationalization of emerging market multinational
companies.

3.1.2

One’s Place of Business

Recent literature reveals an increasing preoccupation with how crises, shocks, and disruptions
may affect a firm’s relationship to the places in which it conducts business (Chung, Lee, &
Beamish, & Isobe, 2010). Perhaps due to the growing incidence of such disruption and its oftendetrimental effects on global operations (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & Steen, 2010; Jallat &
Schultz, 2011), most papers focus on minimizing the downsides of adversity by reducing
exposure (Yamakawa et al, 2008). Getting away from danger has been presented as a strategic
endeavour (Berry, 2010; Belderbos & Zou, 2007)—firms reconfigure their subsidiaries to
balance risks across multiple (but differentially risky) host countries. Established multinational
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companies (MNCs) typically do so by timing or pacing their exit strategies (Dai, Eden, &
Beamish, 2013; Dai et al., 2017; Darendeli & Hill, 2015; Figueira-de-Lemos & Hadjikhani,
2014). It is economically rational, and often beneficial in the long term, for MNCs to divest
subsidiaries located in politically unpredictable environments (e.g., Dai et al., 2013; Darendeli &
Hill, 2015; Soule, Swaminathan, & Tihanyi, 2014), and there is robust support for such
flexibility under different kinds of uncertainty (e.g., Chung et al., 2010; Belderbos & Zou, 2007;
Belderbos & Zou, 2009). MNCs have the flexibility to close some businesses, relocate or invest
in new subsidiaries (Berry, 2010; Harrigan, 1981), and/or refocus on core activities (Duhaime &
Grant, 1984; Markides, 1992; Bergh, 1997; Chang & Singh, 1999).
Detachment from one’s place of business is never easy (Kibler, Fink, Lang, & Muñoz, 2015;
Lawrence & Dover, 2015). Foreign subsidiaries are comparatively cheaper and quicker to uproot
(Alvarez & Görg, 2009), but when crises strike one’s home (Coucke & Sleuwaegen, 2008),
escape means relocating the company’s headquarters (Meyer & Xia, 2012). Laamanen, Simula,
and Torstila (2012) deem this “the ultimate international business decision” (p. 187) because it
challenges the very identity of the firm. Leaving one’s home presents an even greater challenge
for emerging country multinational companies (EMNCs), either because they may not have the
choice of “opting-out” of their home-context institutions (Meyer & Thein, 2014, p. 157), and/or
because doing so may be misinterpreted as giving up on their home countries. Extant research
documents voluntary headquarter relocation, typically motivated by tax avoidance (Birkinshaw
Braunerhjelm, Holm, & Terjesen, 2006; Baaij, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2004). Instances of
involuntary relocation of headquarters are quite rare, in large part because most firms do
everything they can to avoid leaving their home in the first place. For example, Luo and Tung
(2007) explain how EMNCs deliberately offset institutional voids at home by going to
environments rich in well-developed institutions—especially when dependence on domestic
norms shortchanges their global prospects (Luo & Wang, 2012; Luo, Zhao, Wan, & Xi, 2011)
and the new environments are better aligned with their strategic needs (Witt & Lewin, 2007).
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3.1.3

Institutional Arbitrage

Boisot and Meyer (2008) define institutional arbitrage as “an exploitation of the differences
between different institutional arrangements operating in different jurisdictions” (p. 356). They
document how institutional arbitrage enabled Chinese firms to access better and more efficient
institutions in developed economies, and how supplementing what they could access at home
with what they could reach for abroad allowed these firms to better compete with MNCs from
developed markets on a global scale.
The notion of institutional arbitrage (Boisot & Meyer, 2008) is relatively recent, and existing
literature is not yet very clear on the specific forms of arbitrage that firms may pursue (Jackson
& Deeg, 2008; Luo & Zhang, 2016). We have also little understanding how institutional
arbitrage unfolds and what determines firms’ arbitraging needs (Luo & Zhang, 2016). We
contribute by inducing and illustrating three distinct mechanisms of institutional arbitrage, which
we refer to as resource-centric, value-centric, and horizon-centric arbitrage. To preface our
qualitative findings, we show how adversity helps a firm figure out what it needs abroad, as well
as why and when.
The first, and most discussed thus far, mechanism of institutional arbitrage focuses on the what –
the resources that a firm (no longer) controls. As resources become scarcer or pricier at home
(Wu & Chen, 2014), or are not available in the first place (e.g., technology and brands) (Luo &
Tung, 2007), firms “explore” other contexts in a quest to replace what they need to continue
operating.
The second mechanism contemplates the why. As the rules of their environment get interrupted
or interpreted in different ways, firms need to revise and realign what they stand for. While some
of these changes are concrete and materialize in operations (Sullivan-Taylor & Wilson, 2009),
others are more abstract or subtle and engage notions of fit, legitimacy, and even ideology. As
firms fall out of sync with their home contexts, they may be more inclined to question their
original beliefs and allegiances. Greater exposure and experience with instability makes some
firms more willing and able to adjust to what is (no longer) valued in their home country.
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The third mechanism of institutional arbitrage touches on the when. As the home environment
runs dry of opportunities, it forecloses firms’ planning horizons (Hiatt & Sine, 2014), and forces
them to break free from their past and rebuild their future elsewhere.
Our inductive approach recasts internationalizing out of a challenging home context as a gradual
and deliberate process, whereby firms progressively engage in distinct types of institutional
arbitrage deemed appropriate given successive changes in one’s place/s of business. We
specifically show that EMNCs sequentially engage in resource, value, and horizon arbitrage. We
further reveal that each type of arbitrage recasts the relationship with one’s home context by
rendering core attributes more or less pertinent to their internationalization. Taken together, our
findings advance new inductive propositions on the role of home context, offering a multi-modal
process model of institutional arbitrage as a step-wise detachment (Boddewyn, 1983) that
sometimes ends with a firm relocation (Laamanen et al., 2012; Meyer & Thein, 2014; Meyer &
Xia, 2012; Yamakawa et al., 2008). In so doing, our process model bridges theories of
attachment (McKeever et al., 2015) and escape (Witt & Lewin, 2007), explaining how different
modes of arbitrage punctuate firm’s movement along the continuum they anchor..

3.2 Methods
3.2.1

Longitudinal Comparative Case Study Design

To understand how unrest at home may influence EMNCs’ internationalization, we chose an
exploratory, longitudinal, multiple-case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner,
2007). Given our interest in home context in the midst of turmoil, we focused on Lebanon at a
critical juncture in its history. Within Lebanon, we further focused on the food and hospitality
industry, which conflict historians suggests bears the brunt of the disruption (Spilerman and
Stecklov, 2009) and local as well as global account depict in dire terms (e.g. experiencing “a
regression as high as 10 to 15% a year,” (Uncovering the Lebanese Restaurant Industry, 2014))
as we commenced our data collection. By picking the worst circumstances, and holding them
constant across firms, we rule out the role of adversity per se as a plausible explanation of our
findings. Specifically, because all firms we studied were steeped in the exact same conditions to
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begin with, any variance in their internationalization choices could not be reduced to exogenous
events. There is one caveat: prior research posits that crises can be interpreted and enacted in
different ways, even by seemingly identical firms. The literature suggests that history affects
how entities (individuals, ventures, communities) experience adverse events, depending on their
embeddedness and endowments (Barin Cruz, Aguilar Delgado, Leca, & Gond, 2016; Maitlis &
Sonenshein, 2010). We therefore included both firms that were well-established before the onset
of adversity in 2005 and firms that were just starting.
Comparative designs are also premised on variability along one or more critical theoretical
dimensions (Patton, 2002). Because we were interested in internationalization, we purposefully
sampled firms with one of three types of prior experience overseas: 1) none; 2) exports only; and
3) established subsidiaries. Arguably the internationalization options might differ across the three
types of firms, albeit in non-obvious ways. For example, it is not a foregone conclusion that
firms with more foreign experience would adapt quicker or better to distress, because their prior
commitments may now hinge on resources that are destroyed or discontinued at home or oblige
firms to exchanges they can no longer honour. At the same time, having done it before might
offer helpful lessons, and help some of the ‘veterans’ avoid rookie mistakes. Given the novelty
of the research question we ask, there are no clear priors in how prior internationalization
experience patterns subsequent internationalization. Instead we warrant sufficient variability by
sampling, so we can analytically discern if or how past internationalization choices might (or
not) affect future moves.
As we began our data collection, we became sensitive to the multiple attributes of home, with a
possible contrast between Lebanese-born and Lebanese-based firms. Three quarters of our
sampled firms were Lebanese-born; one quarter referred to Lebanon as their home, but we soon
realized it was their second rather than first home. While we did not have any reasons to expect
(nor did we eventually find) any systematic differences between these two groups, we continued
sampling until we were able to match these second-home firms (Lebanese-based, but not born)
on the same three kinds of prior internationalization experience we sampled the Lebanese-born
firms.
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All firms we considered were indigenous standalone firms; that is, they had not been subsidiaries
of either domestic or international companies. While many begun without much of an
international footprint and none of our respondents described them as multinationals at the
beginning of our inquiry, by the end of our study, all firms met Casson’s (1982) definition of
MNCs because they “owned outputs of goods or services originating in more than one country”
(p. 2), as well as Buckley and Casson’s (1985) definition of the same term because they “owned
or controlled income generating assets in more than one country” (p. 1–2). To accurately
describe their changing nature, we refer to them as nascent EMNCs, and explain their
internationalization as an emergent rather than planned process. By tracking how, and explaining
why, the same changes in these firms’ shared place of doing business yielded rather different
internationalization moves as the crises escalated, we induce new theory about the recursive
relationship between home context and internationalization for indigenous EMNCs (Doh, 2015).
Table 3.1 introduces our 12 cases using the names of Phoenician and Greek gods and goddesses
as pseudonyms to disguise the firms.6

6

Seven of these cases were included in Essay #1 and further analyzed here in Essay #2. Appendix 3.1
reveals those cases. We also pursued two additional, de novo cases, and then added three contrast cases,
which were not included in Essay #1.
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3.2.2

Time-frame, 2005–2016

While Lebanon has been an on-going theater of disruption for several decades, we focused on a 12-year
window of a series of severe crises (“Lebanon Country Profile,” 2016) that clearly demarcated by the
onset of adversity in 2005 and the return of instability once the Syrian refugee crisis peaked in 2014.
Appendix 3.2 lists the key events. The 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the 34day military conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, shook up an otherwise prosperous and
entrepreneurial landscape of businesses, which had long included a mix of multi-generational family
firms and start-up along with subsidiaries of established MNEs (Jamali & Mirhsak, 2010). Before
2005, the vast majority of food and hospitality businesses focused within Lebanon, serving a wide
diversity of tourists pouring in from the region. Growth was thus largely indigenous and premised on
the much that Lebanon had to offer. By 2016, the Lebanese eco-system was decimated, with the
majority of establishments pared or even completely closed down. As the Economist opening quote
vividly suggests, Lebanese-born and based ventures sought and found greener pastures elsewhere, often
by following their customers no longer travelling to Lebanon and finding ways to serve them in their
own (relatively more stable) countries.
By using a combination of retrospective and prospective interviews, our inductive design allowed us to
document how a common but rapidly changing home context systematically influenced the
internationalization pattern of 12 nascent EMNCs over an eventful 12-year window.
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Table 3.1 Descriptions of Case Studies
Firm

Domain/Business

Private
Interviews

Public Accounts

Internationalization

Dione

Food & Beverage (F&B) hospitality services established
in 1998
500 employees

1 (2013)
1 (2017)

1 (2010) – 2 (2012)
3 (2013) – 3 (2014)
2 (2015) – 2 (2016)

F&B services founded in 2003
180 employees

1 (2013)
1 (2016)
1 (2017)

Byblus

F&B – hospitality services
established in 2005
130 employees

1 (2015)
1 (2016)
1 (2017)

1 (2003) – 1 (2008)
1 (2011) – 2 (2012)
2 (2013) – 3 (2014)
3 (2015)
1 (2009) – 1 (2011)
1 (2012) – 4 (2013)
2 (2014) – 2 (2015)

2005 – No outward
internationalization.
2016 – JV in the US & UAE.
Franchise in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
& Oman.
2005 – No outward
internationalization.
2016 – JV in the UAE. Franchise in
Saudi Arabia.
2005 – No outward
internationalization.
2016 – FDI in the UAE.

Sydyk

F&B production founded in
1964
150 employees

1 (2015)
1 (2016)
1 (2017)

1 (2013)
1 (2015)

Cadmus

F&B production – Family
business founded in 1979
350 employees

1 (2013)
1 (2017)

1 (2012)
1 (2013) – 1 (2014)

Adonis

F&B production established in
2006
50 employees

1 (2013)
1 (2016)
1 (2017)

F&B services – Family
business founded in 1960
730 employees
F&B services & retail company
established in 1999
500 employees
F&B – hospitality services
founded in 2003
330 employees

1 (2015)
1 (2016)
1 (2017)
1 (2015)
1 (2017)

1 (2009) – 1 (2010)
1 (2011) – 1 (2012)
6 (2013) – 3 (2015)
5 (2016)
1 (2009) – 1 (2011)
1 (2012) – 1 (2014)

2 (2015)
1 (2016)
1 (2017)

2 (2006) - 2 (2011)
1 (2012) - 1 (2013)
3 (2014) – 1 (2015)
1 (2016)

F&B services founded in
Bahrain in 2006
50 employees
F&B, retail & hospitality
founded in Venezuela in1965
500 employees

1 (2016)
1 (2017)

1 (2012)
1(2014)

1 (2016)
1 (2017)

2 (2015) – 2 (2016)

F&B services established in
Saudi Arabia in 1985 –
relocated to Lebanon in 1992
60 employees

1 (2016)
1 (2017)

1 (2007) – 1 (2012)
2 (2015) – 1 (2016)

Lebanon-born Firms

Ugarit

Nomios
Thalassa

Lebanon-based Firms

Kothar

Astarte
Medea

Melkart

2 (2012)
1 (2013)

2005 – 20% of business is exports
to Saudi Arabia, Qatar & Africa.
2016 – 80% of business is
international. New HQ in Nigeria.
Subsidiary in Ghana.
2005 – Export to 20 countries.
2016 – FDI (WOE) in Jordan.
Export to 35 countries. Franchise in
Kuwait, the UAE, & Jordan.
2006 – Exports mainly to Syria.
2016 – Exports to new countries.
(26 countries) – planned operation
(Chicago). Operation in Australia.
2005 – Subsidiaries in the UAE.
2016 – New FDI in the UAE.
FDI in Saudi Arabia & Jordan.
2005 – Subsidiary in Cyprus.
2016 – Established subsidiary in
Ivory Coast. Contemplating Iran.
2005 – Subsidiaries in the UAE &
UK.
2016 – Relocated HQ to the UAE.
Contemplating FDI in South East
Asia, Turkey, & Greece.
2006 – No outward
internationalization.
2016 – FDI in Lebanon.
2005 – Exports to Paraguay &
Mexico.
2016 – FDI in Lebanon.
2005 – Subsidiaries in the
Philippines & Japan. Exports to
KSA, Jordan, Cyprus, Kuwait,
Senegal, Spain, & Russia.
2016 – Projects in Saudi Arabia.
Relying more on exports & new
markets: Qatar & Pakistan.
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3.2.3

Data Collection

We developed detailed longitudinal narratives for each one of the 12 cases using a combination
of in-person observations in three consecutive two-month field trips (approximately 2 weeks per
case), archival sources (89) and analyses (5 expert interviews), in-depth interviews (13, lasting
between 60 and 120 minutes7) and two follow-ups (18, half-sample in 2016, then full-sample in
2017)8, including the presentation and validation of the induced framework to all protagonists
between June and August 2017.
While each one of our cases spanned approximately the same 12-year window9, data pertaining
to the 2005-2013 period was collected retrospectively and therefore subject to recall biases
(Golden, 1992). To mitigate this concern, we took several steps to verify these retrospective
accounts by triangulating archival data and probes in later interviews, and did not detect any
inconsistencies between early and later accounts. However, it is possible that protagonists would
have selectively retained, or discarded, key information during the eight years we did not have
direct or recurrent contact with them. Should this have been the case, we might have expected a
distinct pattern of internationalization between firms who moved early and late, and even more
precisely between those firms, which began to arbitrage after rather than before our first wave of
direct contacts in 2013. We were on alert for such discrepancies throughout the analysis, but
found none. Indeed, restricting our analysis to the 2013-2016 yielded the exact same inductive
findings, despite the significantly reduced subset of internationalization moves undertaken by the
firms we sampled.

7

7 of these interviews were conducted in person in Lebanon by the first author, four interviews took
place in person in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the remaining two occurred via Skype.
8

All except six of the follow-ups which were held on location were conducted remotely via phone or
Skype.
9

Two of the cases were founded in 2006.
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We updated the protocol for each of the different waves of interviews. The 2013 and 2015
version was used in a broader study of how indigenous firms responded to emergencies reported
in Chapter 2 and appears on pages 66-68 (Appendix 2.2) of this dissertation. The 2016 and 2017
follow-ups are included in Appendix 3.3.
The primary data for the case studies were collected during three consecutive two-month field
trips in 2013, 2015, and 2016, and included 13 in-depth interviews with 12 organizations (we
interviewed both co-founders for one organization), as follows. In 2013 we visited 4 Lebanonborn firms (4 interviews); in 2015 we visited 5 more (6 interviews). In 2016 we added the 3
contrast cases of Lebanese-based firms (3 interviews).
The first round of interviews with the firms (in 2013 and 2015) focused on how the political and
economics instability impacts the firm and what kind of changes the management team made to
accommodate to the political and security disruptions. In an effort to capture some of the
emerging insights, our second round of interviews (i.e. first follow-up in 2016 with 6 out of the 9
cases) added a second protocol, which encouraged a comprehensive and accurate depiction of
internationalization moves, experiences and rationales, requested comparisons of moves in and
across time (earlier versus later moves), and sought reflections on any connections between
going abroad and leaving Lebanon. Both interview protocols were semi-structured, with enough
commonality to allow us to establish a common and comparable foundation among the firms
while remaining sensitive to key differences among them. In each field trip, we resorted to
questions and clarifications to more fully capture nuances in the interviewees’ interpretations and
tease out differences among their understanding, choices and experiences. We reused the two
protocols for interviewing the contrast cases in 2016.
The first follow-up in 2016 focused on connections among emerging constructs, while the
second follow-up with the full sample (12/12) in 2017 zoomed even further into the recursive
relationship between home context and internationalization. Each additional layer was analyzed
with, rather than separately from, all prior rounds and types of data. Each layer unsettled old
insights, replacing them with new ones.
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We supplemented the interview data with detailed field notes. Because all the interviews were
conducted in Arabic, with some informants resorting to English or French for added eloquence,
the second author did not have instant access to the interviews. The field notes served a dual
function by crossing the language and the distance barrier, so that authors could process new
insights in real-time. These field notes neither reduced nor replaced the original accounts, which
were translated and transcribed as soon as possible, often within a week. Rather, they captured
themes that recurred within and across interviews. We conducted the follow-ups in English, with
both authors present and probing. Instead of written field notes we conducted verbal debriefs
immediately following each interview. These debriefs were more interactive, allowing us to
compare and contrast our understanding in real-time,
While in the field, the first author engaged in observation of the studied firms, and the industry
overall. He added 5 interviews with experts (in 2013); immersed himself in conversations with
local businessman and women; crossed paths with some of the protagonists in economic forums
and events he attended, and had brief conversations with them whenever possible. For example,
he met three of his informants during the June 25 “Appeal against Economic Suicide,” a
movement with a public symposium that took place in Beirut on June 25, 2015. These
conversations were rapport-building rather than data-gathering encounters, since it would not
have been appropriate to ask such sensitive questions amidst their competitors.
External accounts are particularly helpful for longitudinal case comparisons because they can
reveal differential trajectories and patterns, over and above differences among protagonists at a
given point in time (e.g., Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). For each of the 12 firms, we conducted
comprehensive archival searches of public records and solicited private records including press
releases, websites, presentations, and brochures. We paid particular attention to public accounts
given by our protagonists in the local and international media (e.g., magazines, newspapers,
reports, cases, videos, and social media activity). We added analyst reports and industry articles
describing differential responses by their competitors. In total, we used 89 corroborating
documents to triangulate the insights from our interviews with key informants and industry
experts. We complemented the firm’s interviews and follow-ups with the five in-person, in-depth
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interviews with industry experts who provided their opinions about different events and firms.
On average, expert interviews lasted 87 minutes.

3.2.4

Data Analysis

Our inductive approach closely heeded Eisenhardt’s (1989) and Eisenhardt and Graebner’s
(2007) recommendations for multiple case theory building. We constructed detailed case-by-case
narratives, which captured each firm’s internationalization moves over time (Santos &
Eisenhardt, 2009). We then juxtaposed the 12 cases and identified three groups of moves, which
sought and found resources, values, and opportunities no longer available at home elsewhere. We
zoomed into each subset of moves to better understand the three kinds of arbitrage, articulating
and illustrating differences among them. We noticed that firms lacked and pursued resources
early on and opportunities later on, with an interim stage where they focused on their values
rather than things or actions. We also noticed that the meaning of home was not static, and
seemed to get updated once firms switched to a different kind of arbitrage. Attributes ubiquitous
in prior accounts became rarities in subsequent descriptions, while new ones cropped up
unexpectedly. Switches from positive to negative, then again from negative to positive, attributes
of home further puzzled us, especially when there had been no sudden changes in the
environment per se that might warrant such dramatic re-categorizations. We remained unclear,
however, on whether the meaning of home was a cause or an effect of internationalization. Our
follow-ups honed in on the relationships between each kind of arbitrage and the meaning of
home. We came to understand that the relationship was recursive, with one informing the other
over time. Internationalization often motivated how one categorized one’s home so that multiple
attributes of home got added or dropped as firms transitioned from one type of arbitrage to
another. While it is not necessarily productive to claim that one always comes first, let alone
causes the other, the co-evolution between home context and internationalization recurrent in our
12 cases suggests that the meaning of home is not a byproduct of exogenous events in as much as
reconstructed as firms seek and find greener pastures elsewhere.
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3.3 Findings
All firms in our study deemed internationalizing essential to the challenge of surviving the
disruption at home.
Dione started brand new business concepts aimed exclusively at international markets: “We are
living in an unstable country. To survive, you need not only to have one leg outside of Lebanon,
but 15 legs... Opening in other countries in the region, and hopefully outside the region as well,
gives us this stability and this gives us a way to keep growing and to know that in 10 years we
can still be here.” Adonis similarly explained: “We were just starting our international markets,
but we were not as aggressive. When things got bad here, we became more aggressive in
international markets. What can [we] do? […] We don’t have other choices.”
Our data suggest that how firms experience political and economic unrest in their home context
shapes their internationalization. Because instability at home hindered firms’ operations through
erratic customer behaviour, questioned their plans, and restricted their prospects, firms sought
out multiple institutional contexts in order to mitigate the progressive deterioration in their
resources, values, and horizons at home. All firms started with resource-based arbitrage, and all
tipped from one mechanism to the next sequentially, but only as they were fast approaching the
limits of their resources, values, or horizons. Once a given limit had been reached, firms recast
their relationship with their home context by, respectively, recommitting, rescinding, or
relocating.

3.3.1

Recommitting

Firms rapidly and often radically reoriented their internationalization strategy towards other
institutional contexts in order to leverage assets under-leveraged at home. This resource-centric
arbitrage was evident through three mechanisms: conserving resources, compensating for lost
rents, and complementing risk-return. “Conserving resources” is all about salvaging or saving
critical assets left undamaged but also unused due to the distress at home. “Compensating for lost
rents” means using these assets in international markets instead. “Complementing risk-return
ratios” refers to one-sided expansions of a firm’s portfolio of activities abroad by deliberately
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selecting deployments where remaining critical resources could be put to their most lucrative
use.
The assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005 abruptly impacted Ugarit’s home operations
as the threat level discouraged local clients from going out and tourists from visiting Lebanon.
Concerned about the impact of the crisis on its employees, Ugarit pursued alternatives in
international markets that would safeguard their jobs, through franchising in Dubai: “the name
gives small royalty fees to the mother company. I might be saving half of the salaries from the
percentages I’m going to get from there.” Among other markets in the Middle East, Dubai also
came first on all three criteria: some of their employees (their most critical resource) idled by the
instability at home could be redeployed there at a favorable risk-return ratio. Ugarit had a distinct
preference for markets like the UAE that were proximate enough to home, so the firm could
offer temporary job opportunities, and even growth prospects, to their current employees with
the goal of encouraging those employees to come back to Lebanon once the situation stabilized.
Kuwait was off the list because it was a too small market. The Saudi market was sufficiently
large, but Ugarit decided against it because Saudi Arabia was experiencing political instability of
its own at that time. Ugarit also opted against entering more distant markets such as North
America because they were worried that once their employees relocated there, they would never
come back to Lebanon.
All nine firms resorted to conserving resources, compensating for lost rents, and seeking riskreturn ratios that complemented current activities in order to salvage their operations and sustain
presence at home. Table 3.2 summarizes our data on recommitting. The more dependent the
firms were on the domestic market, the more committed they were to safeguarding their
relationship with the home context. Their internationalization moves merely redeployed their
existing assets to other institutional environments where they could temporarily generate better
yields. These surplus rents earned through subsidiaries abroad were channeled right back into the
home-based operation, treated as a form of “foreign aid” for their struggling headquarters. Even
when firms experienced unprecedented success in international markets, they still attributed most
of their success abroad to the advantages that their home country continued to provide. Even as
operations thinned out to a standstill, most continued to describe Lebanon as “the showcase.”
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Despite the worsening crisis in Lebanon, firms like Ugarit remained hopeful that the situation
would soon get better and they could focus back on operations at home. Second-generation firms
like Nomios even had plans to resell all of their temporary operations abroad so they would be
able to expand their operations in Lebanon as soon as the situation stabilized.
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Table 3.2 Recommitting
Resource-centric Arbitrage
Overall
Rating*
Definition

Rationale

Conserving
resources

Compensating
for lost rents

Complementing
risk-return ratios

Concrete actions that show,
salvage, or save assets
deemed critical
Frugality extends the
lifespan of critical assets,
allowing firms to use them
longer

Calculus of rents lost
at home and sought
and found elsewhere
Fuller use of critical
assets helps firms slow
down the involuntary
erosion of rents

Comparisons of riskreturn ratios across
different locales
Finding alternative riskreturn ratios to gain
greater control over the
instability

Result

Nomios

++++

We will give it at least one more
year. … We went abroad
because of [our home operation].
This is the pilot. How can you
close it?

More employees want to
leave Lebanon than stay.
When there are a lot of
people wanting to leave,
instead of requesting $1
to go and work in our
international outlets, they
would do so for $0.70. …
We make the salary
higher for people who are
willing to stay, and make
the salary lower for
people who want to leave.

Our international
operations are growing on
their own. We do one
restaurant that works out
well and it makes another
new restaurant. The
second makes the third.
We are not injecting
money as a big
corporation.

We don't want to take a
huge risk outside … if
Lebanon gets a quiet
and stable situation … I
would sell all my
international operations
and … even stop
travelling for business
purposes.

Ugarit

++++

If I don’t take care of my
employees who have been
working with me for ten years,
we will go. This is where the
franchising idea started. … We
are securing jobs to return. …
For me, it was another way.
Because the person who went to
Dubai or Saudi Arabia as a
manager will come back to
Lebanon.

Look how much smaller
Lebanon got. … You
need licensing, branding,
franchising, you have to
open abroad. That way,
you can survive during
this crisis. An incentive to
put our feet outside
Lebanon [and obtain] a
certain income.

I took a big risk here
[which Dubai helps offset,
financially]. I get a small
percentage as personnel.
Plus the name gives small
royalty fees to the mother
company. I might be
saving half of the salaries
from the percentages I’m
going to get from there.

We are thinking of the
coming days and taking
precautions. If the days
go right, no one needs
anything. … Call it
Lebanization, call it
what you want, but it’s a
bond. … We are
Lebanese and we are
coming back.

Cadmus

+++

We export to over 30
countries now.

… which
helped us in maintaining
our stability in Lebanon.

Dione

++

We were able to make up
for our drop in Lebanon
by exporting to other
markets.
.
[New concept] was done
to grow the brand outside
of Lebanon. From the
start, we had the vision
and the manuals ready
from the first day we
were working on the
brand, so we can take it
international.

There are more restaurants
closing this year than
opening. To be able to stay
here, you need to have
antennas elsewhere.

We are very biased for
Lebanon, and we
wanted to be in
Lebanon; but a year like
this one is carnage for
the Lebanese market.

Byblus

+

The political instability
sped up our expansion
process to abroad. So
there is a silver lining to
[the instability]: it
motivates you to look for
different alternatives in
different markets to apply
your investment and your
human capital.

The cost-benefit analysis
is better for Dubai. Why I
would invest here put all
the investment here when I
would do better in Dubai.
However, if the situation is
still stable here and
growing, then, yeah, I
would open one more
branch here.

Ideally, I would have
stable a Lebanon with a
strong economy and
tourism sector. If that
were the case, we would
invest everything to
make it a better country.
[He is still hopeful that
one day he can return to
a peaceful, stable
country.]

Lebanon for us is like a
catalogue. Potential partners
such as investors from Saudi
Arabia come to Lebanon to look
at the concept.
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Adonis

+

Had a struggle month to month
to pay the salaries and the rent. I
would have been gone bankrupt.

When things got bad here,
we went more aggressive
in international markets.
What can I do?

Part of what happened in
Syria forced us to go out
and export. And so the
business got geared more
and more towards export.

That was the straw that
broke the camel’s back.
We built the business on
the understanding that
Hezbollah might fight
with Israel again. … It’s
when the Lebanese
started shooting at each
other that it turned to a
complete dysfunction.

Kothar

+

Fear of the unknown, of not
being able to pay the salaries.
It’s a big responsibility. When
you have an employee that is not
paid, what can be worse than
this? The business fear, … the
continuity fear.

We [eventually] shut down
everything in Lebanon. we
just have a virtual office
because we still have some
staff on our company for
social security. We still
have our lawyers. But we
reduced the costs to, like,
really nothing and that’s it.

We’re not investing in
any new projects for the
time being but we look
at this market as a great
opportunity as soon as
the consequences of the
Syrian war are reduced
and there is more
stability in Beirut.

Sydyk

+

There were huge losses. The
factory stopped. When the
factory stops; the employee has
nothing to do with, he has to get
paid. Everything stopped but I’m
still paying my employees. I
don’t want to lose them and they
all have families. … Everyone
[in Lebanon] is paying half
salaries now because there is a
crisis. I found the right formula
with my team here to be able to
grow. That is why we are [still]
paying good salaries.

We reduced our exposure
in Lebanon but we still
have an office there and
we still have a few outlets
there. … Why would you
stick to the idea of taking
from outside to cover
losses inside? for what?
For ego reasons? Bit by
bit we had to shut down
because we could not
sustain our operations.
We decided to go abroad
with putting the base here
in Lebanon and using
whatever advantages
Lebanon is still offering.
If I wanted to hire
someone like Head of
Projects in Africa, it will
cost me 10 times more
what I pay him in
Lebanon. In Africa, I
need to pay his salary,
accommodation, security
and other costs.

We decided to go out [of
Lebanon]. I didn’t have a
choice. To survive, I had
to diversify. … This was
the only strategy!
Otherwise, we would have
closed the whole business
if we relied on the
business in Lebanon. …
As long as I am doing
great abroad with the base
and support from Lebanon,
I will not close down.

In Lebanon, I will not
make it bigger, I will
keep it as is. However,
if we need to leave the
country, we will leave
the country. … I am a
businessman. As long I
am not losing money I
will stay open. The day
I lose money, I will
close down.

Thalassa

+

You have almost 1,000
employees and their families.
You feel this is the driving force
… What will they do if we close
the business?

We were planning to go
into Syria, but the war
escalated there. Now, I’m
trying to expand into Iran
and Africa. I have a large
team working on the
Africa project.

It is all affection in
Lebanon because you
are the local and it is
your country … Not
always 1 plus 1 equals 2
in Lebanon, they make
minus sometimes … It
becomes emotional and
humanitarian.

* To rate the mechanisms, we assigned each case a score of “+” for use of a particular mechanism. We
added plus signs to denote how prominently that particular mechanism factored in the public and private
accounts for that case, relative to the eight others we examine in this paper.
# The text in this table is based on personal interviews, and prioritizes the accurate transcription of those
interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished grammar or
syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard.
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In this first stage, firms’ internationalization moves were home-bound: firms pursued, and
justified, foreign entry as a way to capitalize on their strong ties to their home context and make
ends meet while their home market was on the mend.
While all firms engaged in at least one of the three resource-centric arbitrage processes, some
reached the limits of their critical resources a lot sooner than others. Like Ugarit, Adonis initially
“jumped” to international markets to keep the business running. “Our local market here is a joke”
and “I had a struggle month to month to pay the salaries and the rent,” Adonis explained. “I had
no choice,” he added, “I had to go out to compensate for this net loss.” For Adonis, success
abroad was quick, and the company soon started questioning its ties to Lebanon.

3.3.2

Rescinding

As instability at home started to impinge on foundational values, defined as what is right/good or
wrong/bad for the organization (Gehman, Trevino, & Garud, 2013), firms began questioning
their long-term commitment to their home country context by engaging in three related forms of
value-centric arbitrage: dissonance becomes habit; demonizing “the downs”; and de-valorizing
“the ups.” Dissonance becomes habit captures repeated instances of incommensurability
between what firms did and the consequences of their actions: the harder they tried, the less
satisfactory the outcomes. As firms repeatedly tried, but failed, to find the right combinations of
actions that were good or right for them, they started condemning the negative consequences of
the increasingly restrictive home context on previously valued aspects of the operation, that is
demonizing “the downs”. “So we’re working, it’s true that you’re working, but do you want it or
not? You’re going backwards,” Ugarit explained. When struggling firms caught a break in the
turbulence and the business picked-up enough to offer them some respite, firms reflected on the
more and more limited upside of their efforts at home compared with similar efforts elsewhere,
which we labelled de-valorizing “the ups”.
The start-up of Byblus coincided with the onset of the political and economic unrest in Lebanon,
but the founder and his partner were determined to make a go of it. During the war in 2006, they
had to postpone the opening of the business and take refuge at Muscat. Soonest the war was
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over, they returned to Lebanon and hosted “a CFP: cease-fire party.” In 2012, the business
started to struggle due to a ban on tourists visiting Lebanon from the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC). Byblus had just expanded the year before, so it was ready for more—and not less—
business. The set-back rendered the prior investment useless. While the founder was initially
quite bullish on the prospects of Byblus, he became “more mature and pragmatic”, and
eventually grew outright pessimistic: “For now, in Lebanon you feel you can’t improve.”
Table 3.3 illustrates the use of value-centric arbitrage by the nine firms in our study. Whereas
resource-centric arbitrage prolonged the survival of the firm in Lebanon by preserving the
significance of the home context throughout any and all internationalization moves, value-centric
deliberately downplayed the importance of the home context. Recognizing that doing what was
good and right for their firm was getting them further and further behind at home, as Ugarit
noted, firms began decoupling their domestic and international strategies. While most still valued
their survival within Lebanon and did what they could to continue their operations there, they
gradually refocused on growth elsewhere independently from what they or might accomplish at
home. As firms straddled multiple contexts, they leaned less and less on their home context.
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Table 3.3 Rescinding
Value-centric Arbitrage
Overall
Rating*

Dissonance becomes
habit

Demonizing
“the downs”

De-valorizing
“the ups”

Definition

Repeated instances of
incommensurability
between actions and their
consequences

Damning accounts of
negative consequences
that are unwarranted,
given the investments

Decrying the
progressively limited
upside of intensifying
efforts

Rationale

Revising what one has
long deemed worthy
based on feedback from
the home context

Reluctantly coming to
comprehend how the
home context severely
constrains the value of
previously cherished
skills and moves

Adjusting downward
the value one places on
previously cherished
skills and moves, and
discarding those that no
longer yield payoffs
I don't think Lebanon will
be stable in my lifetime. …
We looked at conditions at
home and realized it was
time to focus outside.

Dione

++++

To be able to sustain from a
business perspective, you
need some stability, you need
to be able to make long-term
plans. [At present] we only
make plans for next month,
cannot make plans for next
year or for five years.

But when something such
as the July War in 2006
happens and you get a slap
on your face.

Byblus

++++

For now, in Lebanon you feel
you can't improve. When you
have no help from the
government you can't do
anything. … What did these
governmental institutions
provide? Heartache!
Nothing! They do not
provide anything well for us.
… It is easier to say what
they don't provide. … Here
you are on your own.

There is no end in sight.
Personally, I don’t see [the
security situation] getting
sorted for years.

When you take $1 of
currency invested plus 1
unit of risk plus 1 unit of
time and resources and
energy and you assess the
returns from these three
things together and you do
the same exercise for a city
like Dubai, then the
formula scientifically,
quantitatively and
qualitatively makes it a lot
better to invest your dollar,
time, know how, and
energy in a stable economy
with a yearly growth and
high spending power. …
Everyone I knew here is
over there now.
If I were based in a
different country that had
stability, I would definitely
double the existing
business. At least. Without
exaggeration.

Result

Then, you start to think
about new plans and
look at different markets.
This is exactly what
happened.

I always contemplate
future turbulence in
Lebanon. Why would we
stay? Well, as long as
our operations are
profitable, … we stay.
… However, there is a
threshold of instability at
some point, instability is
going to increase to a
point where you don't
achieve your
[profitability targets].

Where I can go? I need
to expand. … I need
oxygen. There is no
oxygen here. …

Thalassa

+++

Adonis

+++

I’ve had enough. 42 years of
worrying over s*** that I had
no control over … No, no,
no. I don’t want any more of
your challenges, thank you
very much.

If Australia hadn’t come
along, and if the US didn’t
come a long, and nothing
else came along, … would
still be fighting in Lebanon
to make it work.

It is a day to day challenge
to get things done in this
country. … It’s too hard
and it shouldn’t be that
hard.

It was inevitable that we
leave.
I’m very lucky compared
to others.

Kothar

+++

The stability, whether it is
political, security, or
economical, is key for any
kind of business and
especially for ours. … The

So many times you needed
to shut down the
operations, close on many
weekends and many days.
How you can make money

The consequences of the
political instability were
very adverse to our
operations. And they were
the main reason why we

The biggest pain at the
end of the day is to
leave. It is not easy to
leave your own country,
but [for us it was]
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political instability is the
major factor that made the
market as it is today [unfit].

and how can you progress
in an environment like
this?

are ultimately going
outside and looking for
other opportunities in
different markets.

necessary.

+++

I am by nature an optimistic
person but when it comes to
Lebanon I am not. I am very
happy, the business is
growing, we are getting new
exciting projects but I cannot
trust the country anymore
from the business sense.

In Lebanon, we are on
survival mode for the
business. Abroad, we are
doing amazing. In Lebanon
we are just breaking even
and covering our costs.
The profit is coming from
abroad.

All our eggs were in this
country. … We’ve been
here for 52 years and we
were happy. But if I get
an opportunity to exit, I
wouldn’t say no.

Cadmus

+

Ugarit

+

During 2006, … all the ports
were shut due to the war. …
We were very worried, as if
we stop importing our
factory stops production.
Also, if we stop exporting,
we lose our sales and
revenues.
Here in Lebanon we don’t
have strategic planning. Here
we have day-to-day, sorry,
minute-to-minute, second-tosecond planning. Day-to-day
is too big. … Your problem
today is you cannot do a fiveyear strategic plan when you
don’t know your second.

The crisis isn’t affecting us
much now. If nothing
major happens here, we
will not close down the
business fully. It’s more
cost effective for [us] to
stay here. However, it is a
different story if ISIS
attacks Lebanon.
We started to have a fear,
as our international
customers do not wait for
your production. … The
supermarket can’t wait for
your products if you are
late in fulfilling the order.
We started thinking about
[going outside] after only 3
years from opening [in
Lebanon], because of
Hariri’s events. If it would
have continued like this, I
think I would have stayed
another year or two years
before saying “next.”

We can’t stay here; we
have to have a foot outside
Lebanon. Now, outside
Lebanon is a bit shaky too.
But compared to Lebanon,
everything is great. So, this
is what made us go outside.

This is my strategy. I
don’t know if it’s right
or wrong. … It’s not an
escape at all. It’s not
even the right strategy
for diversification.

Nomios

+

Every year we are going
backward. You look
around and see cats and
mice walking on the streets
[once buzzing with
clients]. You become sad
about the country. …

There’s no money in
Lebanon. Let’s put it this
way. Imagine we only have
this restaurant. Would we
have been able to live like
this?

In case the business is
going down and down, I
would close this
restaurant in Lebanon
and we would continue
outside, but this is
something I would hate
to do because Lebanon is
the foundation of our
business … so I prefer it
won't happen.

Sydyk

I used to be looking forward
to coming to Lebanon. It
used to be stars glowing …
Now I come back indifferent.

* To rate the mechanisms, we assigned each case a score of “+” for use of a particular mechanism. We
added plus signs to denote how prominently that particular mechanism factored in the public and private
accounts for that case, relative to the eight others we examine in this paper.
# The text in this table is based on personal interviews, and prioritizes the accurate transcription of those
interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished grammar or
syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard.
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3.3.3

Relocating

Starved of opportunities due to worsening instability in Lebanon, the nine firms not only
intensified their search for greener pastures but also began separating their past (at home) from
their future (elsewhere). As prospects for doing business at home became dimmer, firms
reframed their internationalization moves as ways to “raise their own bar” from what was no
longer possible at home to what may still be possible elsewhere. Kothar eloquently explained
this separation: “Until 2011, there was no decision to leave Lebanon at all; there was still a
decision to expand in Lebanon. We knew the ups and downs. We knew the instability. We were
trying to live with it. It was challenging, but at the same time, we were hedging our bets by
opening more businesses. [But] after 2011, with the Syrian crisis, we came to a point where we
saw the efforts made … and the problems reached a point where it did not make any sense for us
to continue … having a base there. And we saw that being based in Dubai gives us a much
bigger [advantage].”
Among the nine firms in our study, Kothar and Adonis were particularly effective in separating
the past from the future. They both ended up relocating their headquarters. Other firms, such as
Dione and Byblus, clearly prioritized their international expansions but did so without fully
relocating elsewhere. Nomios pursued opportunities within Saudi Arabia and the UAE to make
up for shortfalls of opportunity at home, but capped international expansion to two or three
foreign markets, iterating their readiness to cash out of all these subsidiaries once stability
allowed them to re-focus on Lebanon.
We identified three types of horizon-centric arbitrage: renouncing goals, removing limits, and
rebalancing priorities. Renouncing goals refers to letting go context-specific goals that are no
longer achievable. Removing limits is about recognizing that the limits imposed by the home
context are not a reflection on the firm, and might be transcended by going outside. Rebalancing
priorities captures the work firms do to focus away from dimming prospects at home and orient
themselves towards brighter prospects abroad. Byblus noticed “a negative aura of fear, the
unknown, and pessimism” in Lebanon and “a positive aura of growth and expansion” in Dubai.
As illustrated by quotes in Table 3.4, horizon-centric arbitrage enabled some firms to detach
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from home and relocate elsewhere, even though all relocating firms in our study continued to
keep at least a symbolic foothold in Lebanon. For example, Sydyk kept a showroom and a
factory running there, although the local time budget was significantly compressed from 20% to
5%.
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Table 3.4 Relocating
Horizon-centric Arbitrage
Overall
Rating*
Definition

Rationale

Renouncing
goals

Removing
limits

Rebalancing
priorities

Separating goals
inherently linked with
the home context from
broader prospects and
possibilities
Accepting contextual
contingencies and how
they limit where,
when, and how the
firm goes or grows
next

Taking account of the
specific ways in which
a given context might
be holding back the
progression
Transcending the
constraints imposed by
any given context,
including one’s home

Refocusing on what is
possible beyond the
home context

Result

Exploring new
opportunities afforded
by the choice of
different contexts

Adonis

++++

[We were] in an
uncomfortable seat, I saw
a nice place; I was like
“enough of this s***.”

It just struck me when I
went [to Australia] that
there is an opportunity
screaming ahead. … I
have never felt stronger
about a business plan. As
an opportunity, I have
never anything this
clearly.

We will break even in
Australia from day 1
because I’m that
confident. I have already
pre-sold half of my
capacity. … Australia is
such a hospitable, friendly
place and Melbourne is
wonderfully multicultural.
I don’t feel homesick at
all; everything I need is
here. … It’s such a big
[beverage] centre that I
can ask for any ingredient
on earth, and it’s already
in stock an hour’s drive
from me. We can produce
whatever f***ing
[beverage] I want and sell
it.

I want to go and do
business there that it has
lots of opportunities. …
It’s all about
opportunities in the end.
I wasn’t looking for
them. But I was open to
them.

Kothar

++++

We used to be bigger.
What happened in
Lebanon made us smaller
and gave us an incentive
to leave and be outside.
We have downsized our
exposure in Lebanon due
to political instability
while increasing and
overweighting our
development in the UAE.

I knew that it was going
to be Dubai. Because it
was the showcase – not
for the Middle East - it
was a portal to Europe.
We saw that being based
in Dubai gives us much
bigger growth and much
bigger opportunities.

Now the circle is wider,
now I can say my brands
are not only known here
but also among the
Indians, Russians, and
Europeans. This is why
our horizon is now bigger
when we’re considering
things like expansion. We
are thinking about South
East Asia, Turkey,
Greece, or maybe going
back to London and the
South of France.

The political situation in
Lebanon forced us to
move our headquarters
from Lebanon to Dubai.
We moved here and
decided that most of our
expansion would be in
the UAE. One of the
things at the heart of our
business strategy is not
to present ourselves as
Lebanese, but as a Dubai
group.

Sydyk

++++

With the project turnover
we have, the business
will grow but this is not
my aim. I aim at focusing
on Africa.

Africa is a bit dangerous
but we do not have a
better option. We cannot
work in Lebanon
anymore, nor can we in
America or Europe. We
need to aim to third world
countries. We either need
to work in the Arab world
or Africa.

We’re already in Nigeria
and opening in Ghana. I
hope to take all of West
Africa especially with the
brands we work with and
the amazing team I have
in place. I have a great
team. I will move all the
great employees there. …
We’re on a different scale
now.

Before 2006, we were
focusing 100% on
Lebanon, now we are
75% outside Lebanon,
and targeting 95%.

Of course, with this

Opening in other

We are already in an

Dione

+++

Frankly, we were

Lebanon is the managing
office. We want to
control the whole
business that is done
abroad from here.
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thinking about
[relocation] for 5 years
before 2008, but when
things are growing you
already have lots of work
in the local Lebanese
market, you become lazy,
you get the attitude that
we are doing fine, why I
should think about
something else?
The start of
[internationalization] was
initiated by the War of
2006 … We need a backup plan.

turmoil, the ongoing crisis
management is difficult to
handle on a day to day
basis. We’ve been good at
it. But I think we are good
enough now. We should
stop and try to get to learn
how to manage in a stable
situation. I am looking
forward to opening in
some countries where we
are going to be in a more
stable environment. It is
going to be a new
experience for us.

countries in the region
and hopefully outside the
region as well gives us
this stability.

unstable country, I prefer
not to go to the countries
which are very unstable,
when we want to extend
our legs outside, I prefer
to do in more stable
countries. Unless, the
opportunity like in Iraq is
huge and is worth it
because Iraq is an
emerging market.

Since 2010, each year has
been worse than the last.
By 2012, we already had
expanded but there
wasn’t enough business
to meet our demands.
[In March of 2012, the
GCC (Gulf cooperation
Council) encouraged
their nationals not to visit
Lebanon. Byblus was
forced to close down
operations catering to
foreign tourists that were
no longer coming to
Lebanon.]

The market is small. You
could eventually succeed
but going abroad is
quicker.

Even though it’s a bit
risky, you feel the
investment, you feel the
purchasing power, you
feel the business,
everyone who’s in
business wants to open up
there. So if you succeed
there you’re already
succeeding in a place
where the top layers in the
world are also trying to
succeed.

Lebanon will always be
the creative and
emotional hub, but when
we talk business, it is
abroad.

Lebanon is more unstable
than Africa. The simple
reason why I want to go
there [instead] is because
there is something that
compensates the
instability. There is
money. There is income.
There is a large market.
While here, there is
instability and a small
market. Scarcity and
complaints and nags.

I am trying to expand into
Iran and Africa, because
Iran has potential. It has a
big market: 70 million
people. And Africa, I
think it is the future.

There is saying by Ali
Ibn Abi Taleb: Wealth
converts a strange land
into homeland and
poverty turns a native
place into a strange land.

The international trade
agreements are much
better in Jordan [than
Lebanon]. I can sell
directly to the US from
Jordan with no added
customs on my products.
My agent in the US will
be very happy when I
start to export my
products to him from
Jordan.
We’re not aggressive.
We are receptive. … For
me, the best defense is an
offense.

Byblus

+++

Thalassa

+++

Cadmus

+

We needed an extra
factory to relieve the
production pressure on
the Lebanese facility. We
had two options, either
Lebanon or outside. We
had already bought the
land in Lebanon … We
had the war in 2006, so
we decided that we need
the factory outside.

When we invested in
Jordan, we felt relieved,
as we were not facing the
problems we face in
Lebanon, especially
problems related to
economic and political
stability.

However, today we
believe that the entire
Middle East region is not
stable. Eventually,
someday, if we keep on
growing Inshallah, we
should put our foot
somewhere in Europe,
whether Western or
Eastern Europe, or even
Cyprus.

Ugarit

+

When Jeddah closed and
no one was coming to
Lebanon … Dubai was
the nearest place to put
the name on. I was there
for another meeting. I had
this opportunity. I just
jumped on it. Crazy
jump.

I’ve chosen from several
countries. For example, I
had the option of Riyadh,
the option of Kuwait, and
the option of Abu
Dhabi/Dubai. Riyadh was
so much money but yet
too risky in those days.
Kuwait: small country.

I chose Dubai. Dubai is
the hub which has just
come out of the small
crash, and I think in three
years, it won’t have a
crash, unless they go in
the bubble again. That is
my option and that’s the
card I’m playing.
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Nomios

+

The plans are already
made. What may change
is how much more effort
I invest outside of
Lebanon. [But] we will
be the last to take the
Lebanese flag and leave.

Currently [We are]
focusing more on the
international operations
rather than on Lebanon.

I will expand outside, but
not more than these two
countries. … Riyadh and
Dubai are the only two
places in the Gulf where it
is worth the effort to do
business.

This is why Dubai and
Riyadh have become
important to us, because
all the tourism had been
hard hit in Lebanon. All
our problems turned into
benefits for Dubai.

* To rate the mechanisms, we assigned each case a score of “+” for use of a particular mechanism. We
added plus signs to denote how prominently that particular mechanism factored in the public and private
accounts for that case, relative to the eight others we examine in this paper.
# The text in this table is based on personal interviews, and prioritizes the accurate transcription of those
interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished grammar or
syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard.
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We labelled this third mechanism horizon-centric arbitrage because firms focused on the
discrepancy in their time horizons between home and host contexts. Kothar looked back: “The
biggest loss of all is time! Even if you are not losing money, you are losing time. If you have a
normal situation and you have a prosperous country, you would be growing. [In Lebanon] we
were not growing, we were regressing. And this [lost] time, no one would give it back to you.”
Dubai was full of opportunities, and well-worth his time. There, he forged new partnerships that
fueled further expansion to Southeast Asia and Europe. Today, Kothar introduces the firm as a
Dubai-based MNC. They no longer look back at Lebanon; Kothar shut down most of its
operations there, leaving behind only a small representative office with five employees. Rather,
Kothar looks forward towards new opportunities opening up within and beyond their new base in
Dubai.
Dione was among the first firms in Lebanon (and the first among the nine in our sample) to
recognize the war in 2006 as the beginning of the end. She described it as a “wake-up call.” “We
looked at conditions at home and realized it was time to focus outside.” Her team worked to
obtain a master license for Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Witnessing another crisis in 2007, Nahr elBared, the team decided to initiate a new business concept targeting international markets from
inception, spinning out a born-global venture: “From the start, we had the vision and the manuals
ready … from the first day we were working on the brand.” Dione targeted countries in the GCC,
setting a joint venture in Dubai, and eyeing the U.S. market. Its subsidiary in the United States
soon became a top priority for the team, securing a US$7.4 million investment to enter the
market. Even though Dione has maintained a token presence in Lebanon until today, she
completely rebalanced her priorities: “[In] everything that we do, we don’t look at Lebanon as a
market anymore,” she underscored.

3.3.4

Contrast Cases

The three Lebanon-based but not born firms provided us an opportunity to question whether our
interpretations of the first-stage findings are specific to having Lebanon as a first home of the
firm. Melkart was established in Saudi Arabia, Astarte in Bahrain, and Medea in Venezuela. Our
data indicate that the internationalization trajectories were not a function of Lebanon per se, but

100

rather, a function of the relationship of the firm with its context and what it was considered home
for the firm at the time. Table 3.5 summarizes the data of the contrast cases.

Melkart relocated its headquarters to Lebanon from Saudi Arabia before the unrest started in
Lebanon. It already had active international subsidiaries in Japan and the Philippines, and there
were opportunities then in Lebanon for expansion. However, since 2005, the firm experienced
multiple setbacks in Lebanon but was able to survive by relying on revenues earned in
international markets. The founder expressed that disruption had escalated in Lebanon and
affected the business locally multiple times yet, in all these instances, “[the international
subsidiaries] were helping the survival of the business in Lebanon.” When business was down in
Lebanon, the team at Melkart could allocate more efforts and attention to expanding in
international markets. We noted that Melkart was adopting resource arbitrage patterns, replacing
resources no longer available in this context with alternatives in other contexts, very similar to
the strong cases we discussed in the “recommitting to home” stage (e.g., Nomios, Ugarit, and
Cadmus). The main difference is that Melkart already had some of these alternatives in
international markets, while Cadmus and Ugarit had none before the unrest. Although Lebanon
was a second home for Melkart, the company was very much attached to its Lebanese base. The
founder explained, “It is your base … wherever you go and establish, whether Japan, Spain, or
the United States, … [Lebanon] is your home. It is your country. It is your base. Always, always,
your reference is your country. Let me give you this scenario: if things got very bad in Lebanon,
and the business was affected badly, losing money and is draining us … then what would you
do? That was a question a TV reporter asked me once … You have to close. We would still
continue working outside Lebanon, but our base would stay in Lebanon. We would stay in
Lebanon. We would try to find and manage any business here in Lebanon that could be done
until the situation is stable.” This attachment to this second home, or to what he describes as “the
base,” was evident in the recommitting trajectory followed by Melkart.
Both Astarte and Medea illustrate cases of firms that experienced political and economic unrest
in their first homes (outside Lebanon), and then came to Lebanon. Astarte was founded in
Bahrain, and during a political upheaval in 2011, the team decided to venture abroad. Astarte
decided to come to Lebanon because the founder had some personal ties in the country. Within a
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year of operating in Lebanon, the company experienced the negative repercussions of the Syrian
war spillover and its two venues were losing money. Straddling Bahrain and Lebanon, and
comparing the operations between the two countries, the founder explained that Astarte’s
operation in Bahrain was thriving at that time because the government offered incentives to
businesses to survive and the unrest was temporary, while in Lebanon there was no support and
the disruption was recurrent. We identified a value-centric arbitrage pattern at Astarte, similar to
the rescinding ties internationalization trajectory of Byblus, Dione, and Thalassa. This path was a
reflection of the progressive displacement relationship between Astarte and Lebanon. The
founder expressed, “Putting an X on Lebanon … in Bahrain, it is working well. It is the place,
the reference.” The Lebanese context became less valued for Astarte, as business was struggling
there and the team was becoming aware of the inequality of opportunities between the two
contexts.
Medea is an extreme example. This EMNC was founded in Venezuela, but the recurrent political
violence and instability in Venezuela pushed the founders to relocate to Lebanon. We identified
horizon-centric arbitrage patterns in Medea’s case similar to the situations faced by Adonis,
Kothar, and Sydyk. While Adonis relocated to Australia, Kothar to the UAE, and Sydyk to
Nigeria, Medea relocated to Lebanon. Medea replaced opportunities no longer available in its
first home market due to the distress, with alternatives found in Lebanon. Although the founders
acknowledged the challenges and recurrent disruptions in Lebanon, one of them explained, “We
decided to come back to Lebanon as things in Venezuela have become very much challenging.
… We thought that Lebanon, despite what people say … about Lebanon being dangerous, is not
that risky.” Medea was investing and expanding in Lebanon, though carefully, to leverage longterm opportunities and take advantage of an eventual influx of consumers when the war in Syria
is over and the situation is calm in Lebanon. Avoiding danger in Venezuela, Medea left its old
headquarters and relocated its efforts and senior management team in the relatively better
perceived circumstances in Lebanon, while trusting the local management team to lead its
remaining operations there. Medea’s internationalization trajectory reframed the firm’s
relationship with Venezuela to one of detachment from the first home.
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Table 3.5 Contrast Cases
Resource-centric Arbitrage
Returnees
Melkart
Contrast
Cadmus
Nomios
Ugarit

Rationale

Conserving
resources

Compensating
for lost rents

If you want to go and make a
base outside Lebanon in the
US, you should not come
back or plan to come back.
No one would succeed in his
business if he makes its
location as a second base.

Our main target
was to establish our
main office in
Beirut and to
conduct our
distributing and
supplying
operations from the
capital.

We used to work
outside Lebanon to
secure resources to be
able to bring them
back and fund
[Lebanon-based
venture] and keep it
alive.

Complementing riskreturn ratios

Recommitting

Because my work went
down here, you can give
more time to this other
business, and put more
efforts into its activities.
When you give it more
time, it will generate
more revenues.

Wherever you go and stay,
whether Japan, Spain, or USA,
when you say where is home?
It is your home. It is your
country. It is your base.
Always, always, your
reference is your country.

Value-centric Arbitrage
Astarte
Contrast
Byblus
Dione
Thalassa

I opened in Bahrain because I
was living there. … I couldn’t
expand elsewhere before my
country. It was something
important. I wanted to work
with people who speak the
same language

Dissonance
becomes habit

Demonizing
“the downs”

De-valorizing
“the ups”

Rescinding

There’s stress that I
didn’t live in Bahrain.
Every second there’s
stress, will I finish the
month or not? Will I
manage this month or
not? These things, I
didn’t feel in Bahrain
at all. Plus, there’s
instability. And it’s not
just about bombings.
Even the employees,
you can’t know it they
will come or no, you
can’t know if they are
fooling you or not.

In Bahrain there’s
something called
“Tamkeen.” When there
was instability we got 2
or 3 months of free rent
[plus subsidized wages].
The “Tamkeen”
compensated the
businesses that were
affected by the
instability. So you had
someone to lean back
on [unlike Lebanon].

I blame myself for not
taking time to see how
things are working in
the country. That’s one.
Another thing is that I
blame myself because I
wanted to deal with
everyone like I did in
the Gulf. Everyone as in
customers, employees
and suppliers and even
administrative things. I
think I’m one of the few
who didn’t lie to the
NSSF.

If you can do business in
Lebanon, you can do
business anywhere.
Starting operations in
Lebanon was more
complex than what she
was used to in Bahrain:
doing business in
Lebanon was way more
difficult on multiple
levels, including the
relationship with the
government, suppliers
and employees and
implementing
requirements for tax
purposes.

Horizon-centric Arbitrage
Medea
Contrast
Adonis
Kothar
Sydyk

Many people ask me why
Lebanon? There is danger in
Lebanon. … The country has
been here for 6,000 years,
would it all collapse during
our time? If it does, then what
can I do?
In Venezuela today, there is
danger, risk, armed conflict.
There is kidnapping and I
don't like to talk about this,
but this is the truth. … In
Lebanon, I don't see risks.

Renouncing
goals

Removing
limits

Rebalancing
priorities

Relocation

The company in
Venezuela is 60 years
old. Our employees
over there are very
honest and loyal … of
course the business
there went down a lot,
a lot, a lot, but we still
have some business
running, and our
employees are taking
care of it.

It is known that the
strong capital is
audacious. … Many
people make a lot of
business and buy during
a crisis, so by the time
things are back to
stability, those
businesses have a headstart.

I knew that business [in
Lebanon] is a bit
challenging. But I never
thought that you cannot
do business here. You
need to know what you
are doing. Then you can
invest in Lebanon as
you would in any other
country.

Lebanon is known for its
turbulent and chaotic
nature, with politics being
at the forefront of the
unstable environment, but
our project is for the long
term. We have come back
to invest our experience
and wealth in our
homeland, to benefit its
economy and people; and
just as Lebanese excel
abroad, we want to shine
in our home country.
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3.4 A Model Of Institutional Arbitrage By EMNCS
In prior sections, we sketched the three kinds of institutional arbitrage that emerged from our
data through which firms in economically and politically adverse environments internationalize
by replacing resources, values, and opportunities no longer available at home with alternatives in
other institutional settings. These processes suggest three corresponding propositions:
Proposition 1. Firms that engage in resource-centric institutional arbitrage (i.e.,
conserving resources, compensating for lost rents, and seeking risk-return ratios that
complement their current portfolios of activities) are more likely to approach
internationalization as a way to recommit to their home contexts.
Proposition 2. Firms that engage in value-centric institutional arbitrage (i.e., habituating
to dissonance, demonizing “the downs,” and de-valorizing “the ups”) are more likely to
approach internationalization as a way to rescind ties to their home contexts.
Proposition 3. Firms that engage in horizon-centric institutional arbitrage (i.e.,
renouncing goals, regretting limits, and rebalancing priorities) are more likely to
approach internationalization as a way to relocate from their home contexts.
Taken together, these three kinds of institutional arbitrage demonstrate a continuum of responses
to distress in the home country context. Rather than considering the decision to stay or leave as a
one-time choice (Dai et al., 2013; Darendeli & Hill, 2015), EMNCs that internationalize in
response to distress iterate between their embeddedness within their home context and their
ambitions abroad. As their ambitions are progressively restricted by adversity, they do not give
up suddenly or entirely. Instead, they observe and deal with what is missing or inadequate, one
setback at a time. In contrast to prior studies, which discuss the holistic picture of institutions at
home or abroad (e.g., Witt & Lewin, 2007), we find that internationalizing firms piece together
matching pieces—that is, they look for institutional contexts rich in resources to make up the
shortfall at home, they seek institutional contexts with better aligned values when the ups and
downs triggered by instability at home become hard to reconcile with their ambitions, and they
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are more likely to enter distant, even dangerous, contexts the more starved of opportunity they
become.
Our findings are also consistent with earlier arguments by Luo and Wang (2012) that arbitrage
tends to be specialized (i.e., aimed at specific things) rather than generic. Our inductive
framework adds two novel insights. First, there is a progression from the concrete (resources) to
the abstract (values and opportunities). In the early stages of internationalization, EMNCs from
distressed home contexts focus on material hurdles first; if they successfully overcome these
hurdles, they slow down or even resettle in their home country. It is only when attempts to make
up for the material discrepancies fall short that they begin to question the alignment in values,
and whether or not the ties to their homeland are worth the continuous dissonance between what
they want to accomplish and what is (no longer) possible. Second, there is a temporal sequencing
in that resource-centric institutional arbitrage occurs quickly, almost immediately, and can be
dialed up and down as the adversity intensifies. In our first field trip, we were highly sensitive to
these instantly effective forms of internationalization, which seemed to occur almost overnight
with hardly any forethought. Some of our informants told us casually they just got on a plane,
and 10 or so countries later, they were no longer home-bound. In contrast, value-centric
institutional arbitrage is slow and progressive. Our informants question and debate what they
value, and how much they value their home context relative to their own survival and success,
often straddling one or more alternative contexts for years before they contemplate (let alone
communicate) a willingness to rescind their ties to home. Finally, horizon-centric arbitrage
comes last—typically, as a last resort. Our informants described it as coming up for air when
they could no longer breathe, and going after contexts (sometimes even dangerous ones) on a
whim in a quest for opportunities that would unleash their growth.
Interestingly, most of the firms we studied engaged in all three kinds of institutional arbitrage, in
the same sequence. Even those who, eventually, recommitted to their home contexts grappled
with values and horizons later on, and even those that ultimately relocated elsewhere had earlier
reasserted their attachment to the home context, acknowledging the influence it continued to
have on their EMNCs. But while we found evidence of all three kinds of arbitrage across the 12year timespan of our longitudinal case studies, there was hardly any evidence of overlap between
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these three kinds. The well-punctuated transitions from one kind to another became obvious to us
late in the analysis when we configured geographical moves by each EMNC: the initial pursuit
of any given new context was motivated by one (not all) of resources, values, or opportunities.
Only once the firms had begun operating in that context—and were therefore more aware of the
institutional complexities at play—did they observe whether or not it fit their other needs. In
summary, this discrete and sequential approach to internationalization suggests that the home
context influences the emergence of EMNCs in a step-wise fashion.
Proposition 4. Firms that face distress in their home context are more likely to emerge as
EMNCs when they progressively engage in (a) resource-centric, (b) value-centric, and (c)
horizon-centric institutional arbitrage.
Further, our analysis points to the key insight that the relationship with the home context and the
motivation for internationalization co-vary. EMNCs that are recommitting to their home context
describe internationalization as home–bound: the more they go abroad, the more they want to
return and resume growth at home. EMNCs that are rescinding ties to their home contexts
describe internationalization as straddling multiple homes at once, and switching back and forth
between the two in sync with the ups and downs of their home operations. Last, EMNCs that are
relocating interpret their internationalization as an invitation to settle into a new home, one that is
more fitting to their ultimate aspirations, and also offers them well-deserved respite from a long
and assiduous struggle to survive. While closely interrelated, how the firm interprets the
relationship with the home context is conceptually different and clearly distinguished in the
narratives from the internationalization moves and the firm’s motivation. For example, in one of
our cases, we observed substantial deliberation over values and whether or not to build a second
factory in another country, despite the fact that the firm already served 30 different markets. In
another case, we observed repeated recommitment to Lebanon, despite multiple forms of
business expansions in multiple countries and regions. However, the association between the two
is almost perfect in our interview data, in that in the vast majority of instances, there is a direct
attribution drawn between how one frames home and why one internationalizes. Of course, even
with longitudinal data, the causality underpinning such attribution is hard to determine. It is
plausible that informants reconstrued their understanding of what home context meant to them as
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they internationalized. Our questions and probes helped us reveal that, move by move, a firm’s
relationship with home at that point in time was a very good indication as to which institutional
context it may go to next, and, in particular, the reasons why it chose to do so.
To further unpack this changing relationship with the home contexts, we took a closer look at the
risk-versus-opportunity frames revealed in the narratives. Attention to these frames was triggered
by the recurrent observation (puzzling to us at first) that most respondents approached danger in
new contexts (often higher than in Lebanon) with equally reckless abandon—as long as they
deemed it worth their while due to the presence of resources, values, or opportunities in the new
context.
Proposition 5. EMNCs are more likely to engage in resource-centric institutional
arbitrage (i.e., conserving resources, compensating for lost rents, and seeking risk-return
ratios that complement their current portfolios of activities) when they seek to prolong a
well-defined home advantage and manage “the devil they knew.”
Proposition 6. EMNCs are more likely to engage in value-centric institutional arbitrage
(i.e., habituating to dissonance, demonizing “the downs,” and de-valorizing “the ups”)
when they are mindful to inequality in opportunity between different potential homes,
and consider that their many trials at home immunized them to all sorts of other dangers
that they now felt fit to bear.
Proposition 7. EMNCs are more likely to engage in horizon-centric institutional arbitrage
(i.e., renouncing goals, regretting limits, and rebalancing priorities) when they adopt an
all-or-nothing frame whereby they had nothing more to lose at home but everything to
gain elsewhere, and seek to avoid any and all further dangers to the best of their ability.
We also went back to the data looking for instances where a particular type of institutional
arbitrage backfired—that is, instances where firms not only failed to reclaim resources, values, or
opportunities, but ended up worse off for trying. We found that recommitting to the home
context led to overconfidence in the prospects of stability and repeated deferrals of giving up,
which, in some cases, added a sense of defeat (getting further behind the harder one tried to hope
for the best). We also found that rescinding ties with their home contexts made EMNCs more
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likely to randomize their entries and pursue next chances without much analysis. Further, we
found home-straddling EMNCs to be prone to taking multiple options at once, hoping that at
least one would work out. Last, we observed that while relocation was costly, and firms that
relocated had forgone familiar skills and ways of doing business in the process, there was an
appreciation of the fact that the new home afforded not just greater stability, but also a fuller set
and sense of prosperity, making them feel that they are settling in for a better, longer future.

3.5 Discussion
We reveal a step-wise pathway of internationalization in response to distress at home. Our threestage, sequential framework, shown in Table 3.6, shows that EMNCs arbitrage among home and
abroad institutional contexts to make up shortfalls in resources, values, or opportunities at home.
Our propositions inform the growing intersection of home country contexts and
internationalization by EMNCs (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo & Wang, 2012;
Ramamurti, 2009). We extend prior literature on the internationalization of firms from emerging
economies (Bonaglia, Goldstein, & Mathews, 2007; Goldstein, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007) and
answer calls to study how firms “become” MNCs (Ramamurti, 2012).
A more fundamental contribution speaks to the rapidly unfolding literature on institutions and
internationalization, specifically the ways in which institutional contexts are compared and
contrasted as firms internationalize. Prior literature has only begun to examine which institutions
matter to firms from specific contexts (like China) (e.g., Luo & Wang, 2012) or to a specific
multinational ‘giant’ (Luiz et al., 2017), but has not yet explained why different institutional
arbitrage may matter at different times, nor how attention to specific (even specialized)
institutions may be predetermined by one’s home country. Instead of taking the country of origin
for granted, we show how changes in the relationship a firm has/maintains with one homeland
may radically reorient its internationalization. In addition, we reveal an important silver lining of
disruption at home, showing that it may hasten internationalization for firms that may not have
gone global yet, or otherwise.
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Our work also enriches our understanding of firms’ and MNCs’ relocation (Birkinshaw et al.,
2006; Jenkins, Steen, & Verreyne, 2015; Laamanen et al., 2012; Meyer & Xia, 2012). As firms
progressed through the three paths, they diminished their ties to home, rather than relinquishing
them abruptly. Even firms that relocated from their first home did not abandon their homeland;
they still kept some ties to the first home country through smaller subsidiaries.
Weak or unstable institutions may encourage internationalization (Luo & Tung, 2007) or
constrain foreign expansion (Wu & Chen, 2014). We argue that, initially, firms in distress resort
to internationalization as a potential solution (a means rather than an end), and would follow
different paths based on the constraints they face at home. Some EMNCs end up going to
stronger institutions (Witt & Lewin, 2007), while others relocate to weaker institutions (CuervoCazurra, 2012; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008) premised in large part on what is lacking at
home.
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Table 3.6 Framework of Institutional Arbitrage by EMNCs from Distressed Home
Contexts
When subject to recurrent disruptions in their home country, EMNCs pivot on assets undamaged
by the crisis by rapidly—and often radically—reorienting their internationalization strategy
towards institutional contexts where they can leverage these assets.
Internationalization
Path
Motivation
Relationship with
Home Context
Opportunity Frame

Recommitting

Rescinding

Relocating

Home-bound
Dependency

Home-straddling
Displacement

Home-settling
Detachment

Home advantage

Inequality

Risk Frame

The devil you know

Immunity to danger

Anything is better
than nothing
Danger avoidance

Institutional
Arbitrage
Mechanisms

Resource-centric

Value-centric

Horizon-centric

Conserving resources
Compensating for lost rents
Complementing risk-return

Dissonance becomes habit
Demonizing “the downs”
De-valorizing “the ups”

Renouncing goals
Regretting limits
Rebalancing priorities

Overconfidence
Deferral leads to defeat

Randomness of chance
Failing forward

Foregoing the familiar
Settling for better

Trade-offs
& Traps
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3.5.1

Limitations

Ours is a single-context study, and despite the historically significant comparison of multiple
internationalization moves unfolding over time, inductive references are limited to Lebanon. We
adopted an innovative design by examining three cases of Lebanese-based (but born elsewhere)
businesses, and replicated the tripartite pattern of findings for these firms. This qualitative
validation is important on two counts: first, the robustness is reassuring, showing that one’s
adoptive home can be as influential as the place where a firm was initially born; second, the three
contrast cases originated in three very different contexts (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Venezuela),
yet spoke of similar relationships to their adoptive context as Lebanese-born firms, suggesting
that what a firm identifies as current home is most influential for internationalization. Of course,
future studies could examine MNCs from different emerging settings with comparative designs
that privilege heterogeneity over homogeneity in cases. A logical next question would be
whether different kinds of adversity at home (i.e., political vs. economical, chronic vs. acute,
etc.) have stronger or longer-lasting effects on EMNCs’ internationalization.

3.5.2

Contribution to theory

These limitations notwithstanding, our findings extend theories of institutional arbitrage (Boisot
& Meyer, 2008; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), by beginning to show a nuanced and cascading series of
comparisons among institutional contexts. In our study, these comparisons are triggered by
shortfalls, and are calibrated by simultaneous attention to risk and opportunity differentials. The
accounts we analyze in this study go significantly beyond the state of the field, which debates
whether or not singular dimensions or the plurality of institutions (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop,
& Paunescu, 2010; Witt & Lewin, 2007) in a given context matter, to reveal that firms orient
themselves towards different institutional matches depending on what they need the most at a
given point in time. We complement the current work that focuses on outward FDI as a signal of
institutional arbitrage (e.g., Luo & Wang, 2012) by delineating different mechanisms of
institutional arbitrage and their robust progression.
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We also contribute to research on home country contexts in general (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc,
2008; Luo & Wang, 2012; Ramamurti, 2009), and emerging country contexts, more specifically,
by showing that despite its dire consequences, distress may play a catalytic role in moving
cohorts of organizations towards greener pastures. We answer calls to pay more attention to
changes in institutions and environments to understand “the period effects” on the
internationalization of EMNCs (Ramamurti, 2009), including the initiation and acceleration of
this process. Yet it is not adversity per se that predetermines where firms will look to go to next,
nor their reasons for going; if adversity did serve this purpose, the firms in our study would have
adopted very similar internationalization approaches, or undertaken the same moves simply
because they were confronted by the exact same events at once. Rather it was the way firms
reconstrued their own relationship with their home country context that oriented their next
moves; this is the most revelatory theoretical takeaway of our inductive work. As a firm realized
that a certain form of institutional arbitrage did not fit its needs anymore, it updated and
redefined its relationship with one homeland; looking for a new matching of foreign institutional
environment. This updated relationship of the firm with its home context reoriented the firm to
the next form of institutional arbitrage.
We note that institutional escapism (Witt & Lewin, 2007; Yamakwa et al., 2008) and
institutional arbitrage (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007) have not been well nuanced.
We find that institutional arbitrage is triggered by constraints and challenges at home, consistent
with previous research. However, not all EMNCs are “escaping” their home country when they
adopt institutional arbitrage. In fact, our findings show that some firms pursue arbitrage (i.e.,
resource-centric arbitrage) to recommit to and save their presence at home. Escapism is also a
matter of degree, and our data show that a more “dramatic” escape appears only at a later stage
of institutional arbitrage (i.e., horizon-centric arbitrage), when firms contemplate relocating.

3.5.3

Contribution to practice

There has been a steady surge in interest in emerging country contexts, and an unfortunate
increase in the types of adversity buffeting these contexts. Yet we know relatively little about
how firms continue operating under chronic or cumulative distress, especially when they are
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already operating in a restrictive or underdeveloped institutional environment to begin with.
Attention to how setbacks inform institutional arbitrage is also important, as firms from betterstudied contexts (e.g., China) may also face some type of turbulence. However, these insights are
even more informative and encouraging for contexts affected by recurrent crises, like
Afghanistan or Bangladesh (where most wonder how businesses survive at all, let alone
internationalize).
Our study suggests that internationalizing moves can be instrumental in prolonging a good life
for businesses operating in bad settings. Even if some of these moves may not succeed, they
broaden a firm’s set of capabilities, better preparing it for the next wave of adversity at home or
the next attempt to escape. Despite the conventional wisdom that firms wishing to
internationalize must contemplate this move only after they have established a strong and
successful presence at home, we argue that there are instances when firms need to
internationalize earlier or faster. Perhaps the most intriguing practical takeaway is that
institutional arbitrage influences how a firm reconstructs its own relationship with the homeland.
Firms may recommit (at their peril) to progressively worsening contexts when they construe their
relationship as one of dependency, while others willingly detach from reasonably good
circumstances and leave for what they deem greener pastures.

3.6 Conclusion
Extant theories of internationalization have predominantly developed based on the following
assumptions: (1) political or economic turbulence affects the host contexts of firms’ subsidiaries
more often than the home context of the parent(s), (2) internationalization proceeds and relies on
a relatively stable home context, and (3) the process of internationalization optimizes the mix of
foreign markets to help firms attain or sustain a global competitive advantage.
Our findings challenge and complement these positions by showing how distress in a firm’s
home context can become a powerful force for the decision to internationalize—or to expand
much earlier or differently than the firm might have otherwise intended. While economic crises
and political turbulence can have dire consequences on firms (Oh & Oetzel, 2011), driving some
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to escape (Stoian & Mohr, 2016), leaving one’s home is hardly an easy (let alone quick or
automatic) decision. Our findings show that firms facing distress at home engage a complex,
nuanced, and multi-stage process. They carefully and iteratively compare resources, values, and
horizons across contexts; as these get depleted at home, they attempt internationalization moves
to replenish them. When these moves fail, or even backfire, the firms switch to another kind of
institutional arbitrage. How one relates to worsening conditions at home becomes defining of
what a firm becomes and systematically patterns its internationalization moves and emergence as
an EMNC. We offer propositions that flesh out the interdependence between EMNCs’ home
contexts and their early internationalization, and show an overarching positive insight—that
adversity at home may drive firms towards greener pastures.
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Appendix 3.1 Data Overlap and Acronyms
We examined 12 firms, in total, in Essay #2, seven of which are also analyzed in Essay #1.
Below are the overlaps and corresponding acronyms.

Essay #1
Entrepreneur(s)
Claude

Sydyk

Jean + Ralph

Kothar

Amer

Thalassa

Domain/Business10
Food and beverage (F&B)
production firm founded in
1964
150 employees
F&B services firm founded in
2003
330 employees
F&B services and retail firm
established in 1999
500 employees
F&B services firm founded in
2003
180 employees

Maggie

Ugarit

Marwan

Adonis

F&B production firm
established in 2006
50 employees

Nomios

F&B services firm founded in
1960
730 employees

Byblus

F&B services firm established
in 2005
130 employees

Nader

Zach

10

Essay# 2
Firm

There are discrepancies between the number of employees reported for each venture in the two essays:
consistent with the respective research questions, Essay #1 includes only domestic employees (or just
international if the firm had exited Lebanon) while Essay #2 includes all employees (both domestic and
international).
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Appendix 3.2 Timeline of the Major Political Events in Lebanon11
Date

1975-1990
Feb. 14, 2005
Jun. 2, 2005
Jun. 21, 2005
Jul. 12, 2005
Dec. 12, 2005
Jul. 12, 2006
Nov. 21, 2006
Dec. 1, 2006
May–Sept., 2007
Jun. 13, 2007
Sept. 19, 2007
Dec. 12, 2007
Jan. 25, 2008
May 7, 2008
May 8, 2008
Mar. 15, 2011

Summer 2012
Oct. 19, 2012
Dec. 2012
May 20, 2013
Jun., 2013

Jul. 9, 2013
Aug. 15, 2013
Aug. 23, 2013
Dec. 27, 2013
Apr. 2014
May 2014
Aug. 6, 2014
June, 2016

Description of the Event

Lebanese Civil War
A massive car bomb in Beirut kills Prime Minister Hariri and many others. Immense street protests
take place as a reaction to the assassination.
Journalist Samir Kassir is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut.
A bomb kills George Hawi, former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party.
Defense minister Elias Murr is among those wounded in a car bomb in Beirut.
An explosion kills Member of Parliament Gebran Tueni. Two other people are also killed.
Israel launches a one-month-long war against Lebanon after Hezbollah captures Israeli soldiers in an
attack across the border.
Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel is assassinated by gunmen.
A coalition of political parties stages a massive sit-in demonstration in downtown Beirut. A series of
political protests and sit-ins follows until May 21, 2008.
Clashes between Islamist militants and the Lebanese military at the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr
al-Bared. More than 300 people die.
Member of Parliament Walid Eido is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut.
Political party lawmaker Antoine Ghanem is assassinated in an explosion.
A car bomb kills General Francois El Hajj.
A bombing kills Internal Security Forces officer Wissam Eid.
Pro-Hezbollah fighters lock down Beirut and clash with people.
Pro-Hezbollah gunmen take over large parts of West Beirut. Gun clashes lead to many casualties.
The Arab Spring reaches Syria. The conflict eventually develops into a civil war in Syria. In
Lebanon, one coalition of political parties backs Syrian rebels, while the other coalition supports the
Syrian regime.
The Syrian war spills over to Lebanon through violent clashes in Tripoli and Beirut.
Police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan is killed along with eight other people in a car bomb.
Violent fights breaks out between supporters and opponents of the Syrian president in Tripoli.
Sectarian violence continues to spill over from the war in Syria. Many fights take place in Tripoli.
The main provider of Lebanon’s tourism revenue, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates—issues a travel warning for
citizens thinking of visiting Lebanon, as Syria’s civil war is fuelling violence in Lebanon.
A car bomb wounds at least 53 people in Southern Beirut where many support Hezbollah.
A car bomb in Southern Beirut kills 27 people and wounds 336 others.
Two car bombs in Tripoli kill 42 people and wound hundreds.
Mohamad Chatah, Lebanon’s former finance minister is killed with at least five others in a car bomb
in a central location in Beirut.
The United Nations announces that the number of Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon is over 1
million.
Lebanon’s President Suleiman ends his term of office, leaving a power vacuum. Several attempts are
made in parliament over subsequent months to choose a successor.
Syrian rebels cross to the Lebanese town of Arsal and get involved in clashes. They withdraw after
being confronted by the military, but take many Lebanese soldiers and police captive.
Suicide bombers, allegedly Syrians, strike Lebanese village; aggravating already strained relations
between Lebanese and more than 1 million Syrian refugees in the country.

Sources: “Gulf countries issue travel warnings for Lebanon,” 2015; “Gulf states warn citizens against Lebanon travel,”
2013; “Lebanon profile – Timeline,” 2017; Mroueh, 2015; “Timeline: major attacks in Lebanon since 2005,” 2013;
“Timeline: Tension in Lebanon,” 2014.
11
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Appendix 3.3 Follow-up Questions - Interview Guide

2016 Follow-up Guide
The Impact of War and Conflict
 How does the chronic conflict in Lebanon affect the strategies of the firm? How do you
adapt?
 What are the options of the firm when it faces new political turmoil?
 What resources are the most helpful during distress and why?
 Can you tell me about the business strategy you followed during Summer 2006 (The War
between Lebanon and Israel)?
 What are the objectives of the business in this unstable context? To survive or grow?
Incentives to Internationalize
 What were the main motives of the firm when it contemplated to venture into
international markets?
 What factors did help the company to internationalize?
 What were the major barriers for the firm when the management considered
internationalization?
Internationalization Behaviors
 Name and total number of countries the company has international activities with (in
order, first to last) and year of internationalization. Percentage of total annual sales
coming from international sales
 How do you identify and exploit international opportunities? Can you provide me with an
example?
 How do you identify your internationalization strategy? Risk-seeking or risk-escaping?
Why?
 What are the entry modes that you currently use in the internationalization of the firm?
 Would your internationalization strategy be different if there is no political instability in
Lebanon? Why and how?
General information about the company and the respondent
 Position of the respondent, years with the company, main duties
 Number of employees, total annual sales, field of business, year of foundation
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Closing Questions
 What would be your suggestion to the Lebanese SMEs that are suffering from the
local/regional political instability?
 Do you have anything else you would like to tell me or is there anything I should have
asked you that I neglected to?

2017 Follow-up Guide
Overview: Can you recall some of the international moves that made you seriously rethink your
relationship with Lebanon?

Question 1: Please give us one or two examples of specific international expansion moves that
made you more (or less) committed to Lebanon as a context for you to do business? How did
these moves challenge or complement some of the prior meanings you associated with Lebanon
as home?

Question 2: Please give us one or two examples of specific international expansion moves that
made you feel there are differences between your own values and what was (or was no longer)
possible in Lebanon at that time. What values would you have to give up on if you stayed? What
values would you preserve, or even gain, if you go outside?

Question 3: Was there a specific turning point when you felt like going far away and never
looking back? If so, did you eventually look back – and what did you rediscover in Lebanon that
you might have missed or not fully appreciated before?
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Chapter 4

4

Time To Say Goodbye: A Systematic Review of What
Happens before Exit

ABSTRACT
This essay presents a systematic review of the decisions, actions, and processes that take place
from the contemplation of an entity’s exit through its execution and implementation to the
finality or irreversibility of the exit. We review 90 articles that were published in top
management journals across the literatures in strategy, international business, and
entrepreneurship over the last 21 years, and elaborate on two dimensions: partiality and
temporality. The analysis of prior studies draws attention to the importance of further specifying
the partiality of exit (i.e., what parts of a given entity are being discontinued vs. preserved) as
well as the temporality (i.e., the timing of terminating the parts). We offer a framework to
organize

the

literatures

and

discuss

new

avenues

for

future

research.

131

4.1 Introduction
Whether, when, and how to exit are all critical questions for any entity (DeTienne, 2010), from
the smallest entrepreneurial firm to the largest multinational, in good times and in bad. Exit often
carries negative associations, like failure (Cardon, Stevens, & Potter, 2011), for a given firm
(Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004) or individual (Shepherd, 2003). Exit can befall even promising and
ambitious firms (Tornedon & Boddewyn, 1974) and is often costly, traumatic, and embarrassing
(Wan, Chen, & Yiu, 2015). Exit can even be stigmatizing to oneself (Shepherd, 2003), and
sometimes, to one’s peers (Durand & Vergne, 2015). The significance of exit lingers long after,
influencing outcomes from rigidity and retrenchment (McKinley, Latham, & Braun, 2014) to
rebirth (Walsh & Bartunek, 2011) and to parent companies’ performance (Ioannou, 2013).
Failure can also carry over to distant future endeavours because it helps individuals make sense
of, and learn from, their mistakes and setbacks (e.g., Shepherd, Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009;
Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013).
There have been several reviews of organizational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004),
corporate divestiture, (Moschieri & Mair, 2008) and, more recently, entrepreneurial and small
business exit (DeTienne & Wennberg, 2014; Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010).
Taken together, this body of work suggests that decision makers may choose and control, at least
in part, their exit pathways, deciding on the scope of exit (technology, market, industry, or
geographic region) (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Decker & Mellewigt, 2007). They also exert some
agency in determining when to leave (Elfenbein & Knott, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2009).
Although exit has been studied extensively, it is almost exclusively presented as an event that
punctuates different stages in the life of an organization (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004) or its
founder (Holland & Shepherd, 2013). However, focusing on exit as an event overlooks variations
in what may happen after (Ucbasaran et al., 2013) and what may happen before.
This paper systematically reviews the exit literatures in strategy, international business, and
entrepreneurship to understand what happens before a complete exit becomes final and
irreversible. Because we tackle multiple types and levels of exit across these three literatures, we
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position this review to examine entity exit. As entities exist and exit at all levels of analysis, this
review applies to any and every unit—be it of a market, subsidiary, business unit, organization,
small venture. etc.—insofar as they retain decision and/or behavioural control over their exit.
Taking an entity-level perspective allows us to include partial definitions of exit as the
termination of a part of the whole, as well as processual definitions of exit that examine the
breakdown of a given relationship between a given entity and some other concept, whether
between a founder and one’s venture, a corporate firm and one of its business units, or a
multinational enterprise (MNE) and its foreign subsidiary. Our reach is deliberately broad and
agnostic with respect to what the entity is, partly because we have a much narrower scope of
studies which reveals what takes place before an exit decision or action, and partly because our
prior work suggests that both the partiality and the temporality of exit may be independently
and/or jointly relevant (see Essay #1 for entrepreneurial exit and Essay #2 for headquarters exit).
Our systematic review starts with the prior that entity exit is decomposable by parts and over
time. From the literature review, we induce multiple facets and factors underpinning these two
overarching dimensions (i.e., partiality and temporality). We elaborate on what we know about
each for entities at different levels of analysis. We then combine the two and reflect on the
clustering of prior work in each of the four quadrants, with a three-fold intention. First, we
aggregate previous findings looking for insights in terms of what happens before exit. Second,
we compare and contrast these insights across disciplines to reveal hidden patterns or surface
counterfactuals that may deepen our understanding of what comes before an entity undertakes
the critical decision or action of exit. Last, we are interested in the white spaces – what aspects of
partiality and temporality (or their intersection) we have not yet explored, and suggest an
ambitious future research agenda to learn more.
Understanding exit from this dual perspective—that is, as a set of parts that can recombine into
old or new wholes, and as a temporally unfolding process—can inform the literature on exit in
three ways: (1) by shifting attention from an on/off, one-time event to a deliberate undertaking;
(2) by underscoring that exit is often carefully thought of, planned, and executed long before a
given decision or action; and (3) by revealing the malleability of the part-whole relationship and
its importance for whether an exit decision or exit may be observed to begin with.
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4.2 Definitional Issues and Scope of the Review
We take a cross-disciplinary approach to comb through as many distinct ways to theorize and
test exit as possible. However, with this advantage comes the challenge of creating, as a starting
point, a common strawman definition of what the exit of an entity encompasses.
In strategic management, business exit has been understood as a restructuring activity involving
a diversified firm’s divestiture—usually in a form of the sale, in part or totality, of one of its
subsidiaries, business units, or divisions of a company (Decker & Mellwigt, 2007; Sharma &
Manikutty, 2005) to adjust its ownership and business portfolio (Brauer, 2006). Firm or business
exits have been labelled accordingly as divestitures, business exits, or divestments.
In international business, exit is examined as foreign exit or divestment. It refers to the MNE
withdrawing from a subsidiary operation (Benito, 1997, 2005; Chung, Lee, Beamish, Southam,
& Nam, 2013) and it is considered a significant corporate-level decision (Soule, Swaminathan, &
Tihanyi, 2014). International divestments are quite common and could include a broader
definition, from pulling out of a market or downsizing foreign operations to switching to lower
commitment modes of operation (Benito & Welch, 1997; Wan et al., 2015).
In the entrepreneurship literature, the focus is on the relationship between an individual
entrepreneur and one’s venture, and on distinguishing between exit and failure. In particular,
business exit has been understood as an intentional and voluntary exit decided by the ownermanagers (DeTienne, 2010), whereas business failure has been understood as the forced exit of a
venture when it becomes insolvent and cannot continue under the current ownership and
management (Shepherd, 2003), or is considered economically and/or subjectively unviable
(Coad, 2014; Ucbasaran et al., 2013).
As we want to include as many studies that examine exit as possible in this review, our definition
is broad but builds on previous definitions. We define entity exit as a discontinuity in the set of
activities previously understood and undertaken by a given entity (e.g., subsidiary, business unit,
division, or venture) and/or as stipulated by another entity that is in a direct relation with that
entity (e.g., the parent organization, owner-manager, or entrepreneur). This definition covers all

134

decisions and/or actions—from partial disengagement, such as any reduction in the activities
and/or ownership of the firm (Benito & Welch, 1997; Simões, 2005), to total disengagement or
cessation of business operations (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 2013).
In this review, we include studies on firm failure because it is a distinct form of exit (Jenkins &
McKelvie, 2016). Further, in the literature and across disciplines, there is a distinction between
forms of exit. For example, there are studies of the firm being liquidated, bankrupted, or closed
on a permanent basis, sold in its entirety, partially divested, or passed on to a different owner
(Coad, 2014; Damaraju, Barney, & Makhija, 2015; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). We include all these
types of entity exit in the review.

4.3 Review Methodology
4.3.1

Article Selection Criteria

We employ a systematic review methodology, as proposed by Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart,
(2003), similar to reviews published in the Journal of Management (e.g., Keupp & Gassmann,
2009; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). We selected top management journals in the field of strategy,
entrepreneurship, and international business. Our intention was not to be exhaustive of all
articles published, but to assess the most high-quality, well-scrutinized, rigorous research
produced in the last 21 years (from January 1996 to April 2017). These articles can be
considered validated knowledge, and are likely to have the highest impact on management
research (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Bachrach, & Podsakoff, 2005). A summary of each step of our
methodology, including specific purpose, process used, and outcome, is provided in Table 4.1.
On the basis of this methodology, a population of 186 articles was retained for review. From our
initial readings of the 186 articles, we started to become attentive to the temporal nature of the
exit phenomenon and the partiality of any entity that is in contention for exit (we discuss these
two dimensions in the next section). However, these dimensions were not very clear in the
articles, so we decided to focus on these two dimensions and try to develop them in the review.
We believed that these two dimensions would contribute to our understanding of exit and
provide the most interesting research questions for moving the literature forward. We then
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started coding the articles based on the temporal nature before the exit event, and the partial
nature of exit. We kept only articles that we were able to code for the two dimensions. The final
population

was

90

articles

that

we

reviewed

in

detail.
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Table 4.1 Summary of Methodological Review Procedures
Step

Purpose and Process

Outcome

Step 1: Journal
selection

Identify top journals in management including strategy,
international business, and entrepreneurship fields.

18 high-quality
journals12

Step 2: Keyword
generation

Select search words from our early familiarity with exit
research.

Identify other synonyms from the thesaurus.

14 keywords: exit,
failure, mortality, death,
decline, bankruptcy,
closure, distress,
termination, divest*,
contraction, downsizing,
demise, discontin*

Perform a comprehensive keyword search of article title,
abstract, or keywords in journals identified in step 1.

Cumulative total: 2,119
articles

Check the main articles for keywords used and add them to the
list.

Step 3: Keyword
search

Title search in Business Source Complete database for
keywords identified in step 2 with ‘review’ in abstract and
‘business’ in all text, with no limit to journals or dates.
Step 4: Identify core
papers and narrow
down the pool of
articles for analysis

Develop a set of screening criteria (exclusion and inclusion).
Exclude articles if they belonged to one of the following
categories: (a) the articles examine individual act or choice of
exit that is not connected to a business organization (e.g., an
employee or leader exit); (b) the focus was on unambiguous
exit, so exit leaves no room for interpretation (there is no
information about what happened before and/or after) and there
is a lack of agency in the exit; (c) the focus is not on
organization that is exiting; or (d) the keywords were
mentioned only in passing.

186 articles retained for
first review

Having passed the above exclusion criteria, an article had to
fulfill at least one of the following criteria to be included: (a) it
examines or describes exit as a process (or part of a process);
(b) it offers some insights into what happens to the organization
before and/or after the exit; (c) it offers some discussion on
how exit is delayed, avoided or prevented; and/or (d) it offers
some insights on how exit is interpreted.
Step 5: Code for two
dimensions

Keep articles that offer some insights into the temporality
before exit event and partiality of exit.

90 articles retained for
detailed review

List of journals: “Academy of Management Journal,” “Academy of Management Review,” “Administrative Science
Quarterly,” “Entrepreneurship Theory And Practice,” “Global Strategy Journal,” “International Small Business
Journal,” “Journal of International Business Studies,” “Journal of Business Venturing,” “Journal of Management,”
“Journal of Management Studies,” “Journal of Small Business Management,” “Journal of World Business,”
“Management Science,” “Organization Science,” “Organization Studies,” “Small Business Economics,” “Strategic
Entrepreneurship Journal,” “Strategic Management Journal.”
12
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4.3.2
4.3.2.1

Analytical Dimensions
The temporality of exit

Through multiple iterations across the 90 studies, we came to understand exit as a process that
unfolds over time and goes through different stages. The exit process starts when a signal of
change (i.e., trigger) takes place and the decision maker has to respond by contemplating a
probable exit. Contemplating exit could be a result of a negative event, such as a crisis, disaster,
or other trigger that puts the organization in distress. In addition, decision makers consider exit
from their current business when better opportunities arise relative to current ones (Moschieri &
Mair, 2008). There are many different causes and triggers for exit, but key among all predictors
are the gaps or lapses in performance (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004).
We realized that the exit process can be reverted, slowed down, or accelerated depending on
multiple choices of the decision maker, and conditioned by firm and environmental factors (Cefis
& Marsili, 2011); this is not to say that an exit decision can easily be stopped or transformed, but
there are many mechanisms and subprocesses that take place before the exit is executed or
complete.
We decided to cover research that tackles an entity’s exit from the contemplation of the exit
through its execution and implementation to the finality or irreversibility of exit. Henceforth, we
do not review articles that examine the performance of any entity after exit, nor do we cover
research that focuses on what happens to entrepreneurs after failure or exit (for a review, see
Ucbasaran et al., 2013).
We noticed that the exit decision is an important milestone in the overall process. When decision
makers realize the need to respond to contextual change, they face the dilemma of whether to
exit an entity or not (Buchholtz, Lubatkin, & O’Neill, 1999). The exit decision is made in
relation to past decisions and future decisions or outcomes (Shimizu, 2007), and is not
necessarily a one-time event, but can be part of a decision-making process that is evolving
(Shapira, 1997). If management decides not to exit at one point in time, the decision still needs to
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be constantly reevaluated as environmental and organizational contingencies change (Shimizu,
2007). The exit decision can also be separated conceptually and analytically from the
organizational decline that often precedes it (Pike, 2005), and from the execution of exit that
follows after (Moschieri, 2011). For example, there are many organizational contingencies and
managerial influences that determine when organizations make the decision to exit an entity,
with some decisions considered early or late (Tangpong, Abebe, & Li, 2015). Moreover,
managers of publicly listed companies announce the divestiture (i.e., exit) of certain business
units; however, there is a process that follows the announcement of exit that deals with how and
when the business unit is divested (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006). The announcement of the exit
decision is considered “not the end of the story” (Fothergill & Guy, 1990; Pike, 2005). We use
the decision to exit as an anchor point in the exit process to organize the literature and make
sense of the current research.

4.3.2.2

The Partiality of Exit

We further noticed that entity exit does not necessarily mean that the entity will disappear and
die (Coad, 2014): in many cases death can be prevented (Trahms, Ndofor, & Srimon, 2013) or
resisted (Erkama & Vaara, 2010). An entity may be partially saved (Damaraju et al., 2015;
Durand & Vergne, 2015), partially divested (Brauer, 2006; Vidal & Mitchell, 2015), or partially
disengaged from (Rouse, 2016; Shimizu, 2007). There is also quite a wide spectrum of how exit
is manifested and a variety of alternatives to entity exit (Brauer, 2006). We decided to focus on
the different parts or portions of the whole entity that can continue and/or be reconfigured during
the process of exit. Restricting exit to only those circumstances when a whole entity disappears is
overly restrictive, and misses out on the wide variety of exit decisions and actions that only
affect a subset of an entity’s parts or activities (Buchholtz et al., 1999). The partiality dimension
captures the variety of responses that fall between the polar categories of “business as usual” and
“complete exit” (Meyer & Thein, 2014).
Due to limitations in quantitative datasets and/or analytical challenges, most researchers only
acknowledge these parts in passing (e.g., Mata & Freitas, 2012). Yet as Vidal and Mitchell
(2015) recently noted, divesting partial units of a firm provides a more fine-grained adaptation
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than a high-risk full exit. Further, forms or cases of partial exit might logically and pragmatically
precede further stages of complete divestments (Damaraju et al., 2015). For instance, the
termination of some manufacturing activities could be a prelude for complete liquidation
(Simões, 2005). Even when exit involves a single individual like a manager and an entrepreneur,
the entity engages in several different types of activities, many of which can be escalated or deescalated from (McMullen & Kier, 2016) without challenging the continuance of the entity. For
example, decision makers can de-escalate their commitment to a firm without withdrawing from
it completely (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006), or they can disengage partially from an
entrepreneurial venture (Rouse, 2016). A partial abandonment adds flexibility to any exit
decision and action, but proves especially relevant to entities in transition or distress (Sauer,
1993).

4.3.2.3

Framework

The two analytical dimensions of the exit—temporal and partial—offer complementary insights
on entity exit. We combine these two dimensions using a 2x2 framework, shown in Figure 4.1.
As previously discussed, the decision to exit was an important anchor in the literature, and we
were able to code the articles according to whether they belonged to the “before” or “after” this
decision took place. We made a further distinction for the partiality axis, distinguishing between
the objective and subjective aspects or attributes associated with the parts of the whole.
Many studies, in particular quantitative ones, equate the decision to exit with the event of exit.
An exit decision could, and should, be separated both conceptually and analytically from both
any preceding decline (Pike, 2005) and any subsequent event (Moschieri, 2011; Moschieri &
Mair, 2008). When exit events (that are observable and recorded) are collapsed into the exit
decisions, scholars underrepresent the spectrum and nature of the exit phenomenon.
Most scholars look at exit as a unity, as something that either happens or does not happen. Here,
we argue that exit is partial, and before it becomes final and irreversible, it manifests through
both objective and subjective considerations (Ocasio, 1995; Shimizu, 2007).
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Prior research also compresses the two dimensions. For example, we often think of escalation of
commitment as a temporal process only, especially its persistence characteristic, but it is also a
partial mechanism. One can escalate commitment objectively by throwing good money after bad,
and subjectively by being psychologically attached to it. On the other hand, managers de-commit
to a firm objectively by comparing its performance to the organization portfolio, and subjectively
by distancing themselves from the firm and de-identifying with its previous decisions (Hayward
& Shimizu, 2006). One may still move to a decision to exit in relatively quick terms (i.e.,
temporal dimension), but not divest the largest resources (i.e., partial dimension). While
objective and subjective considerations have not been often or easily separated thus far, we
rigorously coded and classified studies as one or the other according to the main conceptual
arguments and/or insights made in the article. This approach helps us reveal distinct ways in
which decision makers attempt to control the decision or action of exit, as well as which portions
of the entity are in contention for exit.
Crossing these two dimensions yields four distinct quadrants. Quadrant I represents research
before the decision to exit and includes objective considerations for partial exit; Quadrant II
represents research before the decision to exit and includes subjective considerations; Quadrant
III represents research after the decision to exit and includes objective considerations; and,
Quadrant IV represents research after the decision to exit and includes subjective considerations.

4.3.2.4

Coding Method

Each article was assigned to one of the quadrants. However, a couple of articles touched
conceptually on more than one quadrant. Our process involved a set of iterative steps with
multiple review points and comparisons across the articles. The 90 articles were reread, and we
identified and coded for different subthemes within each quadrant. We then organized those
subthemes into more overarching themes. Table 4.2 shows the coding structure. Since scholars
usually did not explicitly state their assumption of partial exit, we inferred the classification
based on a set of definitions we developed from our reading of the literature. In the next section,
we identify the different themes and subprocesses that precede and follow an exit decision, and
shed light on the repertoire of objective and subjective factors in the partiality of exit.
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Figure 4.1 Organizing Framework for Research on What Precedes Exit
Quadrant I

Objective
Decisionmaking
Objective
11 articles

Divestitures
as strategic
decisions
6 articles

Real options
decision
7 articles

Choices of exit
modes
Objective
7 articles

Exit &
Relocation
decisions
(home vs. host)
6 articles

Interdependencies
of exit moves
5 articles

Exit
implementation
& structuring
4 articles

Objective

Retrenchment
& refocusing
as turnaround
attempts
10 articles

Quadrant III

Time to exit
8 articles

Partiality

Complete
and Final
Exit

Trigger
Exit
disengagement
modes
Subjective
8 articles

Social & peer
influences on
exit decision
5 articles

Resisting exit
2 articles

Quadrant II

Quadrant IV

Exit Decision

Subjective

Subjective

Decision-making
Subjective
26 articles
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Table 4.2 Coding Structure
Studies
Belderbos & Zou (2009); Berry
(2013); Chung et al. (2013); Dai et
al. (2013); Dai et al. (2016)
Damaraju et al. (2015)
Elfenbein et al. (2017)
Berry (2010); Coucke &
Sleuwaegen (2008)
Mata & Freitas (2012); Nummela et
al. (2016)
Figueira-de-Lemos & Hadjikhani
(2014); Meyer & Thein (2014)
Boyne & Meier (2009); Davidsson
& Gordon (2016); McKinley et al.
(2015); Schmit & Raisch (2013);
Tangpong et al. (2015); Trahms et
al. (2013); VanWitteeloostuijn
(1998)
Dawley et al. (2002); Mayr et al.
(2017); Lee et al. (2007)
Brauer (2006); Decker & Mellewigt
(2007); Feldman (2013); Lieberman
et al. (2017); Moschieri & Mair
(2008); Vidal & Mitchell (2015)
Buchholtz et al. (1999); Burgelman
(1996); Hayward & Shimizu (2006);
Hsieh et al. (2015); Santangelo &
Meyer (2011); Shimizu (2007)
DeTienne & Cardon (2012);

Sub-theme
Real options and foreign
subsidiaries exit

Theme

Real options in strategic
divestment alternatives
Time to take an exit decision
– Rational delay

Real options decision

Operations exit from home
Foreign subsidiaries exit and
relocation elsewhere
Sleeping strategy in host
countries as a mid-way
between stay and exit

Exit and relocation decisions (home
vs. host)

Before Exit Decision and
Objective Considerations

Organizational decline and
turnaround
Retrenchment and refocusing
decisions as turnaround attempts
Post-bankruptcy turnaround

Strategic divestitures

Organizational
responsiveness to the need to
exit and
(de)-commitment decisions
(objective determinants)

Category

Divestitures as strategic and
reorganizing decisions

Decision making: Objective
considerations
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DeTienne et al. (2008); DeTienne et
al. (2015); Gimeno et al. (1997);
Wennberg et al. (2010)
Hayward & Shimizu (2006);
Kisfalvi (2000); MacKay & Chia
(2013); Miller & Chen (2004);
Pajunen (2008); Shimizu (2007);
Wennberg et al. (2016)

Entrepreneurs’ threshold of
performance and intentions to
exit (objective determinants)
Organizational level exit
decisions under uncertainty
(subjective determinants)

Cater and Schwab (2008); DeTienne
& Chirico (2013); Feldman et al.
(2016); Sharma & Manikutty (2005)
Cardon & Kirk (2015); DeTienne et
al. (2008); Gimeno et al. (1997);
Holland & Shepherd (2013); Khelil
(2016); McMullen & Kier (2016);
Miller & Sardais (2015); Morgan &
Sisak (2016); Shepherd et al. (2009);
Shepherd et al. (2015); Singh et al.
(2015)
Brigham et al. (2007); Collewaert
(2012); DeTienne (2010) DeTienne
et al. (2015)

Family firms exit decisions
(subjective determinants)

Durand & Vergne (2015); Meyer &
Thein (2014); Soule (2014); Wan et
al. (2015)
Blake & Moschieri (2017); Durand
& Vergne (2015); Meyer & Thein
(2014); Soule (2014)
Balcaen et al. (2012); Damaraju et
al. (2015); Fortune & Mitchell
(2012); Lieberman et al. (2017);
Mata & Portugal (2000) Vidal &
Mitchell (2015); Zheng et al. (2015)

Exit decision as a signal

Entrepreneur’s exit decision,
persistence and decision
avoidance
(subjective determinants)

Decision making: Subjective
considerations

Before Exit Decision and
Subjective Considerations

Entrepreneurs’ exit intentions
and planned strategies
(subjective determinants)

Peer pressures on exit
decision
Forms of exit

Social and peer influences on exit
decision

Choices of exit modes: Objective
considerations

144

Elfenbein & Knott (2015);
Lieberman et al. (2017); Norman et
al. (2013); Nummela et al. (2016);
Yamakawa & Cardon (2017)

Speed of exit

Almus (2004); Carreira & Teixeira
(2011); Moulton et al. (1996)
Bergh & Sharp (2015); Burgelman
(1996); Graebner & Eisenhardt
(2004); Moschieri (2011)

Shadow of death as exit
approaches

Chang (1996); Miller & Yang
(2016); Nachum & Song (2011)

Exit as part of the firm’s
trajectory

Brauer & Wiersema (2012); Gaba &
Terlaak (2013)

Mimic exit moves

Akther et al. (2016); Dehlen et al.
(2014); DeTienne & Chirico (2013)

Forms of exit – family
businesses

DeTienne (2010); Graebner &
Eisenhardt (2004); Kammerlander
(2016); Leroy et al. (2015); Rouse
(2016)

Forms of exit –
entrepreneurial ventures

Exit disengagement modes –
subjective considerations

Erkama & Vaara (2010); Walsh &
Bartunek (2011)

Organizational members
responses to the exit decision

Resisting the exit

Time to exit

After Exit Decision and
Objective Considerations

Exit implementation and structuring
How exit is executed

Interdependencies of exit moves

* Please note that some articles overlap between the quadrants.

After Exit Decision and
Subjective Considerations
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4.4 Review of the Literature
4.4.1

Quadrant I: Before Exit Decision and Objective Considerations

In this quadrant, we review the literature that discusses how decision makers grapple with a
decision to exit, and resort to objective considerations in making the decision. In these studies,
scholars ask about the decision to exit, rather than when or how the exit is executed. Yet many
studies operationalize the exit decision as the exit event, compressing the temporal distance
between exit decision and actual exit execution. In this quadrant, we focus on the real options
logic because it dominates the objective considerations in making exit decisions. We then
provide an overview of the literature about exit and relocation, turnaround attempts, divestitures
as strategic and reorganizing decisions, and the decision-making process.

4.4.1.1

Real options decision

A longstanding literature in strategy and international business has addressed the exit decision
from a real options perspective. Times of war (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; 2017), economic
crises (Belderbos & Zou, 2009; Chung et al., 2013), and environmental instability (Berry, 2013)
create a dilemma for the MNE as to whether to exit or stay because both actions have costs and
benefits attached to them. When organizations need to consider exit due to poor performance,
risk of adversity, or any negative feedback from the environment, evidence shows that they tend
to delay the decision to exit by considering other alternatives (Buchholtz et al., 1999; Shepherd
et al., 2015), especially that there are multiple exit barriers that make an exit decision a challenge
(Decker & Mellewigt, 2007). In contexts of uncertainty, the real options perspective may explain
many firms’ decisions, as it offers a rationale to wait, delay the exit decision, and remain
flexible.
A majority of this literature examines diversified firms operating in different markets locally and
geographically. Despite macroeconomic adverse conditions, an MNE might decide to wait and
hold on to a subsidiary if it offers an option value—especially during uncertainty, when current
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circumstances might change (Belderbos & Zou, 2009). However, adversity and uncertainty in a
host market might reach a certain threshold when the MNE starts discounting the option value
because of a substantial increase in the costs of staying, and eventually decides to exit the
subsidiary (Dai et al., 2017). Firms need to know when to exit in a timely manner (Dai et al.,
2013; 2017), and this is contingent on this option value of keeping the business running in this
market; for example, the subsidiary would be of high value, even if it is underperforming, when
it includes hard-to-replace assets (Dai et al., 2017), or has complementary activities and
operations to those of other sister subsidiaries in the portfolio of the MNE (Berry, 2013; Chung
et al., 2013; Dai et al., 2017). MNEs with larger portfolios (across different locations) are less
likely to exit their foreign subsidiaries, and prefer to wait as they can shift activities from one
subsidiary to another in times of uncertainty (i.e., the MNE has built-in redundancy and
flexibility in a portfolio of options across those subsidiaries and locations) (Belderbos & Zou,
2009; Chung et al., 2013; Dai et al., 2017).
Those decisions are considered rational decisions on partial exits as they affect only a subset of
subsidiaries in certain markets, out of a larger portfolio of the MNE. Many times, these decisions
could be made to get rid of subsidiaries that have become a burden on the portfolio. How
managers assess opportunities and threats plays a role in making these decisions, and sometimes
an exit decision becomes the only option to avoid catastrophic losses (Dai et al., 2017).
Damaraju et al. (2015) apply real options rationale to both the decision to exit (Quadrant I) and
the question of how exit will be executed (i.e., mode; Quadrant II). We discuss this study further
in Quadrant II, but it is important to note that this research highlights more diversity in exit
decisions by proposing an additional option: a partial divestment (i.e., spin-off/equity carveouts). Partial divestment is a choice that must be counterbalanced to complete divestment, or to
non-divestment decisions. Nevertheless, the authors find that a decision for a partial exit has less
real options value than those of not divesting or completely divesting, due to the complexity of
implementing the partial divestment (Quadrant II) after this decision has been made.
In this quadrant, we did not find research that empirically investigates the time it takes
organizations to make an exit decision. The closest study is Elfenbein et al. (2017), in which the
authors discuss exit delays by conducting an experiment with entrepreneurs/managers with
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equity stakes and advisors with no stakes. Both groups had to make an “exit or stay” decision
with an underperforming firm. As expected, decision makers do not make a sudden and prompt
decision to exit. When decision makers delay an exit decision, due to the uncertainty of future
outcomes, the authors label this delay as rational delay: it is the option to wait, as in a real option
logic. However, the authors noted that when entrepreneurs/managers own an equity stake in the
venture, they tend to take more time than non-owner advisors, over and above a rational delay, to
make an exit decision; owner-managers need more certainty that the business is unprofitable
before exiting (Elfenbein et al., 2017).

4.4.1.2

Exit and relocation decisions (home vs. host)

Domestic firms face more challenges than foreign firms when making exit decisions as managers
and owners are more attached to locally based operations, which usually represent older
businesses or legacy operations (Feldman, 2013). There has been more focus in the international
business literature to examine exit from a foreign subsidiary, and in strategy literature, focus on
exit from a market or business unit as one of many in a diversified portfolio of the organization.
However, there has been little research that examines how multinational or diversified
organizations consider exiting home-based businesses. One of the few studies of this nature,
Berry (2010), examines how opportunities in foreign markets (such as lower-cost production and
new market opportunities) might motivate firms to exit operations from home. Moreover,
Coucke and Sleuwaegen (2008) looked into the impact of globalization and entry of new
competitors as threats to local firms that need to respond by considering an exit option. The main
argument is that domestic firms might need to resort to “partial entity” exit by divesting
production activities (Berry, 2010) or offshoring (Coucke & Sleuwaegen 2008), and relocate to
foreign locations.
These decisions are partial because they do not entail complete exit decisions of an entity, but
they may be necessary so the parent organization could survive in its own domestic market. Exit
and relocation became common during the 1997 Asian financial crisis as firms could weather
challenges they were facing in certain subsidiaries and/or locations (Chung et al., 2013). At the
same time, when better global market opportunities arise, firms might decide to divest some
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peripheral businesses of an entity at home to allow more time and attention for new activities in
other markets (Berry, 2010). This form of partial exit from the home market to reallocate
resources and relocate into new business in foreign markets has not been well developed in the
literature, though it is becoming a more common exit phenomenon (Chung et al., 2013; Mata &
Freitas, 2012). Instead of looking at those exit decisions as uniform, Mata and Freitas (2012)
acknowledge the diversity in exit decisions, such as multinationals partially exiting their
operations from Portugal—the focal country of their study—with or without relocation of the
divested operations elsewhere in the world, and the partial exit of purely domestic firms by
offshoring their operations abroad. Although, Mata and Freitas (2012) note that these partial
exits are different from complete exit decisions and have varying implications on the parent
organization, they are unable to account for these exit decisions empirically.
Comparing purely domestic firms to foreign firms and to domestic-based multinationals, Mata
and Freitas (2012) find that MNEs are more flexible to make an exit decision due to the
footlooseness advantage of “being foreign.” In other words, firms are less emotionally attached
to their foreign subsidiaries than to their own domestic businesses, especially as those exit
decisions are made at headquarters rather than at the subsidiary level (Mata & Freitas, 2012).
MNEs resort to more flexible exit decisions by comparing conditions across different
subsidiaries in different locations continuously, and then decide whether they should exit a
certain subsidiary and maybe relocate somewhere else. Often, they move a business from one
location to another, to an extent where foreign subsidiaries’ presence becomes temporary in
some locations (Coucke & Sleuwaegen, 2008; Mata & Freitas, 2012). Although foreign firms
may require longer periods of activity in order to make a decision to exit (due to large entry
costs), they are still flexible and can make an exit decision more easily than domestic firms,
especially when environmental conditions change in a host country or elsewhere (Mata &
Freitas, 2012). Examining international new ventures’ exits from international markets,
Nummela and colleagues (2016) argue that exit from a market is only a temporary problem for
MNEs, as they can fall back on revenues from other markets. However, international exit could
be more severe for international new ventures that have little or no domestic revenues
(Nummela, Saarenketo, & Loane, 2016).
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Adding to the diversity of exit decisions, we identified research on exit that postulates that MNEs
can resort to a middleground exit choice that falls in between the two extreme decisions of
“business as usual” (i.e., continue) and “full exit: (i.e., complete discontinuation of operations
and the most radical response to environmental pressures) (Meyer & Thein, 2014). A low-profile
strategy (Meyer & Thein, 2014) or sleeping strategy (Figueira-de-Lemos & Hadjikhani, 2014)
provides a more fine-grained response to changes in the foreign macro environment. Low-profile
strategy is about continuing a presence in a market but reducing commitment and visibility (e.g.,
lower commitment modes, low-profile branding, or serving the market indirectly through
partners in other locations) (Meyer & Thein, 2014). Further, highlighting the diversity in
commitment decisions (e.g., divestment, total market exit, or preserving the status quo
commitment), Figueira-de-Lemos and Hadjikhani (2014) argue that in highly uncertain
environments, the MNE may become unable to make major decisions regarding an entity exit
(here, a subsidiary exit) and adopt a sleeping strategy, in which it tends to decrease its tangible
assets (e.g., production plants, subsidiary ofﬁces, and transportation vehicles) and commit in a
more intangible way (e.g., personnel, education, advertisement actions, managers’ meetings, or
relationships inside and outside the ﬁrm) to reassess its current tangible commitments. Lowprofile and sleeping approaches shed light on the aggregated parts of a subsidiary in these
contexts, and help to explain how a parent MNE can decide to exit some parts of the entity while
preserving other parts by committing intangibly.

4.4.1.3

Retrenchment and refocusing decisions as turnaround attempts

In the context of decline and low performance, there is always reluctance to make the decision to
exit. In particular, many exit barriers (Decker & Mellewigt, 2007) discourage firms from
engaging with an exit decision. Decker & Mellewigt (2007) identify three main barriers to
business exit: structural or economic (e.g., resources, ownership concentration, inertia due to age
and size); strategic (e.g., relationships with other businesses of the firm); and managerial (e.g.,
information asymmetries or conflicting goals that dissuade management from making a decision
to exit even though it is justified economically). In the short run, most probably, the management
will simply decide to continue with an underperforming firm.
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As firms experience low performance and exit becomes a probable consideration, managers and
entrepreneurs often resort to failure-avoidance activities. These turnaround attempts can buy the
organization some time before making the exit decision (in the case of failed attempts), or avoid
the exit decision altogether (in the case of successful attempts). Turnaround is defined as a
recovery in performance after a period of organizational failure (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). The
management literature has examined different causes of decline, as well as various responses,
firm actions, and outcomes of organizational decline and turnaround (for a review, see Trahms et
al., 2013).
Van Witteloostuijn (1998) identifies four responses to organizational decline: immediate exit
(when profitability falls below zero), turnaround success (firms move from negative to positive
profits), flight from losses (after a period of losses, the ﬁrm decided to leave the market), and
chronic failure (negative profits, but firm stays in the market). The scenario of immediate exit is
a compression of this “before exit” quadrant, as the decision is taken abruptly here once the
organization perceives the need to respond to the decline. One approach to avoid failure is to
undertake partial exit by closing some entities or downsizing capacity; however, this approach
can only work if the entity and capacity are divisible. Otherwise, the firm faces a yes-or-no exit
decision that can be delayed (i.e., in the long run, a case of chronic failure) or reversed (i.e., in
the case of turnaround success) (van Witteloostuijn, 1998).
Turnaround is a sequence of activities to avoid the ultimate decision of a full exit, or what is
considered as failure (Boyne & Meier, 2009). Trahms et al. (2013) describe strategic and
operational actions as firm attempts for a turnaround. Strategic actions involve leveraging new
markets and products, while operational actions include asset and cost retrenchment (Trahms et
al., 2013). Retrenchment is a reduction in the size and scope of a business by fully or partially
exiting one or more entities, such as exiting difficult markets, deleting unprofitable product lines,
selling assets, outsourcing, and downsizing (Boyne & Meier, 2009, p. 843). Retrenchment that
includes divesting or exiting a certain entity could impact the viability of the organization on a
corporate level. In other words, a partial exit from one of the markets or one of the subsidiaries
becomes a solution to avoid a complete exit or collapse of the organization because it helps to
cut losses and generate resources for better use (Boyne & Meier, 2009).
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Managerial considerations are important in those decisions. For example, appointing new
managers will increase the likelihood of a retrenchment decision because they are less attached
to the business units or subsidiaries of the organization (Boyne & Meier, 2009). Moreover, midlevel managers can play a role in those decisions, sometimes guiding the top management team
in exiting certain businesses and markets, and entering new/different ones (Burgelman, 1996).
Although divesting certain assets and/or exiting entire businesses and markets could help the
firm to turn around, there are inconsistent findings in the literature about the effectiveness of
retrenchment (Trahms et al., 2013; Wennberg at al., 2010). Retrenchment is not always helpful
in addressing the organization’s decline; in fact, it might push the firm to decline further (Boyne
& Meir, 2009). Divesting assets and exiting markets may signal that the firm is struggling, and
push it into a downward spiral (Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). How effective retrenchment is for
recovery is contingent on its early adoption as part of a turnaround attempt (Filatotchev & Toms,
2003; Tangpong et al., 2015). Tangpong et al. (2015) find evidence that early (i.e., within two
years of decline) market exits and divestments are effective turnaround attempts, while early
layoffs and late retrenchment have adverse effects. This study shows how the timing of various
partial exit decisions (e.g., exit from certain markets or layoffs) has a differential impact on the
organization’s survival. The timing of retrenchment actions (i.e., the “when”—whether they are
taken early vs. late) is just as important as the type of actions taken in declining ﬁrms (i.e., the
“what”). Although the study does not examine why and how certain timing has been adopted by
firms (i.e., why early or late decisions were made), we can assume that organizational
contingencies and managerial influences should determine this timing decision (Tangpong et al.,
2015; Trahms et al., 2013).
Other studies show that the most effective turnaround attempts are combinations of both strategic
change and operational retrenchment (McKinley et al., 2015; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013); however,
it is not evident whether the integration of both is effective in cases of severe decline. When
managers need “to stop the bleeding,” they may have fewer resources and attention to invest in
integrating both approaches (Schmitt & Raisch, 2013)
Another interesting but underresearched topic is the turnaround of firms after filing for
bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy represents an indication of a failing ﬁrm and a major step
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towards organizational death (Moulton & Thomas, 1993), there are studies (albeit few) that
looked at reorganization and successful turnarounds after filing for bankruptcy (e.g., Dawley,
Hoffman, & Lamont, 2002; Mayr, Mitter, & Aichmayr, 2017). Bankruptcy could be an
opportunity for reorganization and a special form of turnaround: “the ultimate turnaround
challenge” (Dawley et al., 2002).
Most studies equate bankruptcy with failure or a total exit event. Yet, our conceptual framework
helps to contextualize these studies in this quadrant (before exit decision), as there are cases
when organizations file for bankruptcy to buy more time and defer the decision to exit (Lee,
Peng, & Barney, 2007). Meanwhile, some organizations can reorganize and turn around
effectively, bouncing back and avoiding an ultimate exit or failure. Lee et al. (2007) argue that
institutional changes supporting easier reorganization for firms after filing for bankruptcy would
be conducive to many organizations. Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides an option value for a firm
to revive and, even in cases of out-of-court settlement bankruptcy, firms may or may not cease,
based on the outcomes of the negotiations (Lee et al., 2007).
Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1993) has been used as the common measure to assess a firm’s
financial health and the likelihood that it will file (or refile) for bankruptcy protection (Dawley et
al., 2002). Firms with high strategic choice—determined by re-deployable resources—or low
environmental constraints were able to refocus and benefit from the extra grace period they
received from filing for bankruptcy, improving their Z-score (Dawley et al., 2002).
There are a variety of outcomes of firms’ turnaround attempts, but current research does not
distinguish well among them. The outcomes in increasing order of success are: failure
(liquidation), reorganization bankruptcy, discounted sale, limping along, recovery, and sharp
bend recovery (Trahms et al., 2013). Nevertheless, there are scenarios of firms that are able to
survive and avoid exit despite being economically unviable, outlasting more efficient firms in the
long run. These organizations have been labelled as “permanently failing organizations” (Meyer
& Zucker, 1989), “living dead” (Ruhnka, Feldman, & Dean, 1992), “chronic failures” (van
Witteloostuijn, 1998), and “failure-avoidance organizations” (McGrath, 1999); they are not
making the decision to exit and are feigning “immortality.” Sometimes, decision makers are
willing to keep a failing entity alive for non-economic reasons, such as emotional or social ties.
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They are willing to accept a low level of performance for a long time before even considering an
exit decision (Gimeno et al., 1997). Some actors try to turn them around, some are not
successful, and some are not willing to try because they have no pressures to improve the
organization’s performance. For example, Boyne and Meier (2009) examine public organizations
that face no competition and are not threatened by more superior rivals. When actions are not
taken to improve performance, these organizations become “permanent failures” (Meyer &
Zucker, 1989). Similarly, when firms file for bankruptcy, they are able to postpone their exit
decision during the reorganization stage, though technically they are bankrupt. However, Lee et
al. (2007) note that, in the long run, these already-bankrupt organizations’ chances of survival
are not high.

4.4.1.4

Divestitures as strategic and reorganizing decisions

In the previous section, we discussed retrenchment as a form of divestment that is triggered by
negative feedback from the environment and/or when firms are in distress. Yet it must be noted
that firms also resort to divestments (or divestitures) for strategic purposes that were triggered by
better opportunities, rather than distress. Divestment is part of the resource orchestration of an
organization, a phenomenon that draws upon the conceptual work of resource management
(Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007) and asset orchestration (Helfat et al., 2007; Trahms et al., 2013).
This stream of research in strategic management examines divestitures (Brauer, 2006) as
adjustments of the ownership and portfolio of the firm via different forms, such as spin-off,
equity carve-out, split-up, or unit sell-off. It is the decision for “disposal and sale of assets,
facilities, product lines, subsidiaries, divisions and business units” (Moschieri & Mair, 2008, p.
399). Divestiture is considered a tool (one of many) of corporate strategy and restructuring (for a
review, see: Brauer, 2006; Moschieri & Mair, 2008). This form of exit decision could enable an
organization to reconfigure resources within the corporate portfolio (Capron, Dussauge, &
Mitchell, 1998; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Karim & Mitchell, 2000), leverage better
opportunities elsewhere (Brauer, 2006), or remove an underperforming firm (Chang, 1996). Poor
firm performance (and not necessarily a firm in distress) at the business unit and/or parent level
has been shown to be the strongest predictor of divestiture (Brauer, 2006). Businesses in weak or
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declining industries are first to be considered for divesting, including legacy firms that have
become unrelated to other businesses in the portfolio (Feldman, 2013).
Firms face multiple challenges before, during, and after divestiture (Brauer, 2006), and the
decision to exit a business unit or subsidiary has been compared to a “divorce” between the
organization and the exited entity (Brauer, 2006). However, most of the relevant research has
focused on the antecedents and consequences of divestitures, with very few studies on the
process of divesting (Brauer, 2006; Moschieri & Mair, 2008).
Once managers realize the need to divest a firm, they tend to first redeploy internally rather than
sell or liquidate the firm (Lieberman, Lee, & Folta, 2017). Borrowing from research on the
resource-based view, scholars show that if the resources of the divested entity are related to the
organization’s resources, redeploying internally inside the portfolio makes the exit process faster
due to lower sunk costs, shorter redeployment delays, and a larger portion of the investment
being recovered (Lieberman et al., 2017). There is also evidence that firms try to reap some
benefits before abandoning a business, and try to recombine it with other business units as a first
step towards the exit decision. In this way, the parent organization might be able to extend the
life of this business and deter its full exit (Karim, 2006; Decker & Mellewigt, 2007). This is a
form of a partial exit decision in which a firm achieves the goals of an exit decision, but recovers
some of its investments and stays involved with the divested entity. It is an interesting exit
decision in that some parts of the relationship between the parent and the entity are kept while
others are lost. In addition, research shows that longer-tenured CEOs are more emotionally
attached to their entities and will first try to restructure internally to achieve the performance
threshold, rather than directly consider a full exit decision (Feldman, 2013).
Building on resource reconfiguration, Vidal and Mitchell (2015) differentiate between partial and
full divestiture. Partial divestiture takes place when a portion of the unit, a product line, or a plant
from an ongoing business unit is sold, liquidated, or spun off. The authors find that partial
divestiture is particularly common in cases of increasing performance as a proactive
reconfiguration strategy. On the one hand, divesting partial entities allows a more fine-grained
adaptation (Montgomery & Thomas, 1988). On the other hand, divesting full entities is a higherrisk activity, but one that could allow for more immediate and extensive change—especially in
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cases of low performance (Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). The authors also mention other alternatives
in partial exit decisions, such as the choice to divest smaller entities to fine-tune a growing
business, whereas divesting larger ones could support declining business.

4.4.1.5

Decision making – Objective considerations

The exit decision is a process in itself. Divesting a business is not an impulsive decision, but it
unfolds as a series of actions in response to forces that might induce the divesture or discourage
it (Buchholtz et al., 1999). For instance, Burgelman (1996) shows how middle-level managers at
IBM contributed to resolving the dilemma that top managers had about whether to exit its core
dynamic random access memory business. The responsiveness of the organization to the need to
divest is one of the first steps in considering an exit decision.
Top managers have to decide how the underperforming entity fits with the corporate portfolio of
the organization in terms of performance (Hayward and Shimizu, 2006), resources (Feldman,
2013; Lieberman et al., 2017), and activities (Belderbos & Zou, 2009) before making a decision.
They also look for cues to justify a decision to continue with an underperforming business
(Hsieh, Tsai, & Chen, 2015). In the case of undertaking new actions in a location where they
have performed poorly, MNEs look at their competitors’ performance as cues to justify their
decision to continue (Hsieh et al., 2015). This study complements previous work that has
examined the decision to persist irrespective of external cues (e.g., Shimizu. 2007; Hayward &
Shimizu, 2006). Borrowing from the escalation behaviour and competitive dynamics literatures,
Hsieh et al. (2015) find that firms are more likely to commit (i.e., stay and continue) if small
competitors have positive performance and larger competitors have high action volume, whereas
they become more willing to de-commit to these businesses if larger rivals are incurring losses.
The study shows that there are rational and objective deliberations of a firm’s escalation
behaviour to a losing entity, and not always cognitive and personal bias explanations for this
behaviour.
On the other hand, Hayward and Shimizu (2006) examine de-commitment and de-escalation of
commitment, arguing that the two are different constructs. In fact, firms might de-escalate their
commitment to a losing course of action, but not necessarily de-commit or exit the entity
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(Hayward & Shimizu, 2006). Furthermore, we interpret the sequences and degrees of these
decisions in the literature, as CEOs could start with de-escalation and perhaps then move to decommitment (or not). This de-commitment to a certain entity could be considered a partial
decomposition of the exit; then, after de-committing, CEOs can decide to exit or not. In fact,
when the environment becomes less uncertain, some CEOs might recommit to underperforming
entities and try to turn them around (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006).
Adding to the nuances of commitment and de-commitment in exit decisions, Santangelo and
Meyer (2011) argue that most studies look at exit as a radical form of de-commitment. However,
there are instances of commitment decreases within an entity’s ongoing operations, such as the
instances we reviewed earlier and presented as partial exit decisions: low-profile strategy (Meyer
& Thein, 2014) or partial divestitures (Vidal & Mitchell, 2015).
Our usual understanding of escalation of commitment is based on the temporal aspect of it, when
the decision to exit is delayed and firms continue persisting by recommitting to a certain course
of action. The conceptual framework in our review provides the additional lens of partiality to
understand that there are both material and rational (i.e., objective) elements and emotional and
cognitive (i.e., subjective) elements of the escalation of commitment. Escalation of commitment,
while so often used, has insufficiently been problematized in the literature. An organization can
escalate its commitment differently in objective terms versus subjective terms. The decision to
escalate commitment creates the illusion that the firm is not exiting but, in fact, it is incurring
excessive costs both objectively and subjectively. We discuss the subjective elements in
Quadrant II, but from objective considerations, reinvestment in the failing entity is a temporary
buffer against the probability of exit (Wennberg et al., 2010), and firms may objectively decide
to recommit to a certain course of action (Hsieh et al., 2015).
At the individual level, some entrepreneurs set their intention to exit the firm before an exit
decision is required (DeTienne, 2010). In cases of an intended exit path rather than forced
failure, entrepreneurs would also decide in advance the form of the firm’s exit (DeTienne &
Cardon, 2012; DeTienne et al., 2015). Exit strategy is the mode through which the entrepreneur
intends to exit, and is a precursor to the actual exit decision (DeTienne et al., 2015). There are
multiple exit strategies that allow an entrepreneur to remain involved in the entity, such as one’s
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high involvement in family business succession) (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). Factors such as
entrepreneurial experience, industry experience, level of education, and age of the entrepreneur
inﬂuence the speciﬁc exit path chosen (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). For example, entrepreneurs
with greater industry experience are more likely to stay involved with the business and keep a
partial ownership when they intend to sell the entity to employees. DeTienne and Cardon (2012)
show that exit is more than a dichotomous choice, noting that entrepreneurs have many potential
exit paths available to them. In this review, we show that exit strategies and intentions are
actually decided before the exit decision; however, the exit routes (i.e., the actual form of exit)
belong to our themes in Quadrants III and IV, after the decision to exit has been made.
In the case of low economic performance, entrepreneurs and owner-managers have variant
thresholds of performance—reflecting different aspiration levels—and when performance falls
below a certain threshold, the entity will be dissolved or sold. Particularly in small and new
ventures, the difference in thresholds could be partially explained by objective factors such as the
human capital of the owners, their alternative employment opportunities, switching costs to other
occupations (Gimeno et al., 1997), and personal investment (e.g., time, money and energy) in the
entity (DeTienne et al., 2008). We discuss the decision to persist and the more subjective
considerations in greater detail in Quadrant II.

4.4.1.6

Future research directions

Although the literature in this quadrant examines the decision to exit, most of the studies (in
particular, the real option studies) adopt the exit event likelihood as the measure of the decision.
We argue in this review that “exit decision” and “exit execution” are conceptually different. We
acknowledge the limitations of the data and the challenges to operationalize the decision to exit,
but it is important for future research to distinguish between the decision to exit, and its
execution.
Real options are fundamentally about whether the organization would decide to exit, but studies
do not acknowledge that there is a time to decide to exit and a (separate) time to exit. . We
believe future studies should be careful to distinguish conceptually between the likelihood of exit
and the speed of exit, and elaborate on their choices in operationalizing exit decision (Quadrant
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I), exit execution (Quadrant III), speed to make an exit decision (Quadrant I), and speed to exit
execution (Quadrant III).
Moreover, we need to differentiate between those who “own the option” (i.e., those who make
the decision to terminate—in this case, the corporate team at headquarters) and those who “are
the option” (i.e., those who work in the entity being terminated) (McGrath et al., 2004, p. 96).
Our Quadrant IV calls attention to the very few studies at the unit level (after the decision), but it
is important to understand how actors at the unit level engage with the exit before the decision,
and how they interact with the parent firm during this decision-making process. For example, a
foreign subsidiary has triple embeddedness—corporate, local, and sectoral (Simões, 2005)—and
it would be interesting to unpack exit decisions at each of these different levels.
In addition, there are different causes or triggers of exit decisions, and distinguishing between the
triggers and the time needed to make exit decisions could be a compelling avenue for future
research. For instance, organizational decline takes longer than a crisis, and thus, managers have
more time to react to decline, whereas they need to take immediate action in the case of a crisis
(McKinley et al., 2014). There is also an opportunity to understand how firms set exit strategies
in cases of contingency, and how they can design some checkpoints/“stage gates” or assess
thresholds to exit (Dai et al., 2017; Mata & Freitas, 2012).
Whenever firms decide not to exit, the literature frames this decision as persistence. We argue
that a decision not to exit does not necessarily mean effortful persistence, but could be just a
waiting/“inaction” decision. To persist is an active response, whereas to wait is more passive and
relates to a delayed action. Further, persistence has different layers. Hsieh et al. (2015) note that
persistence with a location may or may not imply persistence with the existing strategies in that
location. Future research that clarifies these issues would contribute significantly to
exit/persistence decision making.
Conceptualizing relocation as a partial exit has the potential to contribute to both theories of
internationalization and firm exit. Some firms decide to relocate assets, subsidiaries, and value
chain activities of their entities to other locations and leave some of them at home. We need a
better definition of relocation that reflects the nature of partial exit from home.
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Moreover, turnaround research should shed more light on successful attempts that saved firms
after they had filed for bankruptcy. The reorganization of firms after Chapter 11 bankruptcy
represents a turnaround challenge that has not been well understood. What are the differences
between the turnaround attempts of firms that have already filed for bankruptcy and those that
have not?

4.4.2

Quadrant II: Before Exit Decision and Subjective Considerations

In this section, we review studies that focus on the subjective elements of how decision makers
in firms and actors grapple with exit decisions. We begin by examining the decision-making
process as individuals and organizations contemplate or avoid exit decisions, and then review the
social influences that impact those decisions.

4.4.2.1

Decision making – Subjective considerations

How individuals and organizations make exit decisions has attracted considerable scholarly
attention among both management (e.g., Gimeno et al., 1997; Shimizu, 2007) and
entrepreneurship scholars (e.g., DeTienne et al., 2008; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Wennberg et
al., 2010; Shepherd et al., 2015). Here, we review, in particular, the subjective elements of this
decision process. We note that the decision to automatically continue with a business does not
require much deliberation, but when there are changes in the context—whether at the level of the
environment, firm, or individual—actors start considering whether they want to abandon the
entity or not (Carver & Scheier, 2013; Holland & Shepherd, 2013). Most scholars examine the
decision to persist as a mirror image of the decision to exit. The biggest challenge in this area is
to be able to identify whether persistence represents a rational course of action (Quadrant I), a
subjective and biased decision, or a character-driven choice (Quadrant II) (Kisfalvi, 2000).
The decision to exit is often linked to models of decision making under uncertainty and risk (e.g.,
Shimizu, 2007; Wennberg et al., 2016). Studies show that, in times of business distress, how one
changes attention to survival and aspiration reference points influences risk preferences and
decision to grow, persist, or exit (Miller & Chen, 2004; Wennberg et al., 2016). For example, as
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organizations near bankruptcy, they are more willing to take risks (Miller & Chen, 2004), and
when older, they are more willing to pursue growth to restore performance rather than cut costs
and consider terminating the venture (Wennberg et al., 2016).
Shimizu (2007) notes that a combination of the following three factors influences the decision to
either exit or retain an underperforming business: (1) the individual risk preferences predicted in
prospect theory, (2) the organizational alternative-seeking behaviour predicted in behavioural
theory and (3) the individual, group, and organizational defensive tendencies predicted in the
threat-rigidity thesis. The author argues that negative performance triggers the decision to divest
the business unit; however, as more losses accumulate, the likelihood of an exit decision tapers
off because threat-rigidity effects prevail and paralyze the organization.
Examining the exit decisions of family firms provides insights on many subjective aspects.
Similar to other organizations, family firms facing organizational crisis tend to avoid exit and
resort to turnaround practices to preserve the business (Cater & Schwab, 2008). In particular, the
altruistic motives and long-term orientation of the family members will extend the timeline for
the firm to be able to implement turnaround strategies. Cater and Schwab (2008) show that
family businesses are more patient and willing to persist due to these subjective motives to
preserve the business in the family, and are willing to incur personal sacrifices. However, other
family characteristics, such as strong ties to the business and emotional attachment, may restrain
turnaround challenges because family members may hinder those changes (Cater & Schwab,
2008), leading to extensive inertia (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). Family businesses are willing to
adopt cost retrenchment but avoid asset retrenchments that involve divesting an entity and/or
avoid major strategic changes (Trahms et al., 2013). This approach may cause more challenges if
the turnaround attempt requires a major asset retrenchment or strategic action. Family firms
controlled by smaller families and based in a more individualistic culture are hypothesized to be
more efficient in making those retrenchment decisions; hence, they should respond faster to the
need to divest and/or to turnaround attempts (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005).
Even when better economic opportunities arise, family firms prefer to preserve legacy and
maintain their dutiful tasks (e.g., preserving employment to workers and family members), rather
than exploit these opportunities (Feldman et al., 2016). If a family firm ultimately decides to
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divest an entity to exploit an economic opportunity, the financial value should be high enough to
offset the costs of sacrificing the non-economic family considerations (Feldman et al., 2016).
At the individual level, underperforming entrepreneurial ventures with similar objective
economic performance react differently due to individual differences among entrepreneurs
(DeTienne et al., 2008; Gimeno et al., 1997). Personal values and experience with adversity
(Holland and Shepherd, 2013), motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic) (DeTienne et al., 2008), and
personal satisfaction (Gimeno et al., 1997) influence the subjective threshold of performance that
entrepreneurs will accept to continue the business. For example, there are instances when an
entrepreneur persists with an economically failing firm because it preserves the entrepreneur’s
social status or acceptance (Khelil, 2016). Empirically, Gimeno et al. (1997) compared firms that
exited with ones that did not (i.e., exit event) to unravel the predictors of persistence of
underperforming entrepreneurial firms. To examine individual-level persistence decisions, more
recent studies resorted to experiments and conjoint studies (e.g., DeTienne et al., 2008; Holland
& Shepherd, 2013).
Escalation of commitment has been used as one of the most common theoretical explanations as
to why entrepreneurs or managers persist (DeTienne et al., 2008; Pajunen, 2008; Shepherd et al.,
2009). Scholars simply argue that the determinants of commitment to a course of action (e.g.,
self-justification, norms for consistency, preference for future uncertain loss over sure loss) offer
sound explanations as to why actors decide to persist with an underperforming firm rather than
exit.
A recent study shows that long before entrepreneurs decide to escalate commitment, they are
already trapped in a mindset that dissuades them from making an exit decision, even when it is
needed (McMullen & Kier, 2016). Entrepreneurs are usually focused on seeking opportunities,
which entices them not to think of exit or plan an exit or contingency strategy (McMullen &
Kier, 2016). In the event of changing conditions, the mindset of the actor is already focused on,
and attentive to, how to complete the goal, as opposed to questioning whether the goal should be
completed/exited. This promotion focus to achieve something delays the realization that one
needs to exit or stop and, by this time, one is still investing in the venture, in a failing course of
action. Entrepreneurs may not realize that a decision must be made about whether to persist or
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not (McMullen & Kier, 2016). McMullen and Kier (2016) note that in lab studies, individuals are
asked to make a decision, but in the field, individuals may not know that there is a need to make
a decision.
We can also borrow more from the literature in cognition to understand how entrepreneurs and
managers make an exit decision. For example, on the one hand, fear of failure might encourage
an entrepreneur to adopt failure-avoidance strategies and make more sacrifices (Cater & Schwab,
2008) to avoid exit. On the other hand, fear of failure can be de-motivating, discouraging
investment (Morgan & Sisak, 2016) and de-escalating commitment.
The decision to exit an underperforming business is not necessarily the opposite of an escalation
of commitment, as often described in the literature. In fact, Hayward and Shimizu (2006)
investigate how CEOs de-escalate from a certain commitment and then de-commit to a certain
business. This decision-making process shows how the exit decision is partial. One can first deescalate a previous commitment to a certain business endeavour and then de-commit to the
entity, and possibly—but not necessarily—decide to exit the business.
The de-commitment to a course of action can take place when one attributes the cause of the
problem to other managers, and hence de-identifies with this business unit and becomes less
psychologically attached to it. It is important to note that managers could de-escalate
commitment to a certain business as a means to correct poor decisions and low performance of
the firm, and need not withdraw from the business unit entirely (Hayward & Shimuzu, 2006).
CEOs might choose instead to wait before making an exit decision, because in general, mental
accounting of individuals is more biased towards escalating commitment rather than decommitting (Hayward & Shimuzu, 2006).
Moreover, there are emotional explanations for delaying entrepreneurs’ exit decisions, in
particular, procrastination and anticipatory grieving (Shepherd et al., 2009). In such cases, the
entrepreneur is delaying the decision to act, trying not to think about the decision that must be
taken. A nuanced distinction is important here, because, in this case, it is a matter of “not
deciding” rather than “deciding to persist”—a distinction that has not been clarified in the extant
literature. Procrastination is related to the act of avoiding response to an emotional threat, while
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anticipatory grieving leads to delay as a way to help oneself to emotionally prepare for the
impending loss (Shepherd et al., 2009) or avoid being stigmatized (Singh et al., 2015).
It would be helpful for managers and entrepreneurs to have “stage gates” where they can assess
the performance of the firm progressively and decide whether to continue or not, especially in
light of changing conditions and new feedback (McMullen & Kier, 2016; Shepherd et al., 2015).
However, the entrepreneurship literature focuses more on existing exit intentions and strategies
of entrepreneurs, when the exit is desirable and planned in advance (e.g., DeTienne et al., 2015).
These exit decisions take place when the business is performing well but the entrepreneur
decides to exit for non-economic reasons, including personal circumstances (Shepherd et al.,
2015).
Entrepreneurs have various motivations for exiting the firm. One can decide to exit the firm due
to lack of fit between one’s decision-making style and the organization’s demands (Brigham et
al., 2007), or conflict between the entrepreneur and investors (Collewaert, 2012). In these
instances, entrepreneurs might decide to exit the business (e.g., sell or liquidate) prematurely
based on a volitional decision that was made ahead of time.
Further, when exit strategies are set in advance by entrepreneurs, they delineate different planned
routes to exit. We were particularly interested in partial exit strategies in which entrepreneurs
(DeTienne et al., 2015) or family business owners (DeTienne & Chirico, 2013) plan to pass on
the business to family members or employees (i.e., stewardship exit). These planned exit
strategies reflect the intention of the entrepreneur and/or owner-manager(s) to stay involved to a
certain degree with the entity, and take care of the firm and/or family continuity (DeTienne &
Chirico, 2013; DeTienne et al., 2015).

4.4.2.2

Social and peer influences on exit decision

Some studies in strategy and international business examine exit decisions in light of subjective
social influences. When organizations operate in an industry that is stigmatized due to the
wrongdoing of other firms (Durand & Vergne, 2015), or in a country that faces global social
movement pressures and global sanctions (Meyer & Thein, 2014; Soule et al., 2014), they need
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to consider exiting from these markets to signal their disassociation from the industry (Durand &
Vergne, 2015) or the country (Meyer & Thein, 2014; Soule et al., 2014) and save their
reputation. Organizations may not have experienced direct adversity or low performance yet in
these markets, but they decide to exit prematurely to avoid risks. In the context of uncertain
environments, exit decisions “diffuse” between similar organizations within a particular network
(Soule et al., 2014). In other instances, an MNE might decide to divest from countries that are in
the same region or have similar political, economic, and cultural conditions as the host country
(where the MNE experienced a dispute with the host government that resulted in an exit
decision) (Blake & Moschieri, 2017). In this case, there is a “contagion” effect among sister
subsidiaries of the same MNE, but in different markets, where the MNE prefers to exit
prematurely to circumvent any future challenges (Blake & Moschieri, 2017). It is interesting that
these exit decisions are made due to “spillover” effects from stigmatized peers (Durand &
Vergne, 2015), “diffusion” within the network of intergovernmental organizations to which the
firm belongs (Soule et al., 2014), and “contagion” from other sister subsidiaries in neighbouring
countries (Blake & Moschieri, 2017). These exit decisions are not considered necessary or
urgent; however, due to social influences and to prevent future challenges or damage, the
organizations make these decisions prematurely.
Moreover, firms do not need to divest all their operations in these markets. In fact, all the exits
observed from the stigmatized industry were partial exits that were enough to signal (1) the
dissociation of the firm from the market and (2) that it follows more socially accepted goals
(Durand & Vergne, 2015). Other firms may resort to partial exit through “low-profile strategy”
by reducing visibility and commitment but still continuing operations (Meyer & Thein, 2014). In
other cases, organizations might avoid the exit decision from international markets, as they do
not want to lose their image or question their identity as an MNE that operates across numerous
countries (Wan et al., 2015). If needed, organizations might partially decrease their involvement
in international markets by first divesting smaller entities, units, or subsidiaries that generate less
positive publicity (Wan et al., 2015).
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4.4.2.3

Future research directions

Developing an empirical understanding of the decision to persist remains a challenge for
researchers. Scholars adopt lab studies and experiments by asking participants to make a
decision. However, in the field, managers and entrepreneurs are not explicitly asked to make a
decision (McMullen & Kier, 2016). It is important to understand when actors feel the need to
make a decision and how they make a decision to persist. Furthermore, the decision making
changes over time as the decision to exit is not a one-time event: managers and entrepreneurs
keep on reevaluating environmental changes and organizational contingencies that affect their
decisions over time. More research is needed to understand how they make those decisions
longitudinally (e.g., Miller & Sardais, 2015) and why and how they move from a decision to
persist to a decision to exit, and maybe revert back to a non-exit decision. In addition, it is
important to examine whether some entrepreneurs rely on effectual decision making (Sarasvathy,
2001) when they contemplate exit decisions; this is an interesting issue because we would
assume that if entrepreneurs rely on effectual decision making, they would be faster in making
the decision to exit.
It is sometimes hard to distinguish between rational effects and more individual, cognitive, and
psychological effects in making an exit decision. Future studies that explore these differences
could be highly valuable, especially when researchers have access to managerial frames of firms
making divestment decisions (Damaraju et al., 2015).
As mentioned earlier, we believe that persistence has to be more nuanced than being the opposite
of a decision to exit. Scholars define persistence as an “effortful action” (Cardon & Kirk, 2015)
and “repeated efforts in the face of adversity” (Markman et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2007). The
opposite of a decision to exit is simply “not to exit”, and this could be either a case of a “waitand-see” attempt (i.e., preserving the status quo) with no effortful action, or a decision to act and
persist (i.e., resisting). Future research should discern between persistence and other alternatives
to the exit decision.
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There are many mechanisms that revolve around the decision to exit, and there is a need for
further clarity and differentiation among the reasons to persist, exit, or not make (i.e., delay) a
decision.
Moreover, exit can be used as a signal to preserve a certain image or impression of the
organization (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Wan et al., 2015). Many times, these exits are executed
partially or temporarily just to pretend or signal something. Future research should better
articulate these decisions of partial exit that are used to give the appearance of an exit, when in
fact the firm has not completely exited. At the same time, there might be some decisions that
give an appearance that the firm has not exited, when in fact it did.

4.4.3

Quadrant III: After Exit Decision and Objective Considerations

We believe that the literature, in general, does not distinguish between exit decision and exit
execution; hence, most studies compress Quadrant III and IV of our review. Yet, we were still
able to review some articles that focus on what happens once the decision to exit has been made,
and before the complete exit of the entity. In this section, we discuss studies on exit modes,
timing, implementation, and structuring, and interdependencies of exit moves.

4.4.3.1

Choices of exit modes

The decision to exit encompasses more than a choice between termination and persistence, as
decision makers have a number of choices on modes of exiting and how to implement the
process (Shepherd et al., 2015). Even distressed firms that must exit follow a two-stage decision:
first, either decide to exit voluntarily or be forced into a court-driven exit (e.g., bankruptcy); and
second, choose to exit—in the case of voluntary exit—either through voluntary liquidation or
sell-off (Balcaen et al., 2012; Mata and Portugal, 2000). Depending on multiple factors, firms
would prefer and value a certain route to exit over other forms. However, the common wisdom
stands that selling the business/entity is a better option than liquidation, and both are better
options than forced bankruptcy (Balcaen et al., 2012; van Witteloostuijn, 1998; Zheng et al.,
2015).
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There are also forms/modes of partial exit that ease the exit process. For example, Lieberman et
al. (2017) show that it is more optimal for organizations to redeploy internally rather than
liquidate the underperforming entity in the external market, arguing that internal redeployment
quickens the exit process. By adopting a partial form of exit by redeploying some of the entity’s
resources internally, an organization incurs lower sunk cost and shorter redeployment delays
(Lieberman et al., 2017).
On the other hand, partial exit of a business by selling a portion of it was found to be less
valuable than full exit when the organization is facing an immediate challenge (Vidal &
Mitchell, 2015). Vidal and Mitchell (2015) show that partial exit is valuable when the
organization is trying to leverage new opportunities and the exit is being implemented for
strategic purposes, freeing resources for future use. The authors argue that a partial divestiture
needs more attention and time from managers to be able to disintegrate an entity’s operations
that are up for divestment; hence, partial exits are less valuable in times of immediate challenges
(Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). Moreover, once an exit decision has been made, a firm could have the
choice whether to divest larger or smaller entities (Duhaime & Baird, 1987; Vidal & Mitchell,
2015).
Damaraju et al. (2015) make the distinction between two forms of partial exit: spin-offs and
equity carve-outs. Spin-offs take place when the equity in the newly formed entity/firm is
distributed to the existing firm’s shareholders, whereas equity carve-out happens when the equity
in the newly formed entity is issued to new shareholders (Brauer, 2006; Damaraju et al., 2015).
Adopting a real options lens to choose the mode of divestment, the study finds that, in times of
uncertainty, partial forms of divestment have less real options value than not divesting or
completely divesting. This work echoes similar findings of Vidal and Mitchell (2015) that partial
exits are complicated and less valuable in conditions of high uncertainty. The values of spin-offs
and equity carve-outs lie in being staged divestments, and they could be the first stage of a
further exit, such as additional spin-off/carve-out, complete exit (e.g., liquidation or sell-off), or
non-exit (e.g., bringing back the entity/business into the parent company) (Damaraju et al.,
2015).
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In the case of a distressed business, voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy are two fundamentally
different exit modes (Balcaen et al., 2012). Bankruptcy is considered a forced form of exit
(Balcaen et al., 2012); however, in Quadrant I, we showed that bankruptcy could also be
considered a decision to prolong the longevity of the business while managers try to reorganize.
In case a company exits voluntarily, it can decide to liquidate piecewise (i.e., when assets are
sold as individual assets) or sell the entire entity (Balcaen et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2015).
Many factors affect a firm’s choice of exit mode. For example, how old the firm is and how
much it holds in cash and debt will impact whether it would exit through liquidation or sale
(Balcaen et al., 2012). An entity’s managerial and organizational capabilities influence the
choice between an acquisition (where managerial capabilities can be saved and transferred) and a
dissolution (where functional and managerial capabilities are selected out) (Fortune and Mitchell,
2012). Further, institutional factors affect exit modes. For instance, in countries with weak
institutions, a sell-off of a distressed entity is a challenging task for the owners because the
market is underdeveloped for such a transaction (Zheng et al., 2015)

4.4.3.2

Time to exit

Recent research examines the time to exit after the decision has been made (Elfenbein & Knott,
2015; Lieberman et al., 2017; Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017). This emerging body of research
attempts to understand why some firms are slower to make an exit relative to others, especially
when the speed of exit might have financial, economic, social, and psychological implications on
the firm and its managers (Shepherd et al., 2009).
In examining distressed ventures (Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017) and organizations in industry
shakeout (Elfenbein & Knott, 2015), studies focus on “time to exit” as a construct to understand
the time between the exit decision and the exit event of a firm. There are different time delays to
exit, during which exit is still incomplete, partial, and in the making. Even in a situation of
distress when exit is impending, how fast the firm exits is still, ultimately, a matter of choice
(Balcaen et al., 2011; Cefis & Marsili, 2011).
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Investments made in the entity prior to economic distress influence how fast an entrepreneur will
exit his/her venture (Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017). Exit delays occur when there are greater
investments of the entrepreneur’s time and money prior to the point of distress (Yamakawa &
Cardon, 2017). However, the greater the number of employees, the faster the exit; in this case,
Yamakawa and Cardon (2017) suggest that entrepreneurs might have to exit this entity early due
to the larger costs of the salaries they incur.
Reviewing banks’ exit behaviours, Elfenbein and Knott (2015) distinguish between three types
of exit delays: rational, organizational, and behavioural. Adopting the Marshallian exit (i.e., the
point at which expected economic profits from operating the business fall below zero) as a
reference point, the authors argue that rational delays arise absent of behavioural biases. They
find evidence of rational delay when firms are uncertain about their true costs relative to others.
Firms do resort to rational delays to get additional signals about their underlying or future
profitability. The study also finds evidence of behavioural delays—on top of rational delays—
when biases influence how firms interpret new information and performance signals (e.g., selfserving attribution and confirmatory biases). A third factor affecting exit speed is organizational
delay, which concerns agency problems (Jensen, 1993) and how non-owner managers engage in
self-serving behaviour and delay exit for their own benefit.
Moreover, the form of exit chosen has implications for how fast the exit process is. Redeploying
inside the business portfolio (Lieberman et al., 2017), and full (rather than partial) divestiture
(Damaraju et al., 2015; Vidal & Mitchell, 2015) speed up the exit process.
Another area of the literature examines the behaviours of firms as they approach exit. The main
question here is whether there is a “sudden death,” or whether firms exit slowly (Moulton et al.,
1996) as a “shadow of death” (Griliches & Regev, 1995) develops. For example, scholars show
that downsizing can serve as an adjustment to cut costs and try to save the company in a
turnaround attempt (Gandolfi & Hansson, 2011; Norman et al., 2013), or to prepare the entity for
an already-decided exit (Almus, 2004). In fact, laying off employees could be only a
postponement of the exit event (Coucke & Sleuwaegen, 2008). Carreira and Teixeira (2011)
support this argument by finding that exit does not happen by a “stroke of misfortune” (Carreira
& Teixeira 2011, p. 338), and that productivity lowers and employee numbers decrease in the
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years leading to an exit. There is evidence of the phenomenon of the “shadow of death sneaking
around the corner,” and it starts approximately three years before exit (Almus, 2004, p. 189).
We find very few articles that mention “sudden bankruptcy” (e.g., Balcaen et al., 2012), and
there has been no elaboration on this phenomenon. To sell or liquidate, parent firms have at least
some partial control of these exits (Balcaen et al., 2012; Leroy et al., 2015). Even in cases of
distressed ventures/entities, parent organizations are still able to control the time to exit
(Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017).
A very promising area of research is the exit of international new ventures (Nummela et al.,
2016) as these firms enter quickly into new markets, but we know less about their exit processes.
Adopting Benito and Welch’s (1997) definition of exit from international markets, Nummela et
al. (2016) show the diversity in the exit pathways of international new ventures as some firms
partially exit from markets and stay involved in international operations, but in different forms of
entities, while others completely withdraw. The exit process is multi-staged (Pauwels &
Matthyssens, 1999) and can evolve slowly or rapidly (Nummela et al., 2016). Firms might
slowly exit international markets by gradually decreasing their involvement and reducing market
spread or switching their operation modes (Benito & Welch, 1997).

4.4.3.3

Exit implementation and structuring

One aspect of the exit process is how exit is implemented and structured after the decision has
been made (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). In particular, the divestiture process in strategy could be
complicated and lengthy because there are multiple parties involved (Bergh & Sharp, 2015) and
the implementation process can impact the performance of the divested entity (Moschieri, 2011).
Burgelman (1996) is one of the early/few studies that looks at exit as a process, starting from the
dilemma of the decision to the implementation of the exit; it is a study that exit researchers
always cite as a template for future research to understand the richness of the exit process.
Burgelman (1996) shows that exit is a process that evolves continuously within the organization
and is less centrally driven. Middle-level managers play a role not only in shaping the decision of
the top management team about the exit decision, but also in implementing the exit and making
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other choices, such as resource allocation and reallocation (Burgelman, 1996). Resources and
managerial actions both play a role in shaping an exit process (Burgelman, 1996). Bergh and
Sharp (2015) add to those factors the role of outside blockholders in pressuring the organization
to exit underperforming businesses and influencing the process by shaping the exit mode.
Drawing from agency theory, the authors find that outside blockholders with larger shares in the
business unit can exercise their self-interest over managers.
Investigating the divestitures of underperforming and well-performing business units within a
corporate portfolio, Moschieri (2011) finds that how the divestiture is implemented and
structured—and especially, how top managers frame this exit—will impact the performance of
the divested unit. When unit managers understand the reason for exit as a sense of opportunity,
and have a perception that they can manage the divested unit once it is independent, they tend to
perform better. In cases of exiting through a sell-off, the relationship between the seller and
buyer is critical for the success of the process (Grabener & Eisenhardt, 2004). Grabener and
Eisenhardt (2004) note that a sell-off from a seller perspective, or acquisition from a buyer
perspective, is a courtship and a process of mutual agreement between both parties. There are
timing, strategic, and emotional factors in this process, and organizations selling their entities
look for an ideal fit in terms of organizational rapport and combination potential of the buyer
(Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). In the case of an involuntary exit, Moschieri (2011) notes that
the process would be different, but does not investigate this case.
As we previously covered, there are different forms of exit and many of these are partial rather
than complete exit. Looking at Moschieri’s (2011) case studies of divestitures, we notice that
they are all partial in a way. In most cases, the parent firm kept shares and relationships with the
divested unit. This study demonstrates that our efforts to better elucidate the partiality of exit are
crucial, as the phenomenon is more common than may be expected.
The duration of the divesting operation in Moschieri’s (2011) study took between six and 18
months. The pace of exit and retrenchment, whether it unfolds slowly (i.e., over an extended
period of time) or quickly (i.e., in a more compressed manner) could have an effect on the
performance of the organization (Tangpong et al., 2015).
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4.4.3.4

Interdependencies of exit moves

A stream of research examines exit actions of firms as part of their evolution and/or strategic
trajectory (Nachum & Song, 2011)—in particular, relative to their entry actions (Chang, 1996;
Mata & Portugal, 2000; Miller & Yang, 2016). Organizations with multiple firms in their
portfolios enter markets as expansion, and exit as contraction, to maintain a healthy portfolio as
part of the diversification and refocusing process (Chang, 1996; Miller & Yang, 2016). Exit and
entry are considered alternative moves that shape the portfolio of a firm in opposing directions
(Benito, 1997). In these cases, exit becomes a partial behaviour within the overall portfolio of the
organization as it adjusts the fit among the different firms and markets where it operates
(Nachum & Song, 2011).
There is a sequence between entry and exit when organizations enter businesses of similar
resource profiles and are more likely to divest lines of business of different profiles (Chang,
1996; Miller & Yang, 2016), with both sometimes occurring within one year (Miller & Yang,
2016). There is also evidence that how the firm entered the market or business (i.e., entry mode)
affects how it exits (i.e., exit mode) (Mata & Portugal, 2000).
Furthermore firms might imitate the exit moves of their competitors when they have limited
information on which markets to exit, as well as when and how (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012;
Gaba & Terlaak, 2013). Gaba and Terlaak (2013) investigate the effects of different
environmental uncertainties on mimic exit behaviours. Using herding models, the authors find
more nuances to the common belief that uncertainty increases imitation: they find results that
uncertainty fosters imitation only when it is idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm. In contrast, uncertainties
that are common to all ﬁrms actually reduce reliance on observational learning.
If we compare this study to Hsieh et al. (2015) in Quadrant I, we can distinguish between two
forms of imitation in exit based on objective consideration. Gaba and Terlaak’s (2013) study
shows that an organization’s exit moves are an imitation of competitors’ moves to reduce
uncertainty. However, Hsieh et al. (2015) show that organizations use cues from others (e.g.,
turnover and sales indicators) to justify their own decisions of escalating commitments and avoid
an exit decision (i.e., before the decision to exit).
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Further, in Gaba and Terlaak’s (2013) study, exit moves are based on objective considerations
where exit may not be necessary but organizations imitate peers and prematurely exit similar
markets. In contrast, studies in Quadrant II (Blake & Moschieri, 2017; Durand & Vergne, 2015;
Soule et al., 2014) show that social and peer pressures motivate organizations to contemplate exit
quickly so they can prevent an impending failure.
The framework of our review helps us to discriminate between seemingly similar exit
behaviours, such as “mimic exits,” that have different explanations. Quadrant I sheds light on
imitation as a mechanism to justify objectively a decision to persist (Hsieh et al., 2015), with
Quadrant II showing mimic pressures as a mechanism for a subjective decision to exit quickly
and avoid an impending catastrophe (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Soule et al., 2014). While,
Quadrant III presents imitation as an automatic objective mechanism that shapes firms’
premature exit moves, when they may not have been necessary (Gaba & Terlaak, 2013).

4.4.3.5

Future research directions

Quantitatively, scholars can only test the binary nature of the exit event, rather than the decision.
This problematizes how little differentiation there is in this literature between the decision to exit
and the actual execution of exit. We believe that there are processes of entity exit, after the
decision has been made, that are still not theorized.
When the organization decides on a form of partial entity exit, such as redeploying internally
(Lieberman et al., 2017), we do not know how much of the initial firm/entity is kept unchanged
in terms of resources, capabilities, and business model. Does the organization need to redeploy
all of its entity back internally to be able to achieve a faster exit process? Are there cases when a
part of the entity is redeployed internally, while the other part is sold or liquidated? What part of
the entity is kept, and what part is sold? Moreover, there are opportunities to examine a
combination of partial and complete exits, such as a large partial exit and smaller full exits
(Vidal & Mitchell, 2015), or an exit scenario when a portion of the entity is sold, another
liquidated, and another reinvested (DeTienne & Chirico, 2013). What determines the act to
divest larger firms versus smaller firms? How does one decide on a hybrid form of exit and

174

execute it? We believe addressing those questions could develop our understanding of different
nuances of partial exits.
Furthermore, we need to understand what happens at the level of the divested entity (i.e.,
business unit, Moschieri, 2011), and how much managers at the divested firm can play a role in
the exit process after a decision has been made. How do the divested entity and the parent
organization interact and collaborate during this stage of the exit process?
In the case of a distressed venture, the issue of whether the exit is voluntary or not is still unclear.
We need more conceptual clarity around the notion of choice (Gaba & Terlaak, 2013) and
volition in the exit process. It would be interesting to understand how much the degree or illusion
of volition over the exit would influence the exit process and its speed.
As mentioned previously, another promising area of research is the exit process of international
new ventures (Nummela et al., 2016) as these firms enter into new markets quickly, but we know
less about their exit processes. Questions that address exit processes of ventures in the
technology sector, which is very dynamic and turbulent, would be timely.

4.4.4

Quadrant IV: After Exit Decision and Subjective Considerations

At the levels of family (e.g., Akther, Sieger, & Chirico, 2016; Dehlen Zellweger, Kammerlander,
& Halter, 2014), entrepreneur (e.g., Rouse, 2016), and organizational members (e.g., Walsh &
Bartunek, 2011), research shows that there are multiple subjective considerations that intervene
within the exit process once a decision has been made. The themes we describe next are
subjective considerations of partial exit in which actors try to cheat death, and stay engaged with
the entity to a certain degree.

4.4.4.1

Exit disengagement modes - Subjective considerations

The exit mode or route chosen is a reflection of many subjective considerations, such as identity
and emotional factors; like the theme in Quadrant III, this research theme looked at choices of
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exit modes, but the focus of the research here is on the subjective factors and, more specifically,
the incomplete and non-final nature of the exit disengagement modes.
Research in family business shows that families decide on exit forms that safeguard the
relationship between the family and the divested entity to preserve the identity with the business
(Dehlen et al., 2014; DeTienne & Chirico, 2013). DeTienne and Chirico (2013) examine both the
exit of the core business and that of a satellite business in the family firm. They suggest that a
stewardship-based exit (e.g., family succession) is preferred over financial reward (e.g., sale) or
cessation-based modes (e.g., liquidation), due to the family’s socio-emotional wealth and
motivation to preserve the core business/its longevity in the family. Entrepreneurs of older firms
are more emotionally attached and would resist exit by passing the business to an outsider,
favouring an internal succession (Dehlen et al., 2014). However, family owners are more willing
to act like investors when the entity to be divested is non-core (e.g., satellite firm in the
portfolio), and would consider selling or liquidating the entity (DeTienne & Chirico, 2013).
On the other hand, Akther et al. (2016) draw on the social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael,
1989) to show that once a family decides to exit an underperforming firm—in this case a satellite
business as part of its portfolio—it is more willing to “shut down” the entity rather than sell it.
The shutdown is considered a partial exit, as the family closes down the operations and keeps the
assets. In a way, the family is avoiding an exit event and feigning an exit when actually, a total
exit has not taken place. In this case, the family can reopen or resuscitate the entity in the future
if it wishes. Shutting down a satellite firm instead of selling it is a temporary pause for the firm
and a promising turnaround attempt, as it saves the organization some economic and
psychological costs (Akther et al., 2016). The family prefers to sacrifice financial rewards
associated with the sale option, just to preserve the family identity and support the continuity of
the business (Akther et al., 2016).
Entrepreneurs have some control over whether the firm will continue after they remove
themselves from the firm and how much they want to be involved after the exit (DeTienne, 2010;
DeTienne & Cardon, 2012; Leroy et al., 2015). Leroy et al. (2015) show that entrepreneurs
driven by their personal intentions (i.e., entrepreneurs’ perceived sense of volition towards
selling) have a substantial impact on deciding whether their ﬁrms will be sold or liquidated.
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Although selling is a complicated task, entrepreneurs should be motivated and committed to
make this transition successful for the firm (Leroy et al., 2015; Grabener & Eisenhardt, 2004;
Kammerlander, 2016). In fact, entrepreneurs do not abruptly exit and disengage from the firm.
There are both physical and psychological disengagements, and the psychological exit takes
more time, and influences the commitment of the entrepreneur to the venture after the exit
(DeTienne, 2010; Rouse, 2016). Entrepreneurs who identify strongly with their organizations
struggle to emotionally and cognitively withdraw from the business after they exit the firm
(Rouse, 2016). Those entrepreneurs put the needs of their organizations over their own and they
stay engaged with the new entity (whether it was sold or went public) in varying degrees (Rouse,
2016). This partial exit might ease the sense of loss (Rouse, 2016), which is quite complicated as
it is a result of one’s own voluntary action to exit (Rouse, 2016). However, one’s involvement
with the “new” entity may dilute over time (DeTienne & Wennberg, 2014).
Entrepreneurs may even be willing to accept a discount on the value of the firm and sell rather
than liquidate it so they can assure the continuity of the business (Kammerlander, 2016). There is
also evidence that long-tenured manager-owners care more about the business continuation and
adopt less economic and rational decisions while exiting the business (Kammerlander, 2016).
This finding supports the earlier work of Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) that the party exiting
the business cares about how the entity is transferred to the new owners, how many subjective
considerations (e.g., perceptions of fit and emotional factors) influence the choice of the buyer,
and how the exit process evolves.

4.4.4.2

Resisting the exit

Members of the entity experiencing the exit or demise do not usually accept the exit easily, and
many resist the decision or try to reverse it before the final exit execution takes place (Erkama &
Vaara, 2010; Walsh & Bartunek, 2011).
Employees would first resist the decision of corporate management to close the business,
resorting to different arguments—from rational claims to emotional and moral implications
(Erkama and Vaara, 2010). Members of the organization would try to justify the viability of the
business and delay the exit event as much as possible (Erkama & Vaara, 2010). Local managers
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are dually embedded in the unit to be shut down, and in the corporate organization that made the
decision to exit. They may argue for a faster exit process in favour of corporate management,
while resisting and delaying the exit in favour of the business unit’s employees (Erkama &
Vaara, 2010).
Examining the process of an organizational death and rebirth, by reinventing an afterlife for the
organization, Walsh and Bartunek (2011) describe the process of disintegration, demise of the
old entity, and then recreation of a new entity. The authors examine the exit process starting from
the announcement by the organization's leaders that the entity will be closing. Anger and other
emotions of organizational members played a major role in the disintegration period when they
first tried to rescue the entity, and then saved what they valued when death became impending,
before recovering and starting a new entity (Walsh & Bartunek, 2011).

4.4.4.3

Future Research directions

This Quadrant IV is not well developed in the literature and we would encourage more
qualitative and longitudinal research that examines how entrepreneurs and managers act after an
exit decision has been made. It would be interesting to study cases where an exit decision that
has already been made is reversed, or cases where actors delay the process even after they have
decided to exit.
Future research should also investigate the case of portfolio entrepreneurs and portfolios in
family firms when they have to exit more than once during their tenures, and many times,
consider exit and entry at the same time. This portfolio theme of exit has been well examined in
the field of strategic management and international business, but extending it to the
entrepreneurship and family business field would be very valuable to our understanding of exit in
different types of portfolio businesses.
Furthermore, more studies are needed to understand the interaction between the implementation
and execution processes of exit from an objective consideration (at the corporate level), and the
subjective resistance of managers and employees at the entity that is being divested.
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4.5 Implications
In contrast to the prevalent explanations in the literature of the determinants and consequences of
firm exit (failure and death), we were interested to understand what happens before the exit.
Because different disciplines have examined exit at different levels of analysis (i.e., market,
portfolio, business unit, individual entrepreneur), we decided to adopt a broad definition of entity
exit that captures any discontinuity in the activities and involvement as previously understood
and undertaken between the parent or decision makers and the entity that is in contention for
exit. We reviewed research on processes and mechanisms that begin from the triggers for, and
dilemma of, whether an exit decision should be taken to the finality of the exit execution. We
complement studies that investigate what happens after firm exit (Ioannou, 2013) or failure
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013), but turn these on their heads to look at what happens “before exit.” The
studies we reviewed collectively challenge the conceptual purity or simplicity of the exit
phenomenon.
We induced two dimensions from the literatures across strategy, international business, and
entrepreneurship. First, the temporal dimension shows that exit is a process that unfolds over
time (Aldrich, 2015; Cefis & Marsili, 2011), and we anchor it by the decision to exit to
distinguish between mechanisms that take place before the decision to exit and those after the
decision. All of these subprocesses and mechanisms happen before the final exit has been
executed. We argue that time should be more explicitly addressed both conceptually and
empirically in exit research, particularly to distinguish between the period before the exit
decision and that after the exit decision. Because of time’s potential to affect the who, what,
where, how, why, and when (Zachary et al., 2015) of entity exit, we think it is crucial that future
research address the temporality of entity exit.
Although we acknowledge the few efforts made with regard to time-sensitive concepts, such as
“delays” (Shepherd et al., 2009) and empirics such as “time to exit” (Eflenbein & Knott, 2015;
Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017), the role of time has not been well integrated theoretically and
empirically to understand exit. We think it is unwise not to distinguish between the temporal
mechanisms and modalities of the exit decision-making dynamics and those of the exit
implementation after the decision. Equating the exit decision with the exit final execution
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compresses much of our understanding of the exit process. In addition, future work is needed to
understand how responses to a threat of exit evolve and combine over time (e.g., wait and see,
persist and adapt (turnaround), decide to exit, then disengage or reengage). Scholars could
examine how long decision makers are willing to persist or attempt the turnaround of distressed
ventures. Once they decide to exit, what factors influence the time to execute the exit?
Second, the partial nature of exit shows that an entity exit is not a uniform phenomenon, but
there is great underlying variety in how exit is manifested. Exit does not always mean that the
entity will disappear: often, organizations and individuals adopt a partial exit that falls in
between the two polar categories (Meyer & Thein, 2014) of “business as usual” and “complete
exit.” These partial manifestations of exit deserve their own theoretical attention (Buchholtz et
al., 1999). We show that, irrespective of what the entity is, when it is in contention for exit, some
lower-nested parts within the entity are preserved, exited, and/or changed. There are both
objective and subjective considerations that influence how decision makers attempt to control the
entity’s exit. For example, some firms resort to a spin-off form of exit, where shareholders keep
ownership with the newly formed entity after exit; other firms might partially divest their assets
from a market to signal dissociation. The exit can range from scaling back production or closing
the smallest plant first to progressively exiting other firms and maybe exiting larger firms
(MacLachlan, 1992). Similarly, manager-owners sell their ventures but stay involved to various
degrees with these ventures. Future research should examine the lower levels of aggregation of
an entity that is in contention for exit, and understand what is kept, changed, and/or lost,
shedding light on the unevenness of the exit process. Further, we should seek to understand how
the exit process differs when decision makers exit product markets versus factor markets (Hsieh
et al., 2015), or developed foreign markets versus emerging markets.
The main insight of this review is that there are many mechanisms and subprocesses that happen
before exit is finally executed (i.e., what is more commonly known in the literature as the “exit
event”). Our conceptual framework starts grouping those themes to orient researchers towards
“what is happening when” in our current understanding of entity exit. When we classify studies,
we are not assuming that we have pure objective or pure subjective considerations that can be
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separated, but rather, we want to take stock of the studies that conceptually address or provide
insights on similar issues of exit.
The framework is a conceptual organization tool, which aims to show that, in order to fully
understand what happens before exit, we need to consider all four quadrants. For example,
organizations might resort to real options objective reasoning in making an exit decision, but the
exit process might be poorly executed and subjectively resisted. We approach exit in a piecemeal
fashion to show what we know and orient researchers to which quadrant of the exit phenomenon
they are addressing in their studies, and which parts they are not. However, our main argument is
that future scholars should always consider the two dimensions of exit: temporality and partial
nature of exit.
The media has covered stories of many firms exiting ventures, markets, industries, countries, or
regions. During the financial crisis in 2008, the exit rate increased quickly for a few years as the
recession dragged on (Aldrich, 2015), and given the growing incidence of natural and manmade
disasters, systemic upheavals of nations and industries, and the forced exit of firms finding
themselves in the middle of conflicts and crises, firms are often compelled to grapple with the
odds of unwanted (yet sometimes unavoidable) exit. Recently, some British firms are
considering exiting and relocating due to the government’s planned withdrawal from the
European Union (Castle, 2017), and some MNEs operating in the United Kingdom are already
contemplating exit, “retrenching their operations, laying people off, discontinuing operations,
and keeping expansion plans on hold” (Cumming & Zahra, 2016, p. 688). Many more firms have
exited Syria due to war and conflict. In times of political and economic turbulence, most of the
large MNEs relocate to other nations, a partial exit phenomenon as the entity exits one location
and enters a new one, preserving some parts of the entity while changing others. This
phenomenon of exit and relocation is becoming more common, and deserves more attention in
the management field. However, smaller and local ventures struggle and try to resist as long as
they can in their domestic context due to limited options, emotional attachment, and fewer
resources. How do these firms manage to resist and delay exit, and when is it time to “stop the
bleeding” and let go? All of these concerns are timely questions that would help us not only to
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better understand current phenomena, but also to develop our theoretical knowledge of the exit
process.
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Appendix 4.1 Summary of Articles Included in Review14
Theme
Author(s) & Year
Brauer & Wiersema
(2012)
AMJ

Industry divestiture waves
and how investors perceive
and evaluate divestiture
decisions

Hsieh, Tsai & Chen
(2015)

Competitors as reference
points for justifying
escalation of commitment

Literature/Theory
Base
Information-based
theories of imitative
behaviour

Method
All divestitures of
U.S. companies
announced and
completed between
1993 and 2007

Escalation behaviour
literature and
competitive dynamics
research

Mixed but deductiveLeading companies in
the IT industry and
investment activities
in China during the
period of 1998 to
2011.

Strategic change and the
rise and fall of an
organization

Process studies of
strategic change in
organization

A five-year
longitudinal study of
the top management
team (TMT) at an
automotive company,
amidst significant and
unexpected global
changes.

Organizational risk

March and Shapira's

Quantitative

AMJ

MacKay & Chia (2013)
AMJ

Key Findings
Firm’s position in an industry divestiture
wave conveys information about whether
or not managers are imitating their
industry peers, which in turn will influence
how investors perceive and assess the
quality of the decision and its likely
performance consequences.
A firm’s escalating tendency is increased
by larger competitors’ high action volume
and smaller competitors’ positive
performance.

An "unowned" view of process that
elevates chance, environmental
uncertainty, and the unintended
consequences of choice to understand the
eventual demise of NorthCo Automotive

Miller & Chen (2004)

14

Articles are ordered by journal.

Organizations performing poorly increased
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AMJ

preferences.

(1987,1992) model of
managers' risk
preferences

Publicly traded U.S.
companies

risk as they neared bankruptcy. Other firms
showed lower risk as performance
improved relative to aspirations.

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Method

Key Findings

Rouse (2016)

Founders psychological
disengagement

Literature/Theory
Base
Psychological
disengagement- Identity

Qualitative

Organizational decisions to
divest

Prospect theory,
organization-level
behavioural theory and
the threat-rigidity thesis

Postdeath organizing

Organizational founding

Quantitative
A sample of
Poorly performing
acquisitions that the
acquirers later chose
to divest. U.S.–based,
publicly held firms
A qualitative,
induction-driven
study of six cases

A theoretical model of founder
psychological disengagement that
delineates how founder work orientations
relate to the disengagement paths that
founders follow when leaving one
organization and starting another.
Divestiture decisions are influenced by
both individual- and organization- level
factors that cannot be explained solely by
one theory and provide a richer
understanding of organizational riskseeking behaviours.

Review of business exit
after Michael Porter’s work

Review

Entrepreneur-friendly

Real options perspective

AMJ

Shimizu (2007)
AMJ

Walsh and Bartunek
(2011)
AMJ

Decker & Mellewigt,
(2007)
AMP

Lee, Peng & Barney
(2007)

A process model of how former members
of defunct organizations found new
organizations to sustain valued elements of
organizational life. Model suggests that
this process unfolds through four periods
of organizing: disintegration, demise,
gestation, and rebirth.

Conceptual
At a societal level, an entrepreneur-

199

bankruptcy law

friendly bankruptcy law, informed by a
real options logic, can encourage more risk
taking and, thus, more entrepreneurship
development by limiting downside risks
and increasing upside gains.

AMR

Author(s) & Year

Theme

McKinley, Latham, &
Braun (2014)
AMR

Decline-induced responses
of innovation or rigidity tha
lead to turnaround or
further decline.

Gimeno, Folta, Cooper
& Woo (1997)

Persistence of
underperforming firms

ASQ

Literature/Theory
Base
Organizational decline
and turnaround

Method

Threshold model of
entrepreneurial exit

Quantitative
1,547 entrepreneurs
of new businesses in
the U.S.
Questionnaires

Human capital

Conceptual

Graebner and
Eisenhardt (2004)
ASQ

Seller side of the
acquisition

Acquisition
Corporate governance

Case studies
Inductive study

Brigham, De Castro &
Shepherd (2007)

Entrepreneur’s satisfaction
and intention to exit.

Organizational
behaviour PersonOrganization fit,
Cognition

Survey responses
from 159 ownermanagers in small
high-technology firms

Angel investorentrepreneur relationship

Conflict perspective

Survey data from 65
angel investors and 72

ETP

Collewaert 2012
ETP

Key Findings

Four scenarios that can unfold when
organizations either innovate or respond
rigidly to organizational decline. Two of
the scenarios are downward spirals that
threaten an organization with possible
death, and two of the scenarios are
turnarounds.
Organizational survival is determined by
two main dimensions: (1) the
organization's economic performance and
(2) the organization’s threshold of
performance.
Considering organizational exit as a
choice.
Acquisition is a process of mutual
agreement between buyer and seller and
encompasses timing and strategic and
emotional factors, not just price
Higher satisfaction and lower intentions to
exit for owner-managers whose dominant
decision-making style complemented the
levels of formalization and structure in
their firms.
Entrepreneurial intentions to exit are
higher for entrepreneurs who face more
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and intentions to exit.

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Davidsson & Gordon
(2016)

Persistence of nascent
entrepreneurs through
macroeconomic crisis

ETP

DeTienne & Chirico
(2013)

Exit strategies of family
firms

ETP
Holland & Shepherd
(2013)

Entrepreneurial Persistence

Literature/Theory
Base
Nascent
entrepreneurship
research stream. Notions
of perceived
environmental
uncertainty and
opportunity confidence
Exit strategies,
threshold theory and the
socioemotional wealth
perspective
Decision making –
individual values

entrepreneurs
belonging to 54
ventures located in
either California or
Belgium.
Method

task and goal conflicts.
Importance of taking into account investorentrepreneur relations when studying their
respective exit processes.

Natural experimentpanel data about
nascent entrepreneurs
in Australia.

A major macroeconomic crisis may trigger
four alternative responses: disengagement,
delay, compensation, and adaptation.
No direct effect of the crisis on nascent
entrepreneurs.

Conceptual

Extrapolating different exit strategies

Conjoint experiment

The persistence decision policies are
heterogeneous depending on the level of
adversity experienced and the individual
values held by the entrepreneurs.

Tracked an
entrepreneur's realtime confidential
communications with
his closest consultant
(one of the authors)
during the last 6
months of an
ultimately
unsuccessful venture
Conceptual

An intrinsic quality of an entrepreneur is
the ability to manage paradox, largely by
bifurcating time—by making temporal
distinctions. An entrepreneur
simultaneously can be optimistic and
realistic, and persistent and adaptive.

ETP
Miller & Sardais (2015)
ETP

How entrepreneurs
reconcile the Paradoxical
demands of the job

Optimism, realism,
persistence and
adaptation.

Sharma & Manikutty
(2005)

Divestment decisions in
family firms

Literature on
divestment, culture and
its dimensions, and

Key Findings

Develops a framework to understand the
influence of community culture and family
structure on divestment decisions in family
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ETP
Author(s) & Year
Cater & Schwab (2008)
FBR

Wan, Chen & Yiu
(2014)

Theme
Turnaround Strategies in
Established Small Family
Firms

& Loane

ISBJ

Identifies unique characteristics of
established small family firms that affect
their ability to initiate turnaround strategies
when encountering an organizational crisis

Conceptual
framework

A firm’s international divestment decisions
are influenced by its organizational image
and identity.

Entrepreneurial exit and
emotional pricing

Behavioural finance

A sample of 1,354
SMEs’ views on exit
intentions. Compare
to 455 actual
ownership transfers.

The failure of International
New Ventures (INV)

INV, failure,
internationalization

Four illustrative cases
from Finland and
Ireland (INV in
software industry)

A long-term relationship between an
owner-manager and a firm, a familiar
relationship between an owner-manager
and a successor, and situational
contingencies increase the emotionalpricing; i.e. owner-manager’s willingness
to sell the firm at a discount.
Managerial capabilities, particularly
managerial experience and business
competence, filter the external drivers of
failure.

A critical review of
research on entrepreneurial
exit

Review

(2016)
ISBJ

Wennberg & DeTienne
(2014)

A case-study
approach

Behavioural
perspective;
organizational identity;
organizational image

ISBJ

Nummela, Saarenketo,

Method

firms.
Key Findings

International divestment;

GSJ

Kammerlander (2016)

family structures.
Literature/Theory
Base
Organizational crisis
Turnaround strategies
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Author(s) & Year

Theme

Dehlen, Zellweger,
Kammerlander, &
Halter (2014)

Determinants of exit routes
in family firms

Literature/Theory
Base
Information asymmetry

JBV

Method

Key Findings

Quantitative
Small- and mediumsized privately held
firms from Germany,
Switzerland, and
Austria that had been
transferred to one or
several individuals.

An owner's inferior knowledge about the
abilities of potential external entrants (in
contrast to family internal successors)
renders a family internal transfer more
likely.
A positive effect of signalling and an
inverted U-shaped effect of screening on
the probability of external exit routes. Firm
age, as a driver of emotional attachment,
weakens these effects.
Explores the development of an exit
strategy, reasons for exit and options for
exit in each phase of the entrepreneurial
process

DeTienne (2010)
JBV

Entrepreneurial Exit –
theoretical development

DeTienne, McKelvie &
Chandler (2015)

Entrepreneurial exit
strategies

Entrepreneurial exit, exit Typology then teststrategies, motivation,
using a crossstewardship
sectional survey
methodology

Persistence of
underperforming firms

Persistence; Threshold
theory

JBV

DeTienne, Shepherd, &
De Castro (2008)

Conceptual

Conjoint analysis

JBV

Khelil (2016)
JBV

Entrepreneurial failure as a
multiform phenomenon that
involves various
configurations.

Explorative
qualitative
Study was conducted
as a preliminary step
to the quantitative

A typology of entrepreneurial exit
strategies consisting of three higher-level
exit categories (i.e., financial harvest,
stewardship, and voluntary cessation).
Different predictors for each of the three
exit strategy types.
Environmental munificence, personal
investment, personal options, previous
organizational success, and perceived
collective efficacy impact the decision to
persist with an underperforming firm. In
addition, extrinsic motivation moderates
those relationship
Examines the different configurations that
can occur and the associated profiles of
failing entrepreneurs.

203

Author(s) & Year

Theme

McMullen & Kier
(2016)

Escalation of commitment,
entrapment, entrepreneurial
mindset

Literature/Theory
Base
Regulatory focus theory;
the theory of action
phases

Fear of failure

The decision to persist is set into motion
long before individuals engage in the costbenefit analysis examined in most
escalation studies.

Loss aversion

Conceptual model

Costs of business failure

Escalation of
commitment;
procrastination

Conceptual

Venture failure
stigmatization

Entrepreneurial failure
stigma

A qualitative,
narrative approach of
the lived experience
of 12 entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurial exit routes
and their drivers

Entrepreneurial exit;
Human capital; Prospect
theory

Conceptual model,
then empirically test
the model using two
Swedish databases

When an individual's threshold for success
is sufficiently high, fear of failure
motivates additional investment. When the
threshold for success is equal to the
foregone outside option fear of failure is
de-motivating.
Introduces the notion of anticipatory grief
as a mechanism for reducing the level of
grief triggered by the failure event, which
reduces the emotional costs of business
failure. Delaying business failure may be
beneficial to recovery and promote
subsequent entrepreneurial action.
Three episodes of entrepreneurs
anticipating, meeting, and then
transforming venture failure.
Stigmatization is best viewed as a process
that unfolds over time rather than a label.
This process begins before, not after,
failure and contributes to venture demise.
Exit through liquidation and firm sale for
both firms in financial distress and firms
performing well.
Human capital factors (entrepreneurial

JBV

Shepherd, Wiklund, &
Haynie (2009)
JBV

Singh, Corner,
& Pavlovich (2015)

JBV

Wennberg, Wiklund,
DeTienne, & Cardon
(2010)

Key Findings

Meta-theoretical
process modelWith illustration from
the events of the 1996
Mount Everest
disaster

JBV

Morgan & Sisak (2016)

taxonomic analysis.
Cluster analysis –
face to face survey
Method

204

JBV

which follow new
ventures and their
founders.

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Wennberg, Delmar, &
McKelvie (2016)

Exit and growth decisions

Literature/Theory
Base
Decision-making theory

Time to exit and escalation
of commitment

Escalation of
commitment framework

A real options portfolio
perspective on foreign
affiliate divestment

Real options portfolio
perspective

The impact of globalization
on the exit behaviour of
firms

Globalization, trade
liberalization and exit

Quantitative,
manufacturing firms
in Belgium

Foreign subsidiary survival
in conflict zones

The role of geography

Geographic
information systems
data for 670 Japanese
multinational
enterprises
subsidiaries in 25

JBV
Yamakawa & Cardon
(2017)
JBV
Belderbos & Zou
(2009)
JIBS

Coucke & Sleuwaegen
(2008)

Method
Quantitative Examining a panel of
14,760 new ventures
in the professional
services sector
Survey data – 93
firms that were
objectively and
subjectively in
financial distress
Quantitative. Sample
of 1078 Asian
affiliates of Japanese
multinationals

JIBS

Dai, Eden & Beamish
(2013)
JIBS

experience, age, education) and failureavoidance strategies (outside job,
reinvestment) differ substantially across
the four exit routes.
Key Findings
How risk preferences change as a venture
ages and increases in size. New ventures'
probability of exit and growth diminishing
with age and size.
Entrepreneurs vary how much they delay
exit based on the amount of investments
they have made in their firm prior to the
point of distress.

Affiliates are less likely to be divested in
response to adverse environmental change
if they represent growth or switch option
value to the multinational firm under
conditions of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Belgian firms that offshore activities to
non-European Union countries are able to
substantially improve their chances of
survival. Unlike domestic firms, the
likelihood of exit of subsidiaries of
multinational enterprises is found to be
less sensitive to domestic market
conditions in the host country.
Greater exposure to geographically defined
threats reduces the likelihood of MNE
survival. Both concentration and
dispersion with other firms affect survival;
however, the effects depend on where the
firm is spatially located (whether the firm

205

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Mata & Freitas (2012)

Exit of foreign firms vs.
domestic firms

JIBS

Nachum & Song (2011)

Literature/Theory
Base
Liability of foreignness;
foreign direct
investment; exit

Quantitative- Dataset
on firms operating in
Portugal

Difference between exit rates of foreign
firms and domestic firms increases with
age, as exit of foreign firms increases with
age while that of purely domestic firms
decreases.
Footlooseness of foreign firms is due to
foreignness more than to multinationality.
The portfolio affects entry more than exit,
suggesting that evolutionary processes
affect MNEs’ expansion more than their
contraction. Exit moves are driven
primarily by internal MNE considerations.
Under high institutional uncertainty,
investors prefer low commitment but
flexible modes that enable later
commitment increases, whereas
institutional voids increase up-front
information search and adaptation costs
that reduce the likelihood of early postentry adjustments.

Path dependence;
evolutionary approach

Increases and decreases of
MNE commitment in
emerging economies

Internationalization
theory; institutional
theory

Research on corporate
divestitures: A synthesis

Review

Decline and turnaround

Environmental change,
human resources,
turnaround

Failing school
districts in Texas

Corporate turnaround

Turnaround;

Empirical study of

JIBS

Moschieri, & Mair
(2008)

is in a conflict zone) and with whom
(home-country peers or sister subsidiaries).
Key Findings

Interdependencies in MNE
growth trajectory

JIBS

Santangelo & Meyer
(2011)

conflict-afflicted host
countries.
Method

Dataset that details all
the location moves of
US legal services
MNEs during 1949–
2006.
A survey data set of
subsidiaries of
multinational
enterprises in
Hungary, Lithuania
and Poland

Journal of Management
and Organization

Boyne & Meier (2009)
JMS
Schmitt & Raisch

Turnaround is influenced by changes in the
munificence and complexity of task
environments, and the appointment of a
new chief executive and front-line staff.
Retrenchment and recovery form a duality:

206

(2013)
JMS

organizational decline;
organizational paradox;
recovery; retrenchment

107 Central European
turnaround initiatives

Method

Quantitative. Data on
205 divestitures

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Tangpong, Abebe, & Li
(2015)

A temporal approach of the
retrenchment–turnaround
relationship

Literature/Theory
Base
Path-dependent pattern
of the retrenchment–
turnaround

Influence of external
owners on divestiture

Agency theory
Divestiture

JMS

Bergh & Sharp (2015)

48 case–control
matched pairs of
firms that either
achieved a turnaround
or did not.

JOM

Brauer (2006)
JOM
Buchholtz, Lubatkin, &
O’Neill (1999)

Divestiture: a review and
research agenda

JOM

Declining firms that implement
retrenchment actions early have a higher
likelihood of successful turnaround.
Early divestments and early geographic
market exits, significantly contribute to the
likelihood of successful turnaround, early
layoffs do not.
The adoption of spin-offs or sell-offs is
associated with the amount of outstanding
common stockholdings held by outside
blockholders and the size of the unit
divested.

Review

Responsiveness to the need
to divest.

Theory of divestiture

Post-bankruptcy

The bankruptcy and
turnaround literatures

Conceptual

A framework of divestiture built around
the core concept of seller responsiveness,
which is defined as the readiness of the
management at the selling firm to respond
to the need to divest. How divestiture
context, management characteristics, and
governance attributes influence seller
responsiveness and, in turn, the price the
divesting firm receives.

Quantitative. Firms
that filed for Chapter
11 reorganization.

Viewing bankruptcy reorganizations as
different choice situations.
Firms with relatively high strategic choice

JOM

Dawley, Hoffman &
Lamont (2002)

they are both contradictory and
complementary. Integrating the two
activities allows turnaround firms to create
benefits that exceed the costs of their
integration, which affects turnaround
performance positively.
Key Findings
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Method

Business failure pathways

Literature/Theory
Base
Environmental stress
and organizational
response

or low environmental constraint were
found to benefit from refocusing actions.
Key Findings

Compares the failure
of firms that declared
bankruptcy from with
the behaviour of
matching firms that
had not failed over the
same period.

Firm effects dominate industry effects in
explaining failure. Four distinctive
business failure pathways based on firm
and industry growth patterns are described.
In particular, debt-funded, forced-growth
strategies create a high risk of failure
regardless of industry growth rate.

Downsizing and resources

Resource-based view

Quantitative

Differences in the relative likelihood of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, acquisition, or
remaining a nonbankrupt going concern
based on the size of the downsizing, firmlevel intangible resources, the tangible
asset intensity of the firm, and industrylevel knowledge intensity.
Exit decision - one section of the review

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Moulton, Thomas &
Pruett (1996)
JOM

Norman, Butler & Ranft
(2013)
JOM

Shepherd, Williams &
Patzelt (2015)

Entrepreneurial decision
making

Review

JOM
Trahms, Ndofor &
Sirmon (2013)

Organizational decline and
turnaround

Review

JOM
Zheng, Singh, & Chung
(2015)

Political ties and sell-off
strategy of firms in
emerging market

Resource dependence
theory and institutional
economics

80 television
manufacturers in
China between 1993
and 2003.

Political ties help firms exit an industry.
Political ties facilitating sell-offs is
contingent on the type of political ties and
the state of institutional development.

The continuity of a firm
when entrepreneurs exit

Theory of planned
behaviour

SEM-Survey data
from 175
entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs' sale attitudes are related to
sale intentions, which are associated with
firm sale. Sale attitudes are positively

JOM
Leroy, Manigart,
Meuleman, &
Collewaert (2015)

208

related to whether entrepreneurs perceive
firm continuation to be out of free will,
their experience, the number of employees,
and whether the firm is a multigeneration
family business.

JSBM

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Mayr, Mitter &
Aichmayr (2017)

Bankruptcy and
reorganization

JSBM
Chung, Lee,
Beamish, Southam, &
Nam (2013)
JWB
Figueira-de-Lemos, &
Hadjikhani (2015)

Literature/Theory
Base
Resource-based view

Method

Key Findings

Longitudinal data on
SME that filed for
bankruptcy

Repositioning as an important factor for
turnaround.

MNE divestments

Real options and. risk
diversification
perspectives

QuantitativeJapanese foreign
subsidiaries

Large MNEs with greater international
diversification are less likely to divest their
subsidiaries during times of economic
crisis.

Commitment decisions in
international markets

Internationalization
process
Commitment decisions
Risk management model

Dynamics of institutional
constraints and the reaction
of business to such
constraints
Organizational inertia,
strategic competition, and
chronic failure

Institutional theory

Inferential abductive
approach that merges
the risk management
model with empirical
data collected from a
32-year longitudinal
case study on nine
Swedish MNCs.
In-depth case analysis
focuses on four
industries

Behavioural and
economic theories of
decline

Conceptual and
quantitative
presenting tentative
evidence from the
chemical industry

Why firms divest

Divestiture; corporate

Quantitative. 190 U.S.

When environmental changes are
perceived as detrimental, firms tend to
decrease their tangible assets and commit
in a more intangible way.
When changes to the environment are
perceived as beneficial, firms follow an
incremental path of commitment,
preferably in tangible kind.
Develop the concept of ‘low profile
strategy’ and propose a conceptual
framework of home country pressures
influencing MNE’s international operation.
A theoretical argument is developed that
explains voluntary exit and chronic failure
by introducing a proxy of organizational
inertia in a model of strategic Cournot
duopoly. Inefficient firms may outlast their
efficient rivals
Lower-cost production and new market

JWB

Meyer & Thein (2014)
JWB
van Witteloostuijn
(1998)
Management Science

Berry (2010)

209

Org Science

strategy

firms over a 20-year
period (1981–2000)

Literature/Theory
Base
Divestiture, product
diversification,
geographic
diversification

Method

Legacy divestiture

Diversification,
divestiture

A sample of
diversified American
firms during a period
of intensive
refocusing activity in
the US

Uncertainty and imitation
in firm exit decision

Herding models;
learning

Quantitative. A 29year panel data set on
the exit of private
venture capital firms

Vidal & Mitchell (2015) Performance feedback and
resource reconfiguration
Org Science
through divestitures

Performance feedback
theory and the resourcebased view

Quantitative.
longitudinal segmentlevel data for firms
operating in the
global pharmaceutical
industry between
1999 and 2009.

Erkama & Vaara,
(2010)

New rhetoric

Shutdown of the bus
body unit of the

Author(s) & Year

Theme

Berry (2013)

When firms divest

Org Science

Feldman (2013)
Org Science

Gaba & Terlaak (2013)
Org Science

Rhetorical strategies to
legitimate or resist

Quantitative. a
comprehensive panel
of U.S. multinational
corporations

opportunities in foreign markets can
provide a better use of existing firm
resources and these opportunities are likely
to influence firm divestment of homecountry operations.
Key Findings
Product market relatedness and geographic
market differences in growth, policy
stability, and exchange rate volatility can
moderate the negative relationship
between performance and divestment.
The post-divestiture operating performance
of firms that divest their legacy businesses
falls short of that of firms that retain
comparable legacy units, especially when
the divested unit operates in the same
industry as others of the divesting firm’s
businesses. Newer CEOs are more likely to
undertake legacy divestitures.
Uncertainty fosters imitation only when it
is idiosyncratic to the firm; uncertainties
that are common to all firms, in contrast,
actually reduce reliance on observational
learning.
Firms with increasing performance,
especially when they also have high levels
of performance, appear to use divestitures
in a “complementary Penrose effect” that
frees resources firms can use for future
growth, with the greatest impact on the
number of partial rather than full
divestitures.
Distinguish five types of rhetorical
legitimation strategies and dynamics.
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organizational restructuring
Org Studies
Author(s) & Year

Theme

Kisfalvi
(2000)

Sources of strategic
persistence

Org Studies

Pajunen (2008)

Literature/Theory
Base
Escalation of
commitment, decision
making, strategic
leadership, strategic
persistence

Organizational decline,
organizational processes

Case study of the
organizational decline
and failure process of
a Finnish
conglomerate

Pre-exit performance of
new firms

Shadow of death

Firm exit after distress

Firm exit, bankruptcy,
acquisitions

Quantitative –
matched sample of
exited and surviving
firms
Quantitative.
A sample of 6,118
distress-related exits
in Belgium

SBE
Balcaen, Manigart,
Buyze, & Ooghe (2012)
SBE

Carreira & Teixeira
(2011)

Pre-exit productivity
Industrial organization
& resource-based
theory, labour
economics, and
organizational ecology

SBE

DeTienne & Cardon

Qualitative. Case
study

Organizational processes
and mechanisms

Org Studies

Almus (2004)

Sweden-based Volvo
Bus Corporation in
Finland
Method

Impact of founder

Entrepreneurial exit;

Quantitative. An
unbalanced panel of
Portuguese
manufacturing firms
covering a 10-year
period
Quantitative, survey

Key Findings
Two related streams of explanations for
persistence: those that see inappropriate
strategic persistence as a possible response
to potential failure (escalating commitment
to a chosen course of action) and those that
see it as a possible outcome of success (the
perils of success or excellence).
Examining the mechanisms driving the
organizational processes
Proposed mechanisms: commitment
escalation, maladjustment, confidence
erosion, and fragmentation.
The performance of firms deteriorates in
the years before exit.

Bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and
M&A are fundamentally distinct exit
routes for distressed firms, driven by
different firm level characteristics and
following a two-stage process.
Exiting firms have a falling productivity
level over a number of years prior to exit.

Entrepreneurs intend to pursue different
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(2012)

experience on exit
intentions

threshold theory

design

SBE
Author(s) & Year

Theme

Method

Akther, Sieger,
&Chirico (2016)

Exit and family business
portfolio

Literature/Theory
Base
Social identity theory

exit paths based on previous
entrepreneurial experience, industry
experience, age, and education level.
Key Findings

Case studies of 6
family business
portfolios

Family businesses may prefer to shut down
a satellite business rather than sell it, due
to identity considerations.

Adverse changes in the
policy environment and
their effect on divestitures

Corporate strategy;
divestiture;
expropriation; policy
risk; Uncertainty

Formal disputes
between firms and
governments that
arise from adverse
changes in policy

Burgelman (1996)
SMJ

The process model of
strategic business exit

Evolutionary process
theory of strategy
making

Chang (1996)

Evolutionary theory;
organizational learning

SMJ

Corporate restructuring;
diversification; entry and
exit

Case of Intel
Corporation's exit
from its core dynamic
random access
memory (DRAM)
business
Longitudinal (1981–
89) data base on entry
and exit activities of
all publicly traded
manufacturing firms
in the US

Following a dispute, firms are more likely
to divest both in the country where the
dispute occurs and in other countries in the
same region. However, the impact of
disputes on divestitures is firm specific,
applying only to firms directly involved in
a dispute.
Pattern of managerial activities through
which resources and corporate
competencies are internally redirected
towards more viable business
opportunities.

Dai, Eden, & Beamish
(2017)

Foreign exit and political
risk

Real options; Resourcebased view

SEJ
Blake, & Moschieri,
(2017)
SMJ

SMJ

Quantitative - 1,162
MNE subsidiaries in
20
war-afflicted
countries between
1987 and 2006.

Entry and exit activities are understood as
search and selection undertaken by the
firm to improve their performance. Firms
sequentially enter businesses of similar
human resource profiles and firms are
more likely to divest lines of business of
different profiles.
Highly valuable resources can become
liabilities when exposed to harm. Best way
to cope with external threats may be to
exit. Bounded value of resources and
options in the face of environmental
contingencies.
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Author(s) & Year

Theme

Damaraju, Barney, &
Makhija (2015)

Real options and
divestments

Literature/Theory
Base
Real options theory

Method

Key Findings

Quantitative. Data on
divestment

The decision to divest a business unit and
the decision to engage in staged modes of
divestment are both sensitive to
uncertainty. Staged forms of governance
create real options that are of lesser value
as compared to simply not divesting a
business unit and also as compared to
completely divesting a business unit.
Media attacks on the focal firm and its
peers increase the likelihood of divestment
for the focal firm.

SMJ

Durand and Vergne
(2015)

Asset divestments in
stigmatized industries

Categories; divestment;
impression
management; stigma

Quantitative
Analysis of the arms
industry

SMJ
Elfenbein & Knott
(2015)

Time to exit and delays

Agency problems;
behavioural bias; real
options

Population of US
banks between 1984
and 1997.

Exit delays

Behavioural strategy;
escalation of
commitment; exit; real
options

A laboratory
experiment - subjects
make decisions about
when to exit a failing
venture

Corporate divestitures and
family firms

Agency theory and
corporate strategy

Quantitative methods
based on a handcollected data of a
sample of over 30,000
firm-year
observations,

SMJ

Elfenbein, Knott &
Croson (2017)
SMJ

Feldman, Amit, &
Villalonga (2016)
SMJ

Patterns of exit support models of rational
delay under ability uncertainty. There is
evidence of delay due to behavioural
bias—firms discount negative signals of
profitability relative to positive signals—
and organizational considerations—delay
increases with the separation of ownership
and control.
“Equity stakes”—receiving the firm's cash
flows and having decision rights over
exit—cause participants to discount
negative performance information, retain
overly optimistic beliefs, and delay exit.
By contrast, participants without these
high-powered incentives exit nearly
optimally.
Family firms are less likely than nonfamily firms to undertake divestitures. The
divestitures undertaken by family firms are
associated with higher post-divestiture
performance.
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Author(s) & Year

Theme

Literature/Theory
Base
Evolutionary theory

Method

Key Findings

Fortune & Mitchell
(2012)

Firm exits at the industry
level

Quantitative. Exits of
struggling firms in the
Internet sector during
2001

De-commitment and
divestiture

Mental accounting
framework

Market entry, market Exit
and resource deployment

Diversification;
resource relatedness and
sunk cost

Event-history
analysis. Contrasting
the experiences of
firms that divested
acquisitions with a
control sample of
firms that did not
divest.
A mathematical
model, descriptive
data, and company
examples

Managerial and functional organizational
capabilities affect whether struggling firms
exit by acquisition or dissolution.
Exit by dissolution represents selection of
both firms and capabilities, while exit by
acquisition represents firm selection but
capability adaptation.
Poorly performing acquired units tend to
be divested when executives can place
them within ‘attributional accounts’ (i.e.,
accounts for the cause of the performance
that do not incriminate them) and
‘comprehensive accounts’ (i.e., within the
context of overall firm performance)

Closure and divestiture by
foreign entrants

Theory of the MNE,
transaction costs

Quantitative. Survey
conducted by the
Portuguese Ministry
of Employment.

Diversification, dynamics
of market entry and market
exit

Resource-based view

Replication - panel
dataset of
manufacturing firms

SMJ

Hayward & Shimizu
(2006)
SMJ

Lieberman, Lee, &
Folta (2017)
SMJ

Mata & Portugal (2000)
SMJ

Miller & Yang (2016)
SMJ

If the performance of a new business falls
below expectations, a diversified firm may
be able to redeploy its resources back into
related businesses. In effect, relatedness
reduces the sunk costs associated with a
new business, which facilitates exit.
Ownership arrangements and
organizational structure affect the
likelihood of divestment, but exert no
significant effect upon closure. Greenfield
entrants being more likely to shutdown,
but less likely to be divested. Firms with
large endowments of human capital are
less likely to exit, irrespective of the exit
mode considered.
Firms tend to enter new markets that have
human resource profiles that are similar to
the firms’ existing businesses, and exit
markets that have dissimilar human
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Author(s) & Year

Theme

Method

Divestiture and
restructuring

Literature/Theory
Base
Divestiture, agency
theory

Moschieri (2011)

Diffusion of foreign
divestments

Divestment, diffusion,
social movements

Using data on firms
operating in Burma
during 1996–2002,

SMJ
Soule, Swaminathan, &
Tihanyi (2014)
SMJ

Exploratory study
based on multiple
cases

resource profiles.
Key Findings
Factors of the implementation and
structuring of a divestiture (e.g., sense of
opportunity) may increase the performance
of a divested unit.
Beyond firm-level concerns, firms divest
in response to the political characteristics
of their home country, and the divestment
patterns of others
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusion

The tradition in management literature centers on examining and understanding exit as an event
(e.g., Berry, 2010; Chung, Lee, Beamish, Southam, & Nam, 2013; Gaba & Terlaak, 2013;
Wennberg et al., 2010), and most scholars equate the decision to exit with a single, binary
(on/off) variable, compressing the nuances and richness of the exit phenomenon. Yet by treating
exit as a binary choice/event, these studies not only compress a certain window of time during
which exit unfolds, but also overlook the variance in the many activities that often precede the
completion of the exit act.
Research on exit as a process is still rare (cf. Burgelman, 1996), and despite multiple calls across
disciplines to examine the processuality of exit (e.g., Aldrich, 2015; Moschieri, 2011; Wennberg
& DeTienne, 2014), we still know little about how different mechanisms and activities unfold
before exit is finalized. The current state of knowledge is further complicated by the many levels
of analysis, from individuals to teams to organizations, and from project to division/subsidiary to
corporation. While there has been growth in some processual insights at some of these different
levels, findings remain piece-meal and are difficult to compare let alone aggregate among such
distinct entities. Coarser views of exit as a binary event have avoided this granularity, and
masked the inherent difficulties of translating processual insights from one entity or discipline to
another.
This dissertation contributes a three-fold discovery of exit as a process that unfolds over time and
across entities. Essay #1 offers inductive insights about the interplay between an individual
founder and one’s venture as the firm navigates multiple, cumulative emergencies. Essay #2 uses
a case-comparative approach to bring to the forefront the interplay between the multiple
institutional contexts a firm engages in internationalization to mitigate political and economic
turmoil at home. Essay #3 systematically reviews and reorganizes the literature on exit across
three different disciplines to shed new light into what we know/do not know about what
precedes, but may not necessarily predetermine, exit.
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Perhaps the most interesting insight emerging from the three studies as a whole is the partiality
of exit. Instead of entities moving from being to non-being, we observe many granular decisions
and actions by which entities stop some activities, so they can begin others. The surprising
insight from Essay #1 that exit is often an occasion for entry is replicated in Essay #2 at very
different levels of analysis (home vs. host country institutional contexts), and resonates with the
multitude of proactive decisions and actions that firms have been shown to take to postpone or
prevent involuntary exit. While findings remain challenging to transfer across different entities,
the key realization is that hardly any entity disappears at once. Rather, the entities studied in this
thesis get dismantled in parts and pieces in ways that help preserve some of the key original
properties as well and as long as possible (Damaraju et al., 2014; Meyer & Thein, 2014).
The second overarching insight pertains to the temporality of exit. While processes unfold over
time, there are many different kinds of processes, from categories (Essay #3), to sequences of
stages (Essay #2), to intricate pathways (Essay #1). The mere fact that any process unfolds over
time masks the vastly different meanings that time may have, depending on which entity exits
and/or why exit may be delayed by some or rushed by others under seemingly identical
circumstances. This dissertation focuses on exit under distress, explaining how otherwise wellpositioned and performing entities (e.g., ventures, emerging market multinational companies
(EMNCs) cope with unexpected emergencies at home (Essay #1), and even turn them into
opportunities elsewhere (Essay #2). The two inductive studies underscore the range of efforts
unfolding over many challenging months (and sometimes years), drawing attention to what
happens before a given entity concedes and completes its exit act.

5.1 Theoretical Contribution
The dissertation advances a blended, multi-disciplinary understanding of exit as one of the ways
firms respond to political turbulence (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Dai et al., 2013; Dai et al., 2017).
While the entities we studied were clearly distressed, their exits reveal a great deal of deliberate
effort, and each essay of the dissertation underscores the adaptive nature of exit as it unfolds over
time.
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Prior literature has underscored that exit is not necessarily bad, and can have multiple functions
for both dying and surviving firms. This dissertation complements previous definitions and
treatments of exit by focusing on the termination of otherwise successful entities “against their
will,” as so many of our respondents emphasized. While firms can plan for good exits, we
examine a subset of circumstances where entities are forced out of their home at the peak of their
performance. Taken together, the three studies speak to a specific type of exit precipitated by
political and economic turbulence—despite strong performance (Berry, 2010; Gimeno et al.,
1997), well-matched markets (Mezias & Kuperman, 2001), sound planning (Hiatt & Sine, 2014),
suitable strategic choices (Brauer, 2006; Decker & Mellewigt, 2007), and careful individual
entrepreneurial choices (DeTienne, 2010).
Essay #1 examines how entrepreneurs respond to political and economic turbulence that
threatens the continuation of their ventures. We reveal two kinds of adaptation (temporal and
partial) by which individuals and their respective ventures interactively navigated the exit
process once exogenous emergencies precipitated the premature termination of an otherwise
strong individual-venture relationship. Partial adaptation drew attention to those elements of the
venture that remained pertinent despite the adversity. Temporal adaptation referred to
entrepreneurial actions that either lengthened or shortened the exit process. We show that the
combination of partial and temporal adaptation de-/re-personalizes the exit process, deliberately
fissuring and repairing an increasingly fragile individual-venture relationship.
Essay #2 asks how political and economic adverse conditions at home influence the
internationalization of firms. We discover that, as adversity at home accentuates, firms multiply
their options regarding whether and when to internationalize and, especially, their reasons for
doing so. Restrictions on their resources, values, and opportunities brought about by distress at
home trigger concerted, specialized, and sequenced efforts to identify institutional contexts with
suitable complements. Similar to the first study, we find that firms do not quit, but rather
progressively and deliberately transition from a deteriorating home to “greener pastures”
elsewhere.
Essay #3 unpacks the partiality and temporality of exit by reclassifying existing literature in a
2x2 framework. We followed a systematic review process to first induce the way parts versus the
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whole of an entity and, respectively, the flow of time have been previously modelled and then
coded 90 studies to identify clusters of findings and communities of inquiry across three
disciplines (strategy, entrepreneurship, and international business).
Because the three essays were developed independently of one another and through different
combinations of theories and methods, the definitions of exit, entities, as well as the relevant
subdimensions of temporality and partiality brought out are conceptually and empirically
distinct. Nonetheless, the three essays support one another by reiterating the importance of
fleshing out the temporal and partial nature of exit as a process. Figure 5.1 summarizes the
contributions.

Figure 5.1 Contributions of the Three Essays
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5.2 Context versus Contextualization
The first two essays speak to exit respectively within and from contexts of adversity. The choice
to focus on these contexts was motivated in part by the gap in the literature, which persists
despite the incidence of political and economic turbulence and, in part, by my firsthand
experience and interest in this subject as a native of Lebanon. For Essays #1 and #2, distress is an
important boundary condition, which of course delimits the generalizability of our inductive
insights to other settings. This compromise is a fair price to pay for revealing “indigenous”
practices, especially in understudied settings (Williams & Shepherd, 2016). The value-add of the
first two essays is the granular view of the unfolding struggles of entities operating in adverse
contexts, and especially the counterintuitive insights on their dual management of parts and time
to make even unavoidable exit more palatable.
As a context, Lebanon is rather unusual, not only because the adversity there unfolded over
decades, but also because entrepreneurs strived despite frequent crises (Essay #1). Furthermore,
as the adversity intensified after 2006, Lebanon became a launch pad for EMNCs (Essay #2) as
entrepreneurs driven away by declining resources, values, and opportunities at home began
internationalizing extensively and some relocating elsewhere.
Our deliberate choice of such an extreme context (Barin Cruz, Aguilar Delgado, Leca, & Gond,
2016) is timely and called for as “this decade is characterized by political instability, economic
volatility, and societal upheaval” (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016, p. 1880).
Lebanon gave us a long series and a large range of adverse events by which to compare entity
exits. In many other adverse contexts, entrepreneurs and organizations would not have faced as
many, as varied, or as recurrent disruptions. Unfortunately, however, the incidence of such
extreme contexts is increasing. Vivid stories and discourses in the public media showcase the
ongoing struggle of firms of all sizes in Syria, with some refusing to leave (“The view from
Aleppo,” 2016), and others rushing to take refuge abroad, where they begin anew (Leigh &
Ma’ayeh, 2016).
The limitations of the chosen context notwithstanding, this dissertation underscores that
contextualization of mainstream theories can add important findings. While danger makes
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extreme contexts rare research settings (Bullough & Renko, 2017), the growing prevalence of
adverse events and their disruptive effects make such studies extremely worthwhile. By
contextualizing theories of exit within (Essay #1) and across (Essay #2) contexts, the thesis
broadens the applicability of current theories, surfacing new boundary conditions for what we
may have prematurely taken for granted (Hiatt & Sine, 2014).
Contextualizing theories of exit offers new lenses, and new ways of seeing refugees and their
relationship to risk. We found some Lebanese firms relocating in comparatively riskier places,
such as Nigeria at the peak of an Ebola outbreak, while Syrian firms uncovered opportunities in
contexts like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt (“Syrian Businesses in Jordan,” 2013), places already
experiencing multiples challenges and instability that affected their own local businesses. On the
surface, some of these emerging patterns seem to fly in the face of the risk-opportunity frames
underpinning strategic choices regarding exit and entry, with firms escaping adversity in search
of safe havens. Instead, our findings reveal contextualized understandings of strategic moves and
a finer-grained, comparative (rather than absolute) understanding of risks and opportunities
(especially in Essay #2).
There have been recent calls to tackle the grand challenges of our times by getting closer to the
key issues and protagonists (George et al., 2016) in a concerted effort to advance indigenous
theories of management (Tsui, 2007). While precise findings may not be transferred outside the
context in which they were induced (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), process theorizing generalizes back
to theories and surfaces critical boundaries. Accordingly, we believe that the key lessons learned
about how Lebanese firms have navigated exit within and beyond their home over 12 years of
recurrent adversity holds important theoretical insights for understanding the seemingly
counterintuitive behaviour of a broader range of economic actors who may see their political
and/or economic contexts deteriorate unexpectedly or suddenly (e.g., contexts of the Syrian Civil
War and Brexit).

5.3 Implication for Policy and Practice
This thesis contributes a contextualized theory of exit as a process, which suggests exit
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dramatically redirects efforts at home and abroad in ways not captured by prior theories. In
addition to the relevance of turning the spotlight on previously neglected actors (those running
businesses on the frontlines of political and economic turmoil), the studies offer several
counterintuitive insights about the complex role of exit in restabilizing economies undergoing
major, cumulative distress.
The key insight this dissertation offers is about the many parallel fronts and kinds of entities
affected by adversity. We show that founders, ventures, headquarters, and subsidiaries are all
grappling with different pressures in different ways and at different times—and that it takes
concerted effort to survive these pressures. Our protagonists complained about unsupportive
policy that added to their many burdens. They accepted the exogenous emergencies, but they
could not – would not – accept the added risks or depleted opportunities that were the result of
misguided political choices. Indeed, those firms that ultimately and completely exited (Essay #1)
and relocated elsewhere (Essay #2) did so not merely because of the adversity at home, but
rather because of the lack of transitional policies that could (at least temporarily) relieve their
burden. Our protagonists were quite ingenious at finding new ways to cut costs or generate
profits, sometimes converting their resources and assets into new uses, but such adaptive
processes were often rendered impossible by old laws.
For example, hotels owners were lobbying the Lebanese government to pass a law that would
make it possible to sell a room or venue within a hotel under a “condo hotel” model so that they
could reinvest the money into the main business (Murray, 2014). These owners suggested several
small policy changes that could assist firms in disintegrating resources and assets of ventures that
were no longer viable so they could repurpose them for other endeavours, which could then
continue to offer (among other things) much-needed local employment. Other business owners
also urged the government to recognize force majeure events so that rents could be waived in
those locations where demand temporarily dried up due to major terrorist events. Note that many
establishments in Syria sport signs hanging on their firms’ doors that read: “Closed for
renovation.” Any policies that can allow such hopeful individuals to bear the economic burden of
the conflict a little while longer may dramatically increase their chance to return, even recommit,
to their homeland.
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The second key insight this thesis offers pertains to the extraordinary degree of risk (both
personal and professional) that most of the protagonists we studied willingly bear in the hope
that their home context will be stable again soon. While in some cases these risks are
overbearing, the longer and more stoically entities confront such risks, the greater their success,
against all odds, both at home and abroad. Risk-seeking or risk-avoidance theories do not even
come close to describing the refined coping practices we documented in our studies (especially
in Essay #1). Observing the recovery of businesses in distressed home contexts may enrich
theories of coping, and hoping, beyond the management disciplines.
There were also a few simple lessons drawn from our findings. For example, partial exit served
everyone better than either extreme. Contrary to accepted findings in strategic management that
partial exit is less valuable than non-exit or complete exit (Damaraju et al., 2014; Vidal &
Mitchell, 2015), we found that in contexts of adversity, partial exit is quite adaptive, adding just
enough degrees of freedom between “business as usual” and total collapse. We also found that
weathering adversity, even when the outcome is dire, strengthens one’s self-confidence (Essay
#1) and emboldens expansions to challenging contexts (Essay #2).
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Appendix A

Reflexivity Statement

Given the qualitative nature of this dissertation, I have decided to include a statement of
reflexivity, since my prior experiences and beliefs have undoubtedly shaped this research
(Willig, 2001). This statement is intended to allow readers to “explore the ways in which a
researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such
research” (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999, p. 228).
I was born and raised in Beirut, Lebanon, and personally experienced multiple periods of
political and economic turbulence that the country witnessed. I also worked in a family-owned
textile business there between 2004 and 2008 before I moved to Canada. Having seen, firsthand,
business ventures struggle and survive in inauspicious settings, I was intrigued by the reasons
that firms stay in such an environment while others leave, and how firms can manage not to exit
when the threat is impending. This interest formed the basis of my dissertation’s focus on “exit.”
I was also motivated by the lack of understanding of this kind of adverse context in the
management field, and eager to learn about unique behaviours that could inform the broader
management community on how businesses in a politically and economically turbulent
environment adapt, struggle, or leave for greener pastures.
I have no prior involvement or affiliation with the hospitality industry nor the food and beverage
industry. I chose to study these sectors because they were the most affected by this turbulence.
Moreover, the political and economic situation in Lebanon worsened since 2011, after I had
already moved to Canada. I undertook my first research trip to the country in 2013.
When I reviewed the extant literature before and during the two empirical studies, I had a
different framework for the systematic review. However, I went back to the exit literature after
the two studies, and coded for different dimensions and themes. I then decided to focus on the
partiality and temporality dimensions, which were also induced from the literature, because they
resonated most with me and were consistent with my empirical studies. I had certainly been more
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sensitized to these dimensions because of my first two essays. Nevertheless, I was able to unpack
the exit process over these two dimensions and across different fields of study, and share more
meaningful insights with a broader audience. I would like readers to be aware of my perspective
and approach when assessing my research and findings.
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